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Given the increasing proliferation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in both 
developed and developing countries, and the huge challenges that are often 
associated with establishing and managing them, and ensuring that they achieve their 
objectives, it is important to understand multiple aspects of their operation. Whilst 
the structural and economic aspects of PPPs have long been recognised and 
researched, the relational aspects of PPPs remain under-researched. This thesis is a 
contribution to addressing this gap in the literature. It uses a dimensional approach to 
understand the nature of inter-organisations relationships (IORs) in PPPs and 
considers the factors that shape these relationships. It also investigates whether a 
particular pattern of relationships is needed for PPPs to deliver more than could have 
been achieved by each partner working alone (synergistic benefits). 
These issues are studied empirically in three educational PPP programmes in 
Pakistan.  In two of these, not-for-profit organisations ‘adopt’ state schools.  In the 
third, the state funds private sector schools on the condition that they offer free 
education to students and achieve threshold quality standards. A case study 
methodology is used and an integrative conceptual framework, derived from a wide-
ranging literature review, is used to guide both data collection and analysis. 
The research finds that partners’ motives for entering into a PPP play a dominant role 
in shaping inter-organisational relationships. These motives are, in turn, influenced 
by a range of contextual and organisational factors. Inter-organisational relationships 
can be broadly characterised as collaborative, contractual, cooperative or conflictual. 
Whereas much of the existing literature emphasises that collaborative relationships 
are a prerequisite for PPPs to deliver synergistic outcomes, this research finds that 
these outcomes are also present in PPPs characterised by cooperative relationships. 
However, inter-organisational relationships in PPPs are not static; they develop and 
change over time. These changes result from a dynamic interplay between contextual 
factors, organisational factors, partner motives and the perceived outcomes of the 
partnership. 
The research reported in the thesis makes a number of contributions to knowledge. It 
sheds new light on the relational aspects of PPPs and offers a new conceptual 
framework for explaining and investigating inter-organisational relationships, which 
integrates insights from the largely separate literatures on PPPs and inter-
organisational relations. It counters an apparent pro-collaboration emphasis in the 
existing PPP literature by documenting and explaining the benefits associated with 
cooperative relationships. It also offers new empirical evidence on the operation of 
PPPs in a developing country context, which contributes to redressing the 
predominance of evidence from developed countries in the existing literature. The 
insights from the research have theoretical and practical implications for the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and overview of the thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are usually seen as a vehicle for bringing together 
the resources, including skills and knowledge, of both the public and private sector 
(Bovaird 2004). In this way PPPs can contribute to tackling ‘wicked problems’ 
which could not be addressed completely by public sector working alone (Stoker 
1998). The rationale for getting involved in PPPs is that they have the potential to 
create ‘synergy’ or what Huxham (2003) refers to as ‘collaborative advantage’. This 
refers to the added value of PPPs that could not be achieved with each partner 
working alone. These synergies are often considered as the ultimate aim of 
partnership work (Skelcher and Sullivan 2008; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002).  
Despite this positive rhetoric, huge efforts are required to achieve these advantages. 
PPPs involve ‘dynamic relationships’ that develop over time due to the participation 
of diverse actors who bring a variety of agendas (Skelcher 2005; Huxham 2003). 
This thesis aims to explore these dynamic relationships within PPPs to understand 
the defining features of the PPPs, the nature of relationships between different 
partners, the factors influencing the relationships and the implications of these 
relationships for the outcomes of PPPs. 
Despite the global spread of PPPs, the term PPP has remained somewhat vague and 
slippery involving ‘multiple grammars’ (Linder 1999; Hodge et al. 2010). A lot of 
scholarly attention has been paid to this phenomenon from many different 
perspectives. Sometimes efforts to sort out this messiness take the form of matrices 
and typologies (e.g. Greve and Hodge 2005; Klijn 2010; Schaeffer and Loveridge 
2002). At some other times the literature explains PPPs as consisting of several 
distinct ‘families’ (Hodge et al. 2010) or identifies different ‘approaches’ to 
understanding PPPs (Weihe 2008). Furthermore, the different forms of PPPs have 
also been discussed against multiple dimensions such as control, funding and 
ownership (Zarco-Jasso 2005). The common theme across all these efforts at 
defining and classifying PPPs is a pursuit to understand how different structural 
forms, functions and outcomes are related and what form of PPP is best suited for 
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what function. However, even after more than a decade of scholarly effort to 
understand these issues, many questions remain unanswered. This is partly because 
of the hybrid and dynamic nature of PPPs in practice. 
In addition to examining the structural aspects of PPPs, another area that has 
attracted considerable scholarly attention is the economic aspects of PPPs. The focus 
of this strand of the literature primarily remains on the formal processes and 
performance indicators of PPPs such as value for money, risk transfer and balance 
sheet figures (Broadbent and Laughlin 1999; 2003); designing contracts and 
allocating responsibilities, risks and rewards (Hodge 2004); the various forms of 
contracts (Evans and Bowman 2005; Martin 2005); the relationship between 
democratic practices (e.g. public interest, accountability and transparency issues) and 
the design of partnerships (Skelcher et al. 2005); the outcomes of PPPs (Hodge and 
Greve 2007; Gazley and Brudney 2007); and the evaluation challenges associated 
with PPPs (Ghobadian et al. 2004; Hodge et al. 2010). 
While the structural and economic aspects of PPPs are important, they are mainly 
oriented towards the front and back end of PPPs (their set-up and performance). 
What happens during the course of a PPP is often given insufficient attention. We 
know relatively little about the unfolding of the relational process in PPPs and what 
shapes inter-organisational relationships (IORs). Even those who think beyond the 
structural and economic aspects of PPPs (e.g. Edelenbos and Klijn 2009; Steijn et al. 
2011; Kort and Klijn 2011) have tended to go straight to managerial issues, paying 
little attention to understanding IORs. 
However, the authors elaborating and explaining different structural forms of PPPs 
are not unaware of the importance of understanding and managing IORs. For 
instance, Skelcher after explaining different structural forms of PPPs talks about trust 
‘as a medium that cements the exchange between government and private actors’ 
(Skelcher 2005: 363). He mentions trust as a medium to resolve conflicts between 
partners and deal with the problems of opportunism. Similarly, in their empirical 
study of PPPs in social services in the City of Stockholm, Almqvist and Hogberg 
(2005) have argued that it is important to study the relationships among partners and 
have emphasised the value of a trust-based approach in order to gain full advantage 
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of PPPs. There are many other examples of authors recognising the need to move 
beyond categorising PPPs according to their structural form and instead pay more 
attention to their IORs. 
In a similar vein, this thesis argues that the debate about PPPs can be enriched by 
paying more attention to understanding the nature of IORs within PPPs and 
exploring the factors that shape them. It reports empirical case studies of three PPP 
programmes in the education sector in Pakistan. The focus of analysis is to 
understand the nature of IORs during different stages of these partnerships and to 
identify and explain the factors shaping IORs in the three PPP programmes. 
The analysis argues that unless we understand the relational as well as structural and 
economic aspects of PPPs it will be difficult to manage them effectively. In the 
collaboration literature these relational aspects of partnership are often referred to as 
a ‘black box’ because of being least understood (Wood and Gray 1991; Thomson and 
Perry 2006). However, the good news is that inter-organisation relationships have 
been investigated by scholars working in another related field (the alliance 
literature).  Some PPP scholars have already identified learning potential in this 
respect. Weihe (2010), for example, has provided a detailed account of the 
conceptual similarities and differences between the PPP and alliance literatures. She 
asserts that the alliance literature, broadly referred to as the inter-organisational 
relations (IOR) literature, has the potential to fill knowledge gaps in the PPP 
literature and can ‘enrich our understanding of the dynamic  and evolutionary nature 
of cooperation’ (Weihe 2010: 520). The conceptual framework for the empirical 
research reported in this thesis draws on insights from the IOR literature and uses 
these in combination with those from the PPP literature. In this way, an attempt is 
made to transfer important insights across historically divergent lines of inquiry. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, the empirical context of this study is 
discussed. This is followed by a section that describes my motivation to undertake 
this research. The research questions are then outlined and some of the key concepts 




1.2 Contextualising the research 
There is widespread agreement that education lies at the core of the whole paradigm 
of development and that it is a pivotal driver for empowering people and enabling 
societies to progress. Education systems around the world have experienced shifts 
from seeing the provision of basic education as a pure government responsibility 
towards greater participation of the private sector in delivering education for all. 
According to a United Nations report about progress towards the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), about 115 million children are still not in school; the 
most of these children live in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (United Nations 
2005). The situation has improved since 2005 and a recent report by the World Bank 
(Dundar et al. 2014) notes that South Asian governments have been investing heavily 
to achieve the education MDGs and accordingly net enrolment in South Asia’s 
primary schools rose from 75 percent in 2000 to 89 percent in 2010. Whilst this in 
encouraging, the report documents that nearly 13 million children in South Asia 
between the ages of 8-14 are still not in school. Additionally, the report raises serious 
concerns about the quality of education in the region. 
These reports raise many concerns about the level of education provided in countries 
such as Pakistan. Traditionally, the provision of public services has been viewed as 
state’s responsibility in Pakistan. However, the state itself has failed to provide 
adequate and comprehensive services under its role as a direct provider (Government 
of Pakistan 2004a). In Pakistan it is a commonly held belief amongst people that the 
private sector is better than the public sector in delivering quality education. This 
belief is supported by the surveys conducted between 2003-2007 under the Learning 
and Educational Achievement in Punjab Schools (LEAPS) project. According to 
these surveys: 
Learning outcomes are poor. They have little to do with where you live, 
and everything to do with whether you go to a public or private school. 
The differences between public and private schools are so large that it 
will take government school students between 1.5 to 2.5 years of 
additional schooling to catch up to where private school students were in 
Class 3. It also costs less to educate a child in a private school. Putting 
learning and cost differences together, the quality-adjusted-cost in 
government schools is three times higher than in private schools 
(Andrabi et al. 2008: viii). 
5 
 
Moreover there are many state schools which exist only on papers and are used for 
purposes other than education. These non-functional schools are referred to as ‘ghost 
schools’. Although no pupils are enrolled in such schools, teachers are still appointed 
and they continue to get their salaries (World Bank 2002). 
Realising that the public sector is unable to meet the educational challenges on its 
own; the government has taken a series of initiatives to involve the private sector in 
the delivery of school education. Private sector provision of education services 
already represents 31% of the total school enrolment in the country (PSLM 2011). 
Government initiatives include restructuring education foundations into more 
autonomous institutions and improving service delivery in state schools through PPP 
agreements with the private sector, including NGOs. As a result the provision of 
education services has undergone many changes during the last two decades. 
According to Jamil: 
Pakistan illustrates a powerful case study of a paradigm shift in education 
from a state owned and state managed schooling system which reached a 
high point in 1972 with nation-wide nationalization of education, to one 
which is increasingly becoming ‘blended’ across government and non-
state partners. The paradigm shift is not just about who owns, who 
finances and who manages schools, but, also about expanding 
partnerships (Jamil 2010: 8). 
In addition, the role of donors in influencing national policies is quite evident in 
countries such as Pakistan. In Pakistan, there is an increasing contribution of donors 
in financing education with estimates around 11% of the total education budget 
(Lister et al. 2010). Donor funding has had a great influence in encouraging and 
sometimes obliging the Pakistan’s government to involve the private sector in 
partnerships. Donors’ emphasis on PPPs has resulted in a policy shift towards the 
involvement of the private sector in education service delivery (Government of 
Pakistan 2003; 2004b). Pakistan is also one of the signatories to Education for All 
(EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) commitments which 
emphasise universal access to quality education. These international commitments 
reaffirm the notion of education as a fundamental human right and have urged 
participating countries to intensify their efforts to address the basic learning needs of 
all (World Conference on Education for All Inter-agency Commission 1990). 
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Strengthening partnerships is seen as one of the main strategies to meet educational 
needs, and it has played a pivotal role in pushing the government to mobilise both the 
private sector and communities in order to meet education targets (Bano 2007). The 
term ‘public-private partnership’ has become a critical component of the education 
reform agenda and is prominent in many government documents, including the 
National Education Policy document. The following quote from the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) illustrates this point clearly: 
Recognising immense contribution of the private sector and NGOs in the 
social sectors, the ESR (Education Sector Reform) is anchored in 
development of partnerships between the private sector, civil society 
organisations and the public sector. Public-Private Partnerships are 
critical to reaching the goals of access and quality at all levels of 
education creating possibilities for both voice and choice and improved 
service delivery (Government of Pakistan 2003: 70). 
1.3 Motivation for research 
For over a decade in Pakistan, PPPs have been promoted as a key strategy for 
increasing efficiency, generating resources and improving the quality of education 
service delivery, particularly to the poor (Farah and Rizvi 2007). These PPP 
initiatives seem to promise a way to deal with educational challenges and meet 
international commitments (UNESCO 2011). However, it is quite frustrating to see 
that, on one hand, some PPP initiatives in Pakistan are discussed as examples of best 
international practices
1
 while, on the other hand, Pakistan remains on the list of 
countries still far from meeting the targets of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) (UNESCO 2008; 2010). This somewhat 
confused and intrigued me and I began reading and researching more into these 
issues. Accordingly, the broad aim of this research is to extend the research on PPPs 
in the education sector of Pakistan and to examine whether the promise of PPPs 
implied in theory and supported by research mostly conducted in the context of 
developed countries is relevant to understanding educational PPPs in Pakistan. 
                                                 
1
 For example, Quality Advancement and Institutional Development (QuAID) programme managed 
by Aga Khan Education Services Pakistan in partnership with the government of Pakistan (mentioned 
as an example of successful Capacity Building Initiatives in LaRocque 2008 and Patrinos et al. 2009) 
and Punjab Education Foundation’s PPP programmes discussed as successful partnerships in Asian 
Development Bank’s report (Malik 2010) 
7 
 
At the start of my PhD, I was sure that I wanted to study educational PPPs in 
Pakistan but the focus of the research evolved iteratively while reviewing the 
existing literature and making sense of my empirical data. When I started looking 
into the PPP literature, I initially felt more confusion than enlightenment. The 
multiplicity and complexity of different perspectives made it difficult to interpret the 
literature and use it in a coherent framework. More intriguingly, the review of the 
PPP literature seemed to suggest that educational PPPs in Pakistan would not count 
as partnerships in the precise sense of that term. The existing literature, much of 
which is based on empirical evidence from the west, seemed to underplay the 
partnership aspect of educational PPPs in Pakistan. The analysis left me concerned 
that the existing literature does not tell the whole story of the inter-organisational 
relationships within PPPs; does not take sufficient account of how PPPs may play out 
in the context of a country such as Pakistan and with respect to a goal which is about 
education not entirely about infrastructure development. All of this led me to 
investigate IORs in educational PPPs in Pakistan with the aim of contributing to both 
the theory and practice of PPPs. 
The choice of research context and PPP programmes is important for four reasons. 
First, the developing country context provides an opportunity to consider whether the 
insights offered by the PPP literature, which have been largely developed through 
studies of PPPs in the west, make sense elsewhere. Second, the study focuses on 
understanding the relational aspects of PPPs which are currently underplayed in the 
PPP literature. Third, the study provides an empirical analysis of the PPPs for service 
delivery whereas the existing PPP literature is skewed towards studying 
infrastructure partnerships (e.g. Van Ham and Koppenjan 2001; Noumba-Um 2010; 
Chen et al. 2013). Finally, the choice of PPP case studies provides an opportunity to 
study how partnership relationships might vary depending on whether the ‘private’ 
partner is a for-profit or not-for-profit organisation. This is relevant due to the 
relative paucity of PPP studies that investigate relationships between government and 
both for-profit and not-for-profit partners. 
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1.4 Research questions 
The above mentioned gaps in the existing literature and my motivations resulted in 
following overarching research question for this research: 
How can we understand inter-organisational relationships in public-private 
partnerships? 
This overarching question is elaborated into the following research questions: 
1. What is a ‘Public-Private Partnership (PPP)’? 
2. How can inter-organisational relationships (IORs) in PPPs be examined and 
characterised? How do different factors influence IORs in PPPs? 
3. What are the implications of different IORs for the achievement of synergistic 
outcomes? 
Despite the widespread use, substantial volume of work and a great deal of research 
on PPPs; the term PPPs is used in ‘a multiplicity of confusing and inconsistent ways’ 
(Wettenhall 2010: 22). Hence, this research aims to make sense of this messiness as 
its point of departure and provides a review of the PPP literature including problems 
in defining PPPs and different perspectives on PPPs in the next chapter. Given the 
dearth of research into the relational aspects of PPPs, the research also aims to 
review fragmented but related fields of study to develop a conceptual framework to 
understand IORs in PPPs. In doing so, this research has been able to connect the 
concepts from the PPP, IOR and mainstream organisation theory and behaviour 
literatures. In addressing the second research question, the research has also sought 
to understand how different factors influence IORs in the educational PPPs in 
Pakistan. Since synergistic outcomes lie at the heart of the aims of PPPs, the research 
also examines the ways in which these outcomes vary across different IORs.  
1.5 Definitions of key concepts and terms 
Keeping in view that there is no agreement over the usage of many terms that lie at 
the heart of this research, there is a need to provide some working definitions of key 
concepts and terms within the context of this thesis. The following working 
definitions have been developed from the existing literature. By defining these 
concepts and terms in this way, it is not intended to be dismissive of the variety of 
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ways in which some other researchers have defined them. Instead, these are the 
definitions that make most sense in the context of this research.  
Table 1.1: Key concepts and terms 
Terms Working definitions 
Public-private 
partnership (PPP) 
Refers to an inter-organisational arrangement that 
combines the resources, including skills and 
knowledge, of a public sector organisation with any 
organisation outside of the public sector (including for-
profits and not-for profits) in order to deliver societal 
goals (Bovaird 2004; Skelcher 2005). 
Private sector Whilst the term ‘private sector’ is often associated with 
for-profit organisations and businesses driven by 
monetary profit, this thesis adopts an extended 
definition that includes both for-profits and not-for-
profits
2
.   
Structural aspects of 
PPPs 
Mainly focus on explaining and classifying the various 
forms of PPPs with respect to different dimensions; 
understanding how different structural forms, functions 
and outcomes are related; and what form of PPP is best 
suited for what function. 
Economic aspects of 
PPPs 
Primarily concerned with the financial issues such as 
value for money, risk transfer and balance sheet 
figures; performance indicators; designing contracts 
and allocating responsibilities; the various forms of 
contracts and evaluation challenges in PPPs. 
Relational aspects of 
PPPs 
Aspects such as the nature of inter-organisational 
relationships (IORs), the process through which these 
relationships develop over time, motives to enter PPPs, 
and factors shaping IORs are referred to as relational 
aspects of PPPs. 
Collaboration Refers to equality in decision making, shared power 
arrangements, reciprocal accountability, joint 
determination of programme activities, and trust in 




Represents the name of the field i.e. inter-
organisational relations concerned with the study of 
‘the properties and overall pattern of relations between 
and among organizations that are pursuing a mutual 
interest while also remaining independent and 
autonomous, thus retaining separate interests’ (Cropper 
et al. 2010: 9). 
                                                 
2
 Both of these views of the term ‘private sector’ are prevalent in the existing literature; PPP 
researchers have often used the extended definition due to the widespread involvement of not-for-





Refers to inter-organisational relationships between 
partner organisations. These are seen as ‘the sequence 
of events and interaction’ among interacting parties 
(Ring and Van de Ven 1994: 91). 
Inter-organisational 
arrangement 
Used as an umbrella term to represent the 
organisational forms or inter-organisational entities 
such as ‘partnerships’, ‘alliance’, ‘joint venture’ and 
‘networks’ (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Huxham 2003). 
Synergistic outcomes The added value created by a PPP that could not be 
achieved by each partner working alone; includes 
qualitative or quantitative outcomes that were not 
possible without forming a partnership. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of ten chapters. Chapter 2 begins by reviewing the ways in 
which PPPs are conceptualised in the existing PPP literature. It provides an overview 
of the PPP literature and argues that bridging to the broader IOR literature is useful 
for developing our understanding of IORs in PPPs. This chapter outlines some 
important insights from the IOR literature that are particularly helpful in the context 
of this thesis. The discussion in Chapter 2 is carried forward in Chapter 3 which 
utilises the PPP, IOR and mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literatures 
to build a conceptual framework that ties many of the key ideas into a framework for 
this thesis. This chapter discusses the literature relevant to the conceptual framework 
and identifies the main lines of argument that emerge from the literature reviewed in 
this chapter. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the methodology employed in this research. A comparative 
case study approach employing qualitative methods is the research strategy. This 
chapter explains the research process including the use of the conceptual framework, 
data collection methods, data analysis and ethical considerations. The chapter also 
pays particular attention to the issues concerning the use of case studies as a research 
design, strengths and weaknesses of the methods used to collect data and the steps 
undertaken to ensure the quality of research. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the individual case studies carried out for this research. 
Each case study is discussed in a separate chapter using a similar format. Each 
chapter starts by introducing the case followed by sections on the PPP set-up; 
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implementation and management; and outcomes. Based on the descriptions and 
findings in these chapters, Chapter 8 presents a cross-case analysis which is 
structured in line with the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3. The 
analysis carried out in this chapter provides the basis for the comparison between the 
theoretical concepts employed in the conceptual framework and the empirical 
findings, and this comparison is presented in Chapter 9. 
Finally, Chapter 10, which is reflective in tone, concludes the thesis. The research 
questions mentioned in Chapter 1 are recapitulated with a brief explanation of why 
these questions were considered important and what has been found in relation to 
each question. This chapter critically reflects upon the course of the research and 
suggests areas where future research could usefully focus. In addition to theoretical 
implications, this chapter also offers some comments on the implications of research 
findings for the policy and practice of PPPs.   






Chapter 2 Setting the foundations for understanding IORs   
in PPPs 
2.1 Introduction 
It was noted in the previous chapter that the structural and economic aspects of PPPs 
have been discussed in depth in the existing PPP literature (see, for example, the 
collections in Ghobadian et al. 2004 and Hodge et al. 2010) but the relational aspects 
of PPPs remain under-explored. This limits our understanding of the diverse and 
dynamic nature of PPPs. It is recognised that huge efforts are required to reap the 
advantages of PPPs and overcome many actual and potential challenges. In meeting 
these challenges, it is important to understand the structural, economic and relational 
aspects of PPPs. No one perspective on its own is capable of explaining all that we 
need to know about PPPs. There is a need to integrate research from all three 
perspectives to develop new insights for understanding and managing PPPs. 
Given that this thesis aims to understand the inter-organisational relationships (IORs) 
in PPPs, the main objective of this chapter is to make sense of the existing literature 
so as to set foundations for the conceptual framework which is discussed in the next 
chapter. This chapter is divided into four sections which are organised as follows: 
Firstly, due to a lot of debate and disagreement around the use of the term ‘public-
private partnership’ in the existing PPP literature, this chapter begins by reviewing 
some of the definitional issues and different perspectives on PPPs in section 2.2. The 
discussion in this section establishes that the slippery and inconsistent use of the term 
has led to different understandings about PPPs which need to be considered while 
developing the conceptual framework for this thesis. Keeping in view the context of 
the empirical study, this section also reviews literature on PPPs in developing 
countries and in the education sector. Section 2.3 discusses the rationale for 
integrating the insights from different fields of studies in order to develop a 
conceptual framework for this research, and explains the relevance of the broader 
IOR literature for studying the relational aspects of PPPs. This section also 
introduces the IOR literature. However, it does not provide a detailed review of IOR 
scholarship, but instead highlights the main contributions this literature can offer in 
understanding IORs in PPPs. This section also flags up some reasons for caution 
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when using the findings and theories in the IOR literature and offers some 
suggestions to deal with these difficulties. Section 2.4 discusses in more detail the 
important frameworks and concepts taken from the IOR literature that are helpful in 
the context of this research. This chapter concludes with four building blocks that are 
used in Chapter 3 to develop a conceptual framework to understand IORs in PPPs. 
2.2 The PPP landscape 
The literature on PPPs is large and rapidly-growing. It is multi-disciplinary as well as 
multi-national and covers a wide range of topics including why PPPs are established, 
their potential benefits and costs, allocation of risk among parties, what results can be 
achieved by PPPs, how they can be evaluated and the reasons for the success and 
failure of PPPs. Although there is no doubt among scholars that PPPs are an 
important part of the public management agenda, scholars have been divided with 
respect to what constitutes a PPP. The following review of the PPP literature both 
sets the scene for this research and discusses some common themes and issues in 
relation to the first research question outlined in the previous chapter. It is organised 
in three sub-sections. The first sub-section outlines the problems in defining PPPs. 
This leads to a discussion of different perspectives on PPPs. Given the context of the 
empirical study, the last two sub-sections review the literature on PPPs in developing 
countries and the education sector respectively. 
 Why is it difficult to move towards a common definition of PPPs? 2.2.1
In the case of PPPs each ‘P’ is controversial and has a long history of debate which 
makes it difficult to define PPPs in a manner which is generally agreed upon.  Taking 
the first two Ps, there is no clear distinction between public and private realms in the 
existing literature making them controversial and open to several interpretations. 
Public-private comparisons have been made in many different areas of research such 
as strategic management, decision-making practices, leadership etc. Within this type 
of literature there are some authors, on one hand, who argue that the public and 
private sectors are converging and they claim that management in the public and 
private sectors is more similar than different (e.g. Murray 1975). On the other hand, 
there are scholars who emphasise the importance of the public-private distinction 
(Rainey et al. 1976; Nutt 2006).  
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Rainey and Chun (2005) have attributed the difference between these two approaches 
to the different theoretical backgrounds of the authors. Broadly speaking, 
economists, political scientists and public administration scholars are more interested 
in public-private bifurcation whereas sociologists and organisation theorists usually 
refer to similarities. The public-private distinction becomes even more obscure when 
not-for-profit organisations (generally referred to as NGOs) are taken into account. 
These organisations have both public and private orientations. Schaeffer and 
Loveridge (2002) argue that NGOs have characteristic of both the public and for-
profit sectors. They explain: 
‘Although they [NGOs] lack the coercive powers of government, they 
also have fewer constraints than government organizations. NGOs are 
usually less secretive than private businesses and therefore less 
concerned about sharing information with the public’ (Schaeffer and 
Loveridge 2002: 183). 
There is no consensus or one right answer to the public-private argument despite 
decades of debate. Nevertheless, due to increasing interdependency between various 
organisations even the proponents of a public-private distinction now recognise that 
the boundary between the public and private sectors has been blurred (Rainey and 
Chun 2005). PPP scholars, despite their diverse theoretical perspectives, also 
generally refer to PPP as a hybrid organisational arrangement that has characteristics 
of both sectors (Klijn and Teisman 2003; Hodge and Greve 2007; Skelcher 2005; 
Wettenhall 2010). Moreover, PPP scholars usually refer to PPPs as a vehicle for 
bringing together the resources, including skills and knowledge, of both public and 
private sector (Bovaird 2004).  
There is a paradox between these two points of agreement. On one hand, PPP 
scholars refer to the boundary between public and private sector becoming blurred 
and situate PPPs on the borders of both the public and private realms. On the other 
hand, the synergetic outcomes or added value that are often considered as the 
ultimate aim of partnership work are grounded in a stereotype of the comparative 
advantage of each sector (Rosenau 1999; Skelcher and Sullivan 2008; Brinkerhoff 
and Brinkerhoff 2002), strengthening the idea of public-private bifurcation. It seems 
reasonable to accept Dahl and Lindblom’s (1953) argument, presented more than 
half a century ago, that while acknowledging the overlapping and blurred public-
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private boundaries, there is still the possibility of a clear distinction between agencies 
(referred to as public sector) and enterprises (the private sector). 
Coming to the third P, partnership, this is used to convey several different ideas 
without any commonly agreed account. Sometimes it is used as a synonym to 
represent any type of inter-organisational arrangement such as an alliance, a joint 
venture or a coalition (e.g. Huxham and Vangen 2005). Sometimes a clear distinction 
between such arrangements is emphasised whereby the term partnership is used to 
represent a weaker arrangement (e.g. Coston 1998). Yet in some other cases 
partnership is considered a stronger inter-organisational arrangement than others (e.g. 
Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002; Brinkerhoff 2002b). 
In short each ‘P’ in PPP is controversial and has a long history of debate which 
makes it difficult to coalesce towards a common definition of PPPs. Nevertheless, a 
lot of scholarly attention has been paid to understand PPPs from different 
perspectives (Hodge et al. 2010; Wettenhall 2010; Weihe 2008). It is possible to 
conceptualise these different perspectives on a continuum where at one extreme PPPs 
are argued to be an efficient solution to wicked problems (Lowndes and Skelcher 
1998). Whereas at the other extreme PPPs are looked upon with great suspicion and 
are associated with phrases like ‘Problem Problem Problem’ (Bowman, 2000). 
In conclusion, there is no agreed definition of PPPs and there is plethora of working 
definitions in the existing literature. The different working definitions adopted by 
PPP scholars are influenced by their varied perspectives on PPPs which has led to 
different understandings of the PPP phenomenon. These different perspectives need 
to be considered in order to understand IORs in PPPs and they are discussed in the 
next sub-section. 
 Different perspectives on PPPs 2.2.2
It is important to look at different perspectives on PPPs in the context of this research 
because the underlying nature of IORs varies with each perspective. It is not intended 
to provide a highly detailed analysis, but to highlight the greatest divide between two 
schools of thought:  one of them considers PPPs as a tool of governance and the 
other thinks of them as a ‘language game’ (Teisman and Klijn 2002; Greve and 
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Hodge 2005). Those who consider PPPs a tool of public governance see co-
production and collaboration as lying at the heart of PPPs (e.g. Peters 1998; 
Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002; Klijn and Teisman 2005). In contrast, those who see 
PPP as a language game involving ‘multiple grammars’ consider PPPs to be a 
buzzword for the traditional practices of contracting out and privatisation through 
competitive tendering (Linder 1999; Savas 2000). These differences of perspective 
are sometimes translated into an articulation of two conceptualisations of PPPs. This 
two-fold categorisation is found under many different labels such as economic (or 
PFI-style) partnerships and social (or organisational) partnerships (Hodge and Greve 
2005); a concession model versus an alliance model (Edelenbos and Teisman 2008); 
innovative contracting versus partnerships (Edelenbos and Klijn 2009); and cPPPs 
(contractual PPPs) and iPPPs (institutional PPPs) (Kort and Koppenjan 2013). The 
distinction between these two categories is illustrated in Table 2.1 by presenting 
Edelenbos and Klijn’s (2009) schema for differentiating them. 
Table 2.1: A comparison between PPPs seen as innovative contracting 
(cPPPs) and partnerships (iPPPs) 
 PPP Seen as Innovative 
Contracting 
 
PPP Seen as Partnership 
Type of relation 














Role of contract in 
the establishment 
and running of the 
PPP 
A clear distinction exists 
between the commissioner 
(public party) and the 
contractor (private party). 
 
 
Cooperation between the 
two parties is limited mainly 
to the time before the 
contract is awarded. The 
public actor subsequently 
controls/supervises the 
private actor with little or no 
mutual interaction. 
 
Strong emphasis on (the use 
of) contracts to inject clarity 
and certainty into the 
collaboration. 
The government and the private 
party are jointly involved in the 
design, construction and 




throughout the process. Initially, 
it focuses on the nature of goals 
and on the search for 
connections. Later, it is geared 




Less emphasis on (inspecting 
compliance with) contract. More 
emphasis on mutual trust. 
Source: Edelenbos and Klijn (2009: 312) 
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In order to avoid confusion when referring to these two schools of thought, in this 
literature review they are referred to as contractual PPPs and collaborative PPPs. The 
advocates of collaborative PPPs criticise the contractual perspective as being too 
‘general regarding the form but specific and narrow regarding the purpose of the 
partnership’ (Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002: 170). They are against the widespread 
use of the term public-private partnership for a variety of public-private cooperative 
efforts, and argue for a more precise vocabulary to distinguish PPPs from other 
organisational forms. Dutch public management scholars, Klijn and Teisman (2005: 
96) define PPPs from a collaborative perspective as ‘more or less sustainable co-
operation between public and private actors in which joint products and/or services 
are developed and in which risks, costs and profits are shared’. On one hand, this 
definition of PPPs enhances their scope as it adds the feature of ‘sustainable co-
operation’ alongside the more traditional benefits of risks and profit sharing 
envisaged for ‘contracting out’ and ‘privatisation’. On the other hand, this definition 
rules out organisational forms such as contracting-out or outsourcing being referred 
to as PPPs. In a somewhat similar vein, Wettenhall (2010) refers to contractual PPPs 
as ‘so-called PPPs’. He draws on Powell and Glendinning (2002) to define ‘real 
partnerships’ as those that involve interdependencies, trust, equality or reciprocity. 
There are some scholars that use the term PPPs in a more generic way to refer to any 
type of working arrangement between government and the private sector (Skelcher 
2005; Pollitt 2003; Bovaird 2004). Under this perspective PPP is used as a ‘catch-all’ 
term to cover a wide range of organisational forms and a wide variety of 
arrangements. For instance, Bloomfield (2006) highlights a range of PPPs:  
The appealing ‘public-private partnership’ label encompasses a broad 
spectrum of creative, intersectoral initiatives. Some rely on private 
philanthropy to achieve a public objective; others use public funding to 
support the missions of private, nonprofit organizations; and still others 
are business transactions, many of which take the form of novel 
contracting arrangements (Bloomfield 2006: 400). 
Whilst the advocates of collaborative PPPs dismiss contracting-out as a type of PPP, 
those writing from a more general perspective consider contracting-out as a form of 
PPP and sometimes use the terms interchangeably (e.g. Kettl 1993). This wider view 
of PPPs is prominent in the literature on PPPs for infrastructural development. The 
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PPP literature on infrastructure notes a variety of PPP arrangements such as BOOT 
(build-own-operate-transfer), BOT (build-own-transfer) and many other variants of 
the generic nomenclature DBFO (design-build-finance-operate). Pollitt (2003) refers 
to these as forms of PPPs and has organised them on the basis of the degree of 
private sector involvement. These arrangements typically involve some type of 
commercial contract whereby the government states its intended outputs and the 
private sector designs, manages, operates and delivers some of the services (Skelcher 
2005; Pollitt 2003). 
There are numerous such models, typologies, descriptions and categorisations that 
can be found in the existing literature on PPPs. For example, in their typology of 
PPPs based on two dimensions, the nature of organisational and financial 
relationships, Greve and Hodge (2005: 6) place different arrangements in a 2x2 
matrix. Both dimensions are characterised by how tight or loose public and private 
actors are organised and engaged financially. The tighter forms are broadly referred 
to as contractual PPPs and the looser forms correspond to collaborative PPPs (see 
Figure 2.1).  

















Joint stock companies 








Source: Greve and Hodge (2005: 6) 
Klijn’s (2010: 74) 2x2 matrix resembles that by Greve and Hodge but Klijn goes into 
further depth by capturing whether the type of relationship between the public and 
private actors resembles a principal-principal relationship or a principal-agent 
relationship (see Figure 2.2). There are some others who have developed multi-
dimensional models analysing partnerships along more than two dimensions. Zarco-
Jasso (2005), for instance, explains the difference between different forms of PPPs 
along three dimensions, ownership, funding and control, resulting in 2x2x2 matrix. 
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Figure 2.2: Klijn typology of PPPs 












1. Design, build, finance, operate 
contracts (PFI like partnerships) 
2. Consortium (like Urban 
Regeneration Companies) 
Loosely coupled 3. Intensive general cooperation 
between public-private actors (in 
policy programs for instance) 
4. Network like partnership 
(intensive over a long time 
but loosely coupled 
organizational relationship) 
Source: Klijn (2010: 74) 
Many partnership frameworks and typologies in the existing literature suggest that 
some types of partnerships are better than others. Generally, these frameworks 
advocate that the higher the level of collaboration the better.  Brinkerhoff (2002b), 
for example, has categorised different inter-organisational arrangements in her 2x2 
framework that defines partnerships as a specific type of relationship characterised 
by both high organisational identity and high mutuality. Similarly Austin (2000) in 
his conceptual framework asserts that there are three different types of partnerships – 
philanthropic, transactional and integrative – which are placed on a collaboration 
continuum as stages and ‘the strategic value of the alliance increases from minor to 
major’ as a partnership moves from philanthropic to integrative (Austin 2000: 72). 
All this suggests some type of hierarchy of different forms of partnerships (either 
explicitly or implicitly). Schaeffer and Loveridge refer to a phenomenon where a 
‘closer’ form of partnerships may grow out of a ‘weaker’ form: 
In real life, a closer form of cooperation may grow out of a weaker form. 
Cooperation is not static but a process that changes over time. As 
participants gain experience working together successfully, they build 
mutual trust that permits them to take on riskier projects, make bigger 
commitments, and work together more closely (Schaeffer and Loveridge 
2002: 182). 
These perspectives on PPPs promote higher levels of collaboration grounded in the 
principles of equality, reciprocal accountability, organisational autonomy, continuing 
interactions and joint decision-making in PPPs. The PPP literature as a whole seems 
to have been concerned with improving collaboration in PPPs, although those who 
adopt a broad definition of PPPs have been less focused on the benefits of 
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collaboration. One reason for the prevailing pro-collaboration disposition in the 
literature is that researchers have typically approached their investigation of PPPs 
from the perspective of a public sector that is resistant to relinquish its autonomy and 
control. As a result there are few studies that have examined the issues from the 
perspective of private sector partners in PPPs. Given these insights from the 
literature, this research has investigated the relational aspects of PPPs from the point 
of view of both public and private sector partners in PPPs. 
Whilst there is a substantial amount of literature and a great deal of research into 
PPPs, much of it is skewed towards the developed countries context. Within this 
literature PPPs are often discussed with respect to different dominant paradigms, 
such as re-engineering in the United States, the need for governance in a pluralist 
state in the United Kingdom or the prominence of the new public management in the 
New Zealand model (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002). It has already been noted 
by many scholars working from an international development perspective that the 
study of PPPs needs to be context specific and it is important to study PPPs in 
developing countries contexts too (Lewis 2000; Parker and Figueira 2010). Some 
important insights from the existing research on PPPs in developing countries are 
discussed in the following sub-section. 
 PPPs in developing countries 2.2.3
Although the phenomenon and practice of PPPs has its origins in British and 
American public policy (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning 1991), there has been an 
increasing interest in PPPs in developing countries too. Many of the factors that 
account for the increased popularity and interest in PPPs tend to be similar across 
developed and developing countries. These factors include the different strengths and 
weaknesses of the public and private sector, the potential of PPPs to reduce the 
burden on strained public resources, access to private finance for expanding or 
improving public services, and greater value for money for public projects. 
Nevertheless, developing countries have specific characteristics that make the study 
of PPPs significantly different from developed economies (Pessoa 2008). One factor 
that is particular to developing countries is the added pressure from international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and Department for International 
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Development. Many developing countries depend on these institutions for financial 
assistance to improve infrastructure and public services delivery. Inspired by the idea 
– or at least the rhetoric (see Brinkerhoff 2002c for a detailed discussion) - of PPPs 
the provision of financial assistance by these institutions is ‘often linked to changing 
the focus and orientation of government from direct involvement and intervention to 
a role revolving around partnership and facilitation’ (Dima 2004: 415). 
Historically, in the context of developing countries, private sector organisations (both 
for-profits and not-for-profits) have played an important role in filling the gap left by 
governments in public service provision. However, the role of the private sector has 
been neglected by most governments (Jütting 1999). Indeed, donor-funded PPPs 
have contributed to making governments first acknowledge and then support the 
efforts of private sector in service delivery (Brinkerhoff 2003). Due to donor 
influence, PPPs have evolved as a significant aspect of public service delivery in 
many developing countries and have taken a central position in many policy 
documents (see example of Pakistan in Chapter 1). 
The existing literature on PPPs in the context of developing countries rarely uses the 
term PPPs and refer to these arrangements as ‘partnerships’ or ‘development 
partnerships’. The coverage of private sector partners in much of this literature is 
narrowed down to not-for-profits (or NGOs) (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Coston 
1998; Batley and Rose 2011). The literature specific to partnerships in developing 
countries can be broadly divided in two streams. The first stream of literature, which 
is usually published in journals related to development studies such as Public 
Administration and Development and Journal of International Development, is 
occupied with the comparative advantages and criticism of partnership arrangements. 
The second stream of literature comprises special reports, corporate materials and 
project documentation published by international donors who describe PPPs in 
glowing terms (Brinkerhoff 2002b). 
Within the first stream of literature, those in favour of partnerships predominantly 
highlight the ‘striking trend’ towards partnerships based on the ‘comparative 
advantages’ of governments and NGOs (Najam 2000). This stream of literature takes 
what Brinkerhoff (2002b: 20) calls ‘the moral high ground…[and argues that 
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partnership] is the most ethically appropriate approach to sustainable development 
and service delivery’. Much of the comparative advantage argument in this literature 
stems from the notion that governments in developing countries are unable to 
provide adequate public services to the citizens and refers to state failure with respect 
to an efficient use of resources (Moran 2006; Teamey 2007). 
Along with the debates and arguments in favour of partnerships, criticisms and 
critiques of partnerships are also widely documented within the first stream of 
literature. For example, Mercer (2002: 6), on the basis of her review of the literature 
on the role of NGOs in the politics of development across the developing world, 
argues that ‘the failure to theorize the political impact of NGOs has led to an overly 
inadequate, explicitly normative interpretation of NGO ideology’ which has 
encouraged the tendency to take NGOs’ positive role as axiomatic. Following a 
critique of this approach, she contends that the role of NGOs in relation to the state is 
far more complex than much of the NGO literature would suggest. 
Similar to the PPP literature in developed countries, the literature in the context of 
developing countries also tends to focus more on the structural and economic issues, 
and is concentrated on infrastructural PPPs (e.g. Dima 2004; Pessoa 2008) to the 
detriment of service delivery PPPs. Yet the PPP literature in relation to developing 
countries has given more attention to the relational aspects as compared to the PPP 
literature in developed countries, but is nevertheless dominated by ‘a thin 
prescriptive, instrumentalist account of factors that make a relationship between 
government and NSP better’ (Teamey 2007: 8). For instance, MacDonald and Chrisp 
(2005) argue that whilst the need for trust is emphasised in the partnership literature, 
it rarely sheds light on how trust can be developed. 
Despite these shortcomings, the attention paid towards understanding the complexity 
of relationships in the PPP literature in the context of developing countries has 
resulted in many typologies of government-NGO relationships (e.g. Najam 2000; 
Lewis 1997; Young 2000; Coston 1998). These typologies are helpful in the context 
of this thesis as they offer possible ways to study the IORs in PPPs which are 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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With regards to the second stream of literature, much of this literature considers 
PPPs as the (only) way forward to meet the challenges of public services delivery in 
developing countries. These arguments are often based on impact evaluations of 
PPPs carried out in both developed and developing countries. In his analysis of these 
documents, Verger (2011) found the World Bank’s  The role and impact of PPPs in 
education (Patrinos et al. 2009) as one of the most comprehensive review of PPPs 
based on 22 academic studies and 92 practical experiences of PPPs. Due to its direct 
relevance to the area of this research, this report is discussed in section 2.2.4. 
 PPPs in education 2.2.4
Whilst education service delivery lies in the realm of public management, it is 
surprising to find the relative paucity of research on educational partnerships in the 
PPP literature. Even if we look at the broader public administration and management 
literature the emphasis seems to be more on health services rather than education. 
Hence, this sub-section draws much more on literature from the field of education 
studies alongside reports published by international donors. 
Many different forms of PPPs are currently used in the education sector around the 
world. According to Patrinos (2009) three main areas in which PPPs can be involved 
are in delivering inputs, processes and outputs. Some governments buy the services 
involved in producing education (inputs), such as teacher training, management, 
curriculum design, or the use of a school facility from private organisations. Other 
governments contract with private organisations to provide the process of education, 
for example, by managing and operating public schools. Some other governments 
contract with private organisations to provide education to specific students (thus, 
buying outputs). 
Different countries have responded to education sector challenges by involving the 
private sector in education service delivery in different ways. If we adopt a more 
generic perspective towards what constitutes a PPP (as adopted by most of the 
literature in the field of education and donors funding PPP projects), there are many 
examples of educational PPPs round the globe. Some of these examples are 
summarised in Table 2.2 
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The private sector is involved mainly through Private Finance 
Initiatives (PFIs) in which educational infrastructure is designed, 
built, financed and managed by a private sector consortium under 
a PFI contract that typically lasts for 30 years. 
Australia The PPPs are mainly carried out for building school infrastructure 
whereby the private sector is given the responsibility to finance, 
design and construct public schools under a long-term contract. 
Canada The Province of Nova Scotia used a P3 model to build 39 schools 
in the late 1990s. 
 
The Province of Alberta and the Province of Nova Scotia initiated 
P3 New Schools Project whereby a private-sector partner is 
responsible for the design, construction, finance and maintenance 
of a specified number of schools for under a long-term contract. 
United States  The private management of public schools has existed since the 
early 1990s and takes the form of charter schools. Contract 
schools remain publicly owned and funded but are managed by 
the private sector, and students do not pay fees to attend these 
schools. 
 
Under Milwaukee Parental Choice Programme (MCPC) vouchers 
were provided to poor families to allow them to send their 
children to private schools at state expense. 
Colombia Colegios en Concesión (Concession Schools) programme, under 
which the management of some public schools is turned over to 
private schools with proven track records of delivering high 
quality education. 
Philippines The Educational Service Contracting (ESC) scheme enables 
government to contracts with private schools to enrol students in 
areas where there is a shortage of places in public high schools. 
The per-student payment is made to private schools by 
government. 
New Zealand Independent private schools receive government subsidies that are 
estimated at 25 to 35 percent of the average per pupil cost of 
educating a child in a government school. Subsidies are 
enrolment-based and vary with grade level. 
Pakistan Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education 
(CARE), a local NGO, manages government schools (more details 
provided in Chapter 5). 
 
The Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) in the Punjab province of 
Pakistan operates several PPP programmes where private sector is 
funded to provide education services to students (discussed in 
detail in Chapter 7). 
Compiled from LaRocque (2008) and (Patrinos et al. 2009) 
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PPPs whereby governments mobilise private investment for the availability and 
maintenance of infrastructure are usually referred to as Private Finance Initiatives 
(PFIs) (Bing et al. 2005). It is clear from the examples of PPPs in the Table 2.2 that 
this method of financing is used in many OECD countries. According to Gibson and 
Davies (2008: 75) many schools would not have been built in the UK in the absence 
of PFI as ‘public money is often simply not available’. 
Weak management is often recognised as a significant constraint to improving the 
performance of public schools (Patrinos et al. 2009). To deal with this problem, some 
governments have initiated PPP programmes that invite private organisations to 
manage non-functional public schools. These PPP programmes aim to improve 
public schools in four main areas: quality, access, infrastructure and community 
participation (LaRocque 2008). PPPs where the private sector manages public 
schools are argued to have the potential to improve quality and increase efficiency 
because these schools have more autonomy than traditional public schools (Patrinos 
et al. 2009). However, the extensive review carried out by LaRocque (2006) found 
that whilst there is evidence of significant performance improvements in some 
examples, there are cases where private management of public schools either had no 
impact or resulted in deterioration in school performance. Hence, the findings 
regarding the impact of private sector management of public schools are 
inconclusive. 
PPPs in which the private sector is responsible for the provision of educational 
services are referred to as demand-side financing programmes whereby students or 
schools are directly funded according to demand. The mechanisms for demand-side 
financing are vouchers, subsidies, capitation grants and stipends (Patrinos 2000). The 
most common mechanisms for this type of partnership are vouchers or voucher like 
programmes which are practiced in many countries including Belgium, Denmark, 
Ireland, The Netherlands and Sweden (LaRocque 2008). In voucher based 
programmes the public sector provides students with vouchers that can be used to 
attend a school of their choice, thus encouraging student choice and school 
competition (Hoxby 2000).  
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Many international financial institutions back the idea of PPPs in education and 
advocate their potential capacity to deal with a range of education problems that are 
common in developing countries context. In addition, provision of funding in many 
cases is tied to working in partnerships because it is considered that governments 
need to take the private sector more seriously in order to meet the Education For All 
(EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (Verger 2011; Rose 2006). These 
arguments are often based on empirical evidence from evaluation studies of 
educational PPPs, mostly using quantitative analysis techniques. Most of these 
studies show that learning outcomes across many countries around the globe are 
better in the education systems with high levels of public funding and high levels of 
private provision (Woessmann 2006; Patrinos et al. 2009). In addition, qualitative 
studies and experiences also highlight lessons learned from a range of successful 
practices on private sector engagement for the delivery of public education. For 
example, a report published by Asian Development Bank documents the experience 
and lessons learned from the Punjab Education Foundation’s PPPs in Pakistan (Malik 
2010). 
In short, a wide range of PPPs is used in the education sector around the world. 
Examples of educational PPPs can be found extensively both in developed and 
developing countries. It is no surprise that educational PPPs are now a ubiquitous 
phenomenon and the literature on them is expanding. Evidence of the impact of 
educational PPPs is also emerging from evaluations of various projects mainly 
funded by international donor organisations. Although much is being learned from 
these ongoing evaluations, they are also raising more and deeper questions (Patrinos 
et al. 2009) such as how different types of PPPs can affect education outcomes and 
which factors support or impede the achievement of outcomes in educational PPPs. 
These questions need to be explored in both developing and developed countries 
contexts for theory building and improving the practice of PPPs in order to meet 
education goals. Consequently, this thesis contributes to better understanding of 
educational PPPs by investigating their operation in Pakistan. 
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2.3 PPP and IOR literatures: bridging the ‘silos’ 
The PPP canvas is broad and multi-disciplinary (Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002; 
Hodge et al. 2010). It is well known that the research traditions, vocabulary, 
academic interests, epistemic and methodological assumptions of different 
disciplines vary enormously (Zald 1995). This implies that different disciplines 
pursue their specific research questions when they look at PPPs through their 
disciplinary lenses. In the field of accounting, for instance, the focus primarily 
resides in value for money, risk transfer and balance sheet figures (Broadbent and 
Laughlin 1999; 2003). In the field of law, the focus is more on the legal and 
regulatory aspects of PPPs and questions revolve around ‘getting the contract right’ 
for different delivery models (Evans and Bowman 2005), the role of national 
regulatory framework to support PPPs and comparing the legal aspects of PPPs 
across different countries (Arrowsmith 2006; Tvarnø 2010). The economists’ 
perspective is tilted towards market conditions, transaction costs and efficiency 
questions. Scholars in political science and public administration are usually 
interested in governing partnerships and investigating the relationship between 
democratic practices and the institutional design of PPPs (Bovaird and Loffler 2003; 
Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Skelcher et al. 2005). 
The different disciplinary orientations of PPP scholars has resulted in what Cropper 
and his colleagues have referred to as ‘research traditions that had grown silo-like’ 
whereby each silo ‘seemed to store unique grains of insight’ (Cropper et al. 2010: 8). 
It is possible to identify such ‘silos’ both within and across different fields of study. 
For instance, Greve and Hodge (2005), have identified two research domains within 
the PPP literature studying the effectiveness of PPPs: one is public policy and public 
finance, and the second is economics and construction engineering. The authors 
discuss the limited interactions between these two research domains. Though not 
untypical in social sciences, limited interactions across research domains and fields 
of study inhibit the theoretical progress of the PPP discourse. Rather than acting as 
building blocks to address the concerns and issues often associated with PPPs, lack 




It has already been noted that a lot of scholarly attention has been directed at 
understanding the structural and economic aspects, and that the relational aspects of 
the PPPs are relatively under-researched. However, there are other research traditions 
and fields of study that can help us develop a better understanding to explore the 
nature and dynamics of IORs in PPPs. Some PPP scholars have already identified 
some learning potentials in this respect. Weihe (2010), for example, has provided a 
detailed account of conceptual similarities and differences between the PPP and 
alliance/IOR literatures. She asserts that the alliance literature has the potential to fill 
knowledge gaps in the PPP literature and can ‘enrich our understanding of the 
dynamic  and evolutionary nature of cooperation’ (Weihe 2010: 520). She argues that 
although both literatures are concerned with analysing cooperation across 
organisation boundaries, little or no communication has taken place across these two 
fields of research. This section discusses the relevance of the IOR literature to 
studying PPPs, but it also discusses some points of caution to be borne in mind when 
bridging the ‘silos’ from two different fields of study. 
 Origins and relevance of the IOR literature 2.3.1
The roots of the IOR literature can be traced in the mainstream organisation theory 
and behaviour literature. It has gathered insightful knowledge based on ‘rich 
theoretical and empirical study by multiple disciplines for decades’ (Austin 2000: 70) 
and comprises theories that focus both on explaining the motives to establish such 
relationships and on their ongoing dynamics. Scholars in the field of IOR have 
contributed from some distinct theoretical perspectives such as resource dependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), exchange (Levine and White 1961) and efficiency 
perspectives (Williamson 1979; 1985). They have sought to investigate the 
determinants of relationship formation (Oliver 1990; Galaskiewicz 1985); strategic 
collaboration (Wood and Gray 1991; Huxham 1996b; Kanter 1994); developmental 
processes (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Arino and de la Torre 1998; Doz 1996) and 
the structures of social relations (Granovetter 1985). The IOR literature encompasses 
studies of organisations from a variety of institutional backgrounds, such as 
relationships between organisations within the same sector and cross-sector 
arrangements. The literature includes the study of government-non-profit relations 
(Salamon 1995; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002), business-non-profit relations 
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(Austin 2000; Wymer and Samu 2003), and multiparty alliances (Gray 1989; 
Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). 
Similar to the PPP literature, the IOR literature comprises various discipline-based 
investigations grounded in a specific theory or theories (Cropper et al. 2010). What 
unites the IOR literature is its aim to examine and understand the ‘pattern of relations 
between and among organisations that are pursuing a mutual interest while also 
remaining independent and autonomous, thus retaining separate interests’ (Cropper 
et al. 2010: 9). This applies to PPPs too. It is somewhat surprising to note that 
although a PPP is inherently a type of inter-organisational arrangement there is very 
limited application of the IOR literature in the study of PPPs (Weihe 2010). 
Transaction costs economics (TCE), as an exception, has received a great deal of 
attention from PPP scholars (e.g. Martin 2005; Boardman and Vining 2010) due to 
their interest in the economic and efficiency issues of PPPs. PPP scholars have been 
interested in what institutional arrangements or types of PPPs are best suited for what 
function. TCE provides a framework that suits these types of question and this is the 
reason that we find widespread application of transaction cost theory in the PPP 
literature. 
The benefits of bridging the PPP and IOR literatures are not unidirectional. While 
there are opportunities for the PPP literature to learn from IOR scholarship, the IOR 
literature can also be enriched by this integration. Kelman (2005) points out that 
much of the pioneering work in organisation theory was written about public 
organisations. However, the attention the field used to pay to public organisations 
has withered over the last decades (Kelman 2005). He identifies several areas where 
public management researchers have the potential to contribute to the mainstream 
organisation theory literature. Examples include the impact of nonfinancial 
performance measures on organisational performance, eliciting good performance 
through other than financial incentives and management of obligation delivery. He 
mentions these examples as issues that are more important in public than in private 




The IOR literature is more directed towards the study of private-private alliances and 
the PPP literature is about public-private alliances. Nevertheless, both literatures are 
focused on working arrangements across organisational boundaries. Hence, it is 
argued that both the PPP and IOR literatures have some immediate value and 
learning opportunities for each other. 
 Reasons for caution 2.3.2
While supporting greater interaction between the PPP literature and the IOR 
literature it is essential to flag some points of caution. This section outlines three 
crucial points to be cautious about when utilising the findings and theories in the IOR 
literature and offers suggestions to deal with some of the difficulties. Firstly, it is 
important to warn PPP researchers that the IOR literature is ‘analytically messy’ with 
different perspectives overlapping and intersecting one another (Galaskiewicz 1985: 
298). As a result PPP researchers could drown in the deep ocean of IOR knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the good news is that from time to time scholars have provided helpful 
overviews and insights of the field (e.g. Whetten 1981; Galaskiewicz 1985; Oliver 
1990; Barringer and Harrison 2000; Hibbert et al. 2010) which help researchers to 
navigate the vast and diverse field of IOR literature. 
A second point of caution is the problem of inconsistent use of different 
terminologies in the IOR literature. This issue has been raised as a problem in 
defining PPPs too. In section 2.2.1, it was mentioned that the term ‘partnership’ is 
used to convey many different perspectives. Similarly, as noted by Hibbert, Huxham 
and Ring (2010) the use of terminologies in the IOR literature and in practice does 
not ‘coalesce towards any agreed version’ which makes it difficult to transfer the 
knowledge from theory to practice (Hibbert et al. 2010: 405). For example, at a very 
basic level the term ‘inter-organisational relationships’ is sometimes viewed as an 
umbrella term to represent the organisational forms or structures such as 
‘partnerships’, ‘alliance’, ‘joint venture’ and ‘networks’ (Brinkerhoff 2002b; 
Huxham 2003). The term ‘inter-organisational relationships’ is also viewed from a 
process perspective (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Thomson and Perry 2006; Levine 
and White 1961). Here they are seen as ‘the sequence of events and interaction 
among organisational parties that unfold to shape and modify an IOR over time’ 
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(Ring and Van de Ven 1994: 91). Under the process perspective IORs are seen as a 
developmental process as opposed to the structural form these relationships take. 
In order to address this confusion, as noted in Chapter 1, in this thesis the acronym 
‘IORs’ refers to inter-organisational relationships between interacting parties and 
‘IOR’ represents the name of the field i.e. inter-organisational relations
3
. The term 
‘inter-organisational arrangement’ is used to refer to the organisational form such as 
partnerships. Moreover, the term ‘collaboration’, which also carries several meanings 
in the IOR literature, is used to refer to participative decision-making, shared power 
arrangements, reciprocal accountability, joint determination of partnership activities 
and trust (Wood and Gray 1991; Thomson et al. 2009; Brinkerhoff 2002a). 
The third reason for caution when linking the IOR and PPP literatures is that the IOR 
literature is dominated, though not limited, by the discussion of private-private 
relationships in a competitive setting such as strategic alliance, joint ventures and 
interlocking directorates. PPP is different in this respect as it involves public-private 
interaction. Therefore, it is sometimes argued that the models or theories developed 
in the broader IOR literature ‘do not have automatic relevance for PPPs’ (Noble and 
Jones 2006: 914). Although it is not possible to dismiss such arguments, it is 
important to keep in mind that under the prescriptions of ‘New Public Management’, 
public sector organisations have undergone many reforms involving the adoption of 
private sector styles of management (Hood 1991). PPPs have different dynamics as 
compared to private-private partnerships and this feature distinguishes them ‘from 
the rest of the IOR literature and thus demand a specific and individual analysis’ 
(Noble and Jones 2006: 914). But, nevertheless, they are inherently a form of inter-
organisational arrangement and hence constitute part of the broader IOR literature. 
The more we cross-fertilize the PPP literature with the IOR literature, the more we 
can learn about the ways in which PPPs are similar and different to other inter-
organisational arrangements. 
                                                 
3
 This operationalisation is similar to the one done by Cropper, S., Ebers, M., Huxham, C. & Ring, P. 
S. 2010. Introducing inter-organizational relations. In: CROPPER, S., EBERS, M., HUXHAM, C. & 
RING, P. S. (eds.) The Oxford handbook of inter-organizational relations. First pbk. ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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2.4 Insights from the IOR literature 
After discussing some reasons for caution while utilising the IOR literature as part of 
understanding and explaining IORs in PPP, this section outlines some key concepts 
and insights from the IOR literature. It is not an extensive review of the broad IOR 
literature, nor does it provide an exhaustive list of the ways in which IOR scholarship 
can complement the PPP literature. Rather, the discussion focuses on the concepts 
and insights that are particularly useful and relevant to address the research questions 
set out for this thesis. 
The IOR literature encompasses studies of different forms of inter-organisational 
arrangement and it is also characterised by the diversity of theoretical and 
disciplinary perspectives adopted and the topics that are investigated. Cropper and 
colleagues identify two ‘core building blocks’ in IOR research: ‘a set of dimensions 
describing the relating organisations and a set of dimensions describing the nature of 
the relationships through which they are linked’ (Cropper et al. 2010: 9). They go on 
to explain that there are two more ‘building blocks’ which are important but do not 
have the same status as the ‘core building blocks’ of IOR research. Rather, they add 
precision to the core building blocks and can help to explain and theorise IORs by 
identifying factors and processes that shape IORs. These additional building blocks 
are the ‘context in which both organisations and their relations are embedded, and 
the processes through which IORs are established, maintained, changed and 
dissolved, and produce outcomes’ (Cropper et al. 2010: 10). 
This suggests that in order to understand and examine IORs in PPPs one needs to 
study the nature of the organisations involved, the dimensions and attributes of 
relationships, the context in which they operate, and the developmental stages of 
PPPs. 
With respect to the nature of organisations, both the PPP and IOR literatures draw 
on the mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literature to examine the 
internal features and dynamics of the organisations. Amongst the most common 
dimensions investigated are an organisation’s vision and mission; leadership; 
organisational culture and structure; and financial autonomy. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 3, the conceptual framework for this research draws on the organisation 
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theory and behaviour literature to understand the ways in which these organisational 
dimensions shape IORs in PPPs.  
In order to examine the dimensions and attributes of inter-organisational 
relationships, it is important to appreciate the main theoretical frameworks that have 
underpinned the analysis of these in the IOR literature (and these are discussed in 
sub-section 2.4.1). 
Although the IOR literature emphasises the need to study the context under which 
organisations choose to establish the inter-organisational arrangements, the study of 
contextual factors is often limited to examining them as initial conditions or 
antecedents to the formation of inter-organisational arrangements. This thesis takes 
an approach where contextual factors are not conceived as only antecedents but also 
examines the ways in which these factors unfold and interplay with other factors 
during the operation of PPPs and thus continue to shape the nature of IORs (and this 
is discussed further in Chapter 3). 
While both PPP and IOR scholars point out that the formation of inter-organisational 
arrangements is a multiphase process (Murray 1998; Noble and Jones 2006; Ring 
and Van de Ven 1994), there are many variations in the ways in which this process is 
explained. IOR scholars usually explain the developmental process as separate stages 
and argue that it is useful to separate them for analytical purposes (Ring and Van de 
Ven 1994; Arino and de la Torre 1998). The developmental process of inter-
organisational arrangements as explained in Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and some 
other researchers is the subject of discussion in sub-section 2.4.2. 
 Major theoretical paradigms 2.4.1
Most studies in the IOR literature are based on one or more theories. In some cases 
scholars build their argument on one theoretical perspective, while in other situations 
they combine elements from different theories for comparison or synthesis purposes. 
This is particularly evident in the strand of IOR literature that examines the factors 
that influence an organisation's decision to enter an inter-organisational arrangement. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine all of these (for that, see Oliver and 
Ebers 1998). Instead, the focus is limited to those theories that are more relevant and 
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have implications for PPPs. For instance, the strategic choice perspective (though 
useful to analyse private-private relationships) can be argued as less relevant to PPPs 
due to its focus on increased competitiveness and market power. Of course, these 
motives have become less unique to the private-private relationships and one can 
argue that entering PPPs may be based on partners’ desires to enhance organisational 
competitiveness. Still, given that pursuing societal goals usually lie at the heart of 
PPPs, it is reasonable to argue that a strategic choice perspective is not as relevant to 
PPPs as it is in the context of private-private alliances. 
The five theoretical paradigms examined here are: 
 Resource dependence 
 Exchange theory 
 Agency theory 
 Transaction costs economics 
 Institutional theory 
Each theory offers insights into the motives to enter an inter-organisational 
arrangement and the balance of IORs in these arrangements. Hence, two purposes 
will guide the discussion of the different theoretical perspectives: underlying motives 
and the predicted balance of IORs. The analysis of underlying motives draws on the 
framework developed by Oliver (1990) which integrates the IOR literature so as to 
offer ‘a set of predictive critical contingencies that are potentially generalizable 
across a broad range of IORs’ (Oliver 1990: 242). She proposes ‘six critical 
contingencies of relationship formation’ (hereafter referred to as motives) that 
persuade the organisations to establish inter-organisational arrangements: necessity, 
asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy. This framework is an 
influential piece of work and is widely cited as a useful summary of motives for the 
formation of inter-organisational arrangements of various types. In relation to PPPs, 
this framework has a potential to explain and understand the reasons why public and 
private sector parties choose to enter PPPs. As expected these motives may overlap 
and interact with one another but it is useful to separate them for analytical purposes. 
This framework is an important part of the conceptual framework for this research 
and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
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In relation to discussing the resulting balance of IORs predicted by different 
theoretical paradigms, the main distinction is between a symmetrical or asymmetrical 
balance. Symmetrical relationships signify that the resulting inter-organisational 
arrangement is characterised by equality of all parties involved. An asymmetrical 
balance of IORs indicates that one of the organisations becomes either more 
dominant or is willing to be subordinate, and thus there is lack of balance in the 
relationships. 
The five theoretical paradigms are discussed separately below and important 
elements of discussion are also outlined in Table 2.3. 
Resource dependence 
A bibliometric analysis of the IOR literature by Oliver and Ebers (1998) concludes 
that resource dependence theory is one of the most frequently employed theories in 
the IOR literature. Resource dependence generally attributes motives of power and 
control to the formation of inter-organisational arrangements. The idea of 
interdependence lies at the heart of resource dependence that is a ‘consequence of the 
open-systems nature of organizations’ (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: 43). It focuses on 
resources that an organisation must acquire from external sources for its survival or 
success. The need to acquire resources creates interdependencies between 
organisations. Although such interdependencies could be symmetric in nature as in 
the case of reciprocal exchange of resources, a resource dependence perspective 
argues that organisations must strive to decrease dependence on other organisations 
by securing control over critical resources. Moreover, an organisation should also 
acquire control over resources required by other organisations in order to increase 
their dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
The formation of a partnership is generally seen as a mechanism to gain access to 
important resources held by others. In short, from a resource dependence paradigm 
an organisation enters partnerships to tap the resources of other organisations and 
gain competitive advantage while striving to acquire power and control over other 
organisations. Hence, resource dependence suggests that in cases where the 
formation of PPPs is triggered by the desire to gain power and control in order to 




The conceptual framework provided by exchange theory is somewhat similar to the 
resource dependence perspective in one fundamental way. Both paradigms are rooted 
in the notion of interdependencies and that organisations must interact with their 
environment to obtain resources in order to achieve their goals. However, both 
theories are quite distinct in their approach to overcome dependencies. The resource 
dependence paradigm, as mentioned above, proposes an asymmetric balance of IORs 
by seeking power and control. Exchange theory, on the other hand, generally refers 
to an exchange between organisations based on motives of reciprocity whereby ‘the 
process of linkage formation typically will be characterized by balance, harmony, 
equity, and mutual support, rather than by coercion, conflict, and domination’ (Oliver 
1990: 245). However, this does not necessarily mean that the exchange of resources 
is always equal and reciprocal. Absolute equality in this sense would be extremely 
difficult to attain and is not sought for. Instead symmetry signifies comparative rather 
than an absolute equality in the exchange of resources. 
One common reason for the formation of PPPs that fits the tenets of exchange theory 
is that organisations enter such arrangements to pursue common or mutually 
beneficial goals or interests. Although the notion of resource scarcity underpins both 
resource dependence and exchange theories, it is likely to induce cooperation instead 
of competition in the view of the latter (Alter and Hage 1993). Thus the balance of 
IORs is likely to be more symmetrical when parties enter from exchange perspective. 
Agency theory 
Agency theory, also referred to as the principal-agent model, is particularly relevant 
to the study of PPPs. PPP scholars often use this theory as a point of comparison 
when distinguishing ‘real’ or collaborative partnerships from other partnership-like 
arrangements. Agency theory usually describes a contracting relationship between 
two or more parties whereby one party (the principal) chooses to contract with one or 
more parties (the agent/s) for reasons of cost and expertise. A principal chooses to 
enter an inter-organisational arrangement with an agent when it lacks the expertise or 
resources required to produce a good or service within its own organisational domain 
(Van Slyke 2007). In their frameworks, PPP scholars usually refer to the public 
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actors as principals and private parties as agents (Klijn 2010; Kort and Koppenjan 
2013). 
Agency theory is based on two assumptions: 1) goal conflict between the principal 
and the agent due to the utility maximising behaviour of each party, and 2) 
information asymmetry resulting in opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Eisenhardt 1989a). As a theory, the focus is on the contract that governs the 
principal-agent relationship. Hence, the principal and agent(s)  
agree on the terms of the contract including the inputs, processes, 
outcomes, quality and satisfaction parameters, monitoring and 
performance-reporting requirements, how the agent is to be compensated 
for doing the work of the principal, and the sanctions that will result if 
the principal detects the agent pursuing his/her own goals above the 
principal’s objectives (Van Slyke 2007: 162). 
Due to the above mentioned assumptions, the principal may use incentives, 
sanctions, and impose reporting requirements on the agents so as to ensure goal 
alignment between both parties. It is believed that principals are less likely to 
experience agent opportunism and goal divergence when they provide ‘clear 
incentives, such as contract renewal and stability, discretion and flexibility in 
program implementation, reputational enhancement, and vigilant monitoring through 
a myriad of formal and informal mechanisms’ (Van Slyke 2007: 163). 
Agency theory predicts an asymmetrical balance of IORs in which a principal 
chooses to enter an inter-organisational arrangement to pursue the motives of 
efficiency.  The theory does not clearly explain the motives of agents entering into 
these arrangements. One reason for this is that the analysis and application of agency 
theory is mostly carried out from the principal’s perspective. For example, the 
principal decides to delegate specific work to an agent and then uses tools such as 
monitoring to avoid opportunistic behaviour of the agents. However, it should be 
noted that theory itself is not ‘unidirectional’ (Van Slyke 2007). Similar to agents, 
principals may also act opportunistically by using information for their own interests. 
This thesis is concerned with the application of agency theory from both principal 
and agent perspective to understand the IORs in PPPs. 
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Transaction costs economics (TCE) 
Transaction cost economics focuses on matching the different forms of economic 
institution, such as firms, intermediate structures and markets, for economic 
interactions so as to most efficiently organise a particular transaction. The choice of 
economic institution is dependent on the characteristics of the transaction such as the 
frequency of the transaction, the amount of investment required for the transaction 
and degree of certainty associated with the transaction (Williamson 1979; 1985). As 
noted by Barringer and Harrison (2000), Williamson’s early work recognised 
markets and hierarchies as the two forms of economic structures. It was later in his 
work that he identified inter-organisational forms as an intermediate economic 
structure (Williamson 1991). 
With respect to inter-organisational forms, transaction cost theory suggests that 
organisations will choose to enter such arrangements in an attempt to become more 
efficient and economise on the costs of transactions. Many authors have raised 
concerns about TCE because explanations are limited to cost-minimising and 
efficiency rationales (Barringer and Harrison 2000). Moreover, the assumption ‘that 
everyone involved in a partnership will get along, and that the corporate cultures of 
the participants will meld together smoothly’ has also made authors critical of this 
theory (Barringer and Harrison 2000: 372, originally Faulkner, 1995). 
Hence, underlying the Williamson’s transaction cost perspective are motives of 
efficiency and it can be expected that ‘the impetus to pursue mutually beneficial 
relations may be greater if an organization anticipates that greater internal efficiency 
will result from the relationship’ (Oliver 1990: 248). There are chances that motives 
of efficiency will interact with reciprocal motives and hence could lead to a 
symmetrical balance of IORs. No one writing from a TCE perspective within the 
IOR literature seems to predict that intermediate structures will be associated with 
control motives and asymmetrical relationships (Oliver 1990). 
Although both transaction cost and agency theory envisage that motives of efficiency 
will stimulate organisations to enter partnership arrangement, the resulting balance of 
IORs predicted by both theories is different due to differences in their theoretical 
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tenets. Whilst the former predicts a symmetrical balance of IORs; the latter suggests 
an asymmetrical balance of IORs between interacting parties. 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory asserts that institutional environments force organisations to 
appear legitimate and conform to prevailing social norms (Dimaggio and Powell 
1983; Scott 1995; Oliver 1991; Dacin et al. 2007). When institutional theory is 
applied to the formation of partnerships, the formation of a partnership can be 
explained by an organisation’s motive ‘to demonstrate or improve its reputation, 
image, prestige, or congruence with prevailing norms in its institutional 
environment’ (Oliver 1990: 246). Along with the desire to improve reputation an 
organisation may be inclined to form partnerships simply as a result of isomorphic 
pressures which involve mimicking or imitating norms for its own survival and 
acceptance (Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Following this argument, institutional 
theory predicts a more passive role for organisations as they conform to the rules and 
expectations of their institutional environment. 
When organisations enter partnerships for the purpose of increasing legitimacy they 
are likely to adapt themselves so as to appear congruent to the ways in which the 
partner organisations operate. In this way isomorphism can encourage organisations 
to seek support from partners whose level of legitimacy is deemed higher than their 
own (Oliver 1990).  
There are situations when entering partnerships are seen as desirable thing to do. It 
can also be either encouraged or enforced by the donors and funding agencies 
(Murray 1998; Bryson et al. 2006). In these cases the motives of legitimacy are 
intractably linked to those of stability and stimulate organisations to enter into inter-
organisational arrangements so as to ensure a reliable flow of resources. From this 
perspective, enhanced legitimacy is also seen as a resource (Phillips et al. 2000) that 
helps to reduce uncertainty in the flow of funds. Hence, partnerships ‘serve as coping 
strategies to forestall, forecast, or absorb uncertainty in order to achieve an orderly, 
reliable pattern of resource flows and exchanges’ (Oliver 1990: 246). 
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Although institutional theory suggests that organisations enter partnership 
arrangements to enhance legitimacy, which may be linked to ensuring stability in the 
flow of resources, the theory is not clear about the resulting balance of relationships. 
It is only when institutional theory is combined with one or more of the other four 
theories that we can postulate the resulting balance of IORs. So keeping in view a 
relatively passive role for conforming organisations, we can expect an asymmetrical 
balance of relationships in situations where the partner organisation with higher 
legitimacy tends to exert power and dominate (influenced by a resource dependence 
perspective). Conversely, a symmetrical balance may result where the ‘legitimising 
partner’ envisages a reciprocal exchange relationship (as suggested by exchange 
theory). 
Just as the scholars using agency theory focus more on the perspective of the 
principal, those drawing on institutional theory are mainly concerned with the 
organisation seeking to improve its legitimacy rather than the one which is perceived 
as more legitimate. This research aims to address this by exploring IORs in PPPs 
from the standpoints of all of the main parties involved. 
 
This sub-section has introduced five important theoretical paradigms within the IOR 
literature and has examined their implications for understanding the underlying 
motives for entering inter-organisational arrangements and the resulting balance of 
relationships. This discussion is summarised in Table 2.3. Although each motive may 
be an independent and sufficient reason to enter PPPs, it is not surprising to find that 
different motives interact with each other both theoretically and empirically. So for 
example, the motives of efficiency and legitimacy may interact if an organisation 
anticipates that its legitimacy is enhanced if it becomes more efficient. The situation 
becomes further complicated if we think about diverse actors entering partnerships 
with varying reasons, which is the hallmark of a PPP. None of the theoretical 
paradigms outlined in this section is sufficient on its own to explain the formation of 
partnerships because each of them ‘explain relationship formation from a narrow 
point of view’ (Barringer and Harrison 2000: 395). Nevertheless, together these 
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theoretical perspectives contribute to a useful conceptual framework to understand 
IORs in PPPs. 
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In situations of interdependence organisations have 
incentives to work with other organisations to exert power 
or to gain control over organisations that possess scarce 
resources. 
Asymmetry Asymmetrical (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978) 
Exchange theory Motives for exchange are guided by desire to enter 
partnerships under the objective of pursuing common or 
mutually beneficial goals or interests. 
Reciprocity Symmetrical (Levine and White 1961) 
Agency theory Agents and principals are driven by opportunities for their 
own personal gain. Due to information asymmetry both act 
opportunistically by exploiting information for their own 
self-interest. Such opportunism needs to be curtailed 
through some control mechanism, but since controls are 
imperfect, some opportunism will remain. A principal 
chooses to enter inter-organisational arrangement with an 
agent when it lacks the expertise or resources required to 




Not clear with respect 
to motives of agents 
Asymmetrical (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Eisenhardt 1989a; 
Van Slyke 2007) 
Transaction 
costs economics 
A theory from neo-institutional economic perspective that 
focuses on matching the economic institution, such as 
firms and markets, for economic interactions so as to most 
efficiently organise a particular transaction. The choice of 
economic institution is dependent on the characteristics of 
the transaction such as the frequency of the transaction, the 
amount of investment required for the transaction and 
Efficiency Symmetrical (Williamson 1979; 1985) 
43 
 
degree of certainty associated with the transaction. ‘A 
transaction-specific governance structure is more fully 
developed where transactions are (1) recurrent, (2) entail 
idiosyncratic investment, and (3) are executed under 
greater uncertainty’ (Williamson 1979: 259) 
Institutional 
theory 
Institutional theory asserts that institutional environments 
force organisations to appear legitimate and conform to 
prevailing social norms. One way an organisation may 
respond to these institutional pressures is by entering a 
partnership relationship with those organisations who have 
established reputation, image, visibility and/or prestige. 
Besides enhancing legitimacy an organisation may be 
inclined to form partnerships simply as a result of 
isomorphic pressures which involve mimicking or 
imitating norms for its own survival and acceptance. 
Legitimacy and 
stability (for those are 
seeking to appear 
legitimate and conform 
to prevailing social 
norms) 
 
Not clear with respect 
to the partner 
organisation deemed as 
legitimate 
Not clear (Dimaggio and Powell 
1983; Scott 1995; Oliver 





 Process frameworks 2.4.2
A common approach to explaining the process through which different inter-
organisational arrangements evolve is to consider them passing through a set of 
stages or phases, also referred to as a life-cycle (Hibbert et al. 2010). There are two 
ways in which scholars have described the evolutionary process of inter-
organisational arrangements: as a linear continuum of stages or as a repetitive 
cyclical process. The linear continuum is a more common approach and scholars 
have labelled such stages in different ways. To illustrate, Kanter (1994) describes the 
evolving relationship between companies using the marriage metaphor. Her model 
consists of five phases: selection and courtship; getting engaged; setting up 
housekeeping; learning to collaborate; and changing within. Another important 
process framework is that of Gray (1989) who conceptualises inter-organisational 
arrangements going through three sequential stages: problem setting, direction 
setting and implementation. 
Similar to the IOR literature there are some linear staged frameworks in the PPP 
literature too. For example, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) have developed a four-
stage partnership life-cycle: pre-partnership collaboration, partnership creation, 
partnership programme delivery and partnership termination or succession. 
Similarly, Noble and Jones (2006) have conceptualised four stages during the 
establishment of PPPs: pre-contact, trawling, sizing up and structuring the 
partnership. Murray (1998) has also developed a multi-phased process framework  
consisting of a series of stages: pre-contact, preliminary contact, negotiating, 
implementation and evaluation. 
The successive stages in these frameworks do a fairly good job in understanding and 
analysing partnership life-cycles from many different perspectives such as which 
modes of governance are prominent at each stage, what managerial challenges are 
associated with different stages and what type of managerial interventions are more 
effective to tackle these challenges. These stages models also help to predict the type 
of IORs at different points during a partnership life-cycle. However, these 
frameworks have limited capacity to shed light on the developmental process of 
IORs and they insufficiently explain the dynamic nature of IORs within different 
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stages of PPPs (or any other inter-organisational arrangement). Whilst these linear 
stages provide a description of how partnerships develop over time, they do not 
explain much how the stages progress or how can we analyse the dynamic nature of 
IORs within each stage. 
A particularly useful and influential framework that conceptualises processes as 
cyclical rather than linear is that of Ring and Van de Ven (1994) (Figure 2.3). This 
framework is helpful in understanding how IORs might unfold, develop and modify 
over time. When this framework is used alongside other process frameworks that 
conceptualise partnerships as passing through a set of stages, it may address the 
limited capacity of the linear models to explain the dynamic nature of IORs within 
different stages. 
Figure 2.3: Process framework for the development of inter-
organisational arrangements 
 
Source: Ring and Van de Ven (1994: 97) 
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This framework conceptualises the developmental process of inter-organisational 
arrangements as comprising a repetitive sequence of three stages: negotiation, 
commitment and execution. These recurrent stages are proposed on the basis that if 
organisations can negotiate minimal, congruent expectations to undertake a joint 
action, they are likely to make commitments for an initial course of action. Such 
commitments are reached informally through a handshake and/or formally 
manifested in contracts, depending on the degree of risk and the willingness of 
organisations to rely on trust. However, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) propose that 
excessive reliance on either of these increases the likelihood of disintegration of 
inter-organisational arrangements. This implies that finding the right balance 
between formal and informal mechanisms is important to sustain these arrangements. 
Finally, execution refers to the stage where the commitments are put into practice. 
The authors assume that initially the relationship is likely to be based on the role-
based behaviour of the parties which is informed by the formal structural agreements 
created at the commitment stage. However, after a series of interactions the parties 
may begin to rely on ‘inter-personal’ instead of ‘inter-role’ relationships. 
Due to the cyclical nature of the framework, it is argued that changing expectations 
and situations may provide an incentive to rethink the terms of the relationship, 
resulting in a several new cycles of negotiations, commitments and executions. 
Similarly, if the commitments are not executed in an efficient and equitable manner, 
it will initiate renegotiations and adjustment in commitments. In the final cycle, the 
parties may decide to terminate the relationship. 
On a closer look, Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) conceptualisation of the negotiation 
and commitment stages are consistent with the requirements for high levels of 
collaboration in the PPP literature. Similar to the Ring and Van de Ven’s framework, 
PPP scholars who distinguish collaborative partnerships from contractual 
arrangements put emphasis on the importance of negotiations to reach agreement. 
However, the logic behind the two lines of argument is somewhat different. The 
proponents of collaboration in PPPs support their standpoint by arguing that it allows 
partnership to take advantage of the strengths of both private and public sectors in 
ways that deliver synergistic outcomes (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and Teisman 2005; 
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Peters 1998). Ring and Van de Ven (1994), on the other hand, argue that repeated 
negotiations provide the opportunity to participating organisations ‘to assess 
uncertainty associated with the deal, the nature of each other's role, the other's 
trustworthiness, their rights and duties in the transaction being considered, and 
possible efficiency and equity of the transaction as it relates to all parties’ (Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994: 98). This shows that whilst the focus of most PPP scholars is 
mainly on outcomes and benefits of PPPs, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) pay attention 
to the role of process in shaping the inter-organisational arrangements and embedded 
IORs. The focus in the latter is useful to examine the ways in which IORs develop 
over time. 
Whilst it is clear that the concept of negotiation is considered crucial in both the PPP 
and IOR literatures, Levine and White (1961) in their framework for the study of 
inter-organisational relationships offer another related concept of orientation. They 
argue that in order to develop an exchange relationship the interacting organisations 
need to accept each other’s goals, referred to as ‘domain consensus’. They provide a 
useful framework for thinking about the different ways in which ‘domain consensus’ 
is achieved and argue that in cases where the functions of interacting organisations 
are not clearly defined negotiations are required to reach acceptance. However, when 
the functions are more clearly specified, ‘domain consensus’ may instead be attained 
by a process of orientation during which one organisation informs other partner 
organisations about the goals to be achieved and gives them an opportunity ‘to 
inquire about the specific procedures’ (Levine and White 1961: 599). The process of 
orientation does not necessarily require the readjustments and compromises that lie at 
the heart of negotiations. 
 
In sum, the aforementioned concepts and insights from the IOR literature when used 
vis-à-vis PPP literature can be valuable for understanding and examining IORs in 
PPPs, and hence will be incorporated in the conceptual framework of this study in 




This chapter has reviewed the broad and multi-disciplinary PPP literature and has 
concluded that whilst there is widespread agreement that PPPs are diverse and 
dynamic, there is no consensus on what constitutes a PPP and how to differentiate 
between varying forms of PPPs. The term public-private partnership is often labelled 
as ‘slippery’, ‘nebulous’, ‘contested’ and ‘ill-defined’ (Weihe 2008; Wettenhall 
2010; Powell and Glendinning 2002) and is defined in various ways. Hence, on the 
basis of the existing literature there seems to be no definitive answer to the first 
research question about what a PPP is. Put differently, there is ongoing debate in the 
literature about what PPPs are but there is a consensus among scholars that PPPs are 
dynamic and diverse. Given that relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to 
the relational aspects of PPPs, this research examines the dynamic IORs embedded in 
PPPs to help us better understand the PPPs. 
The chapter has provided a brief review of the IOR literature and has identified the 
value of drawing on both the IOR and PPP literatures when studying the relational 
aspects of PPPs. The review of the IOR literature in this chapter indicates that IORs 
in PPPs should be investigated during the different stages through which PPPs are 
established and managed over time. Moreover, in order to understand what 
influences and shapes IORs in PPPs one needs to examine the context in which 
interacting organisations are embedded, the nature of the organisations involved 
and their motives to enter partnerships. Whilst these four aspects serve as building 
blocks to develop the conceptual framework for this research, what needs to be 
examined further is the best way of characterising IORs in PPPs which is discussed 




Chapter 3 Understanding inter-organisational relationships 
in PPPs: developing a conceptual framework 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed both the PPP and IOR literatures and suggested that 
integrating the insights from these two research fields is valuable for both fields of 
knowledge. This chapter goes into further details to develop the conceptual 
framework in order to answer the research questions set out for the study reported in 
this thesis. 
The chapter is divided into five main sections and reflects the four building blocks, 
identified in the previous chapter, that are helpful to address the research questions. 
The first section discusses the conceptualisation of IORs in PPPs. The first half of 
this section considers the developmental process of both contractual and 
collaborative PPPs with particular attention to the IORs at different stages and the 
outcomes achieved. The second half of this section draws on the insights from the 
international development and not-for-profit sector literature to enhance our 
understanding of the complexity of IORs. Section 3.3 focuses on the contextual 
factors that are often discussed as influential determinants of IORs both in the PPP 
and in the broader IOR literature. Section 3.4 explains different organisational 
motives for choosing to enter partnerships and the ways these motives may shape the 
IORs. Section 3.5 outlines the organisational factors that have been found to be 
significant in shaping IORs. Section 3.6 integrates the concepts discussed in this 
chapter to articulate the conceptual framework for the research reported in this thesis. 
3.2 Developmental stages of PPPs and the conceptualisation of 
IORs 
Much of the PPP literature is focused on the balance of IORs in two main types of 
PPPs: contractual PPPs and collaborative PPPs. Scholars note the dominance of one 
party in asymmetrical relationships (contractual PPPs) versus a more symmetrical 
power relationship between interacting parties in collaborative PPPs. A common 
assumption is that the goal of PPPs should be to achieve collaborative IORs and a 
symmetrical balance of relationships, where no party to the partnership is dominant.  
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This is supported by some empirical evidence too. Koppenjan (2005), for example, 
argues that his empirical research on transport infrastructure PPPs in the Netherlands 
supports the advantages of collaboration and a ‘logic of connection’ as opposed to a 
contractual arrangement based on a ‘logic of division’. 
Drawing on the PPP literature, Table 3.1 illustrates the contrasts between contractual 
and collaborative PPPs. From an organisation theory perspective, contractual PPPs 
closely resemble the tenets of agency theory (see Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Eisenhardt 1989a; Van Slyke 2007). Collaborative PPPs, on the other hand, are based 
on the principles of a participative system (see Dachler and Wilpert 1978; McCaffrey 
et al. 1995) and notions of cooperation (Alter and Hage 1993). Table 3.1 lists the 
dimensions of PPPs that need to be investigated and considered in order to 
understand the embedded IORs. Keeping in view the developmental process of PPPs 
and IORs, the dimensions in Table 3.1 are grouped under three stage headings: PPP 
set-up, PPP management and PPP outcomes. Although it is not a common practice to 
include outcomes as a development stage, they are included in the table and in the 
conceptual framework because most arguments in favour of collaborative IORs are 
linked to achieving synergistic outcomes. Hence, it is important to compare 
contractual and collaborative PPPs with respect to outcomes too. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, frameworks aimed at explaining the developmental 
process of inter-organisational arrangements do so in two main ways: as a linear 
continuum of stages or as a repetitive cyclical process.  The conceptual framework 
for this research investigates the IORs during different linear stages but also 
considers the underlying iterations within these stages as suggested by Ring and Van 








(logic of division) 
Collaborative PPPs  
(logic of connection) 
Project set-up 
Project definition Unilateral: public sector party 
specifies the problem and solutions 
Joint project development: public and 
private parties involved in joint 




A clear distinction exists between 
the commissioner (public party) and 
the contractor (private party) 
The government and the private 
party involved in joint decision-
making 
Project content and 
scope 
Scope reduction; subdivision of 
project into parts; ex ante goal 
setting 
Scope management; integral 
planning; interweaving of 
objectives and interests 
Preconditions for 
success 
Clear contract and tendering rules 
and clearly formulated 
problems/project requirements 
Linking ambitions and goals as an 
ongoing process rather than clearly 
defined in advance, focus on jointly 
determined tailor-made rules for 




After formal public decision From the phases of exploration and 
planning 
Management 
Risk management Risks are reallocated and transferred Risks are jointly assessed, reallocated 
and shared 
Accountability Hierarchical: private party held 
accountable for the terms agreed in 
the contract and monitored by public 
sector party to meet the conditions of 
the contract 
Reciprocal: each partner is 
accountable to others for its actions 




Ex ante frameworks; strongly based 
on principles of project management 
(specifying goals, organising time 
planning, organising manpower) 
Based on the principles of process 
management (searching for goals, 
linking and connecting actors’ 
activities and linking of decisions) 
Level of co-
production 
Limited and occurring primarily 
prior to the tendering process; after 
that only monitoring; no co-
production 
Extensive during the whole process; 
at first primarily regarding the nature 
of ambitions and searching for 
linkages, later on more co-production 
in jointly realising ambitions 
Outcomes 
Resulting balance of 
IORs 
Asymmetrical: Public sector party 
can be seen a client or principal and 
private sector party as contractor or 
agent 
Symmetrical: More an equal 
(principal-principal) relationship 
characterised by joint determination 
of processes 
Synergistic outcomes Usually limited to cost savings Substantive improvements and 
innovative products/processes 




The argument underpinning the entries in Table 3.1 is that the developmental process 
of PPPs varies across the many dimensions of contractual and collaborative PPPs. 
Contractual PPPs are based on the ‘logic of division’ and hence have a strong 
tendency for clear distinctions and boundaries between responsibilities of each party. 
These PPPs are also referred to as concession models in which the government 
contracts private sector parties to realise public policy goals, and can take different 
forms such as DBFO (design-build-finance-operate) and its variants (Savas 2000; 
Pollitt 2003). Such PPPs involve government stating its requirements in output terms 
and then entering a contractual relationship with the private party (Skelcher 2005). 
Hence, PPPs are characterised by a clear distinction between the commissioner 
(public party) and the contractor (private party) in contractual arrangements. The 
preconditions for success in contractual PPPs are that the public sector devises a 
clear contract with a focus on subdivision of a project into parts and ex ante goal 
setting before involving the private parties. 
With respect to PPP set-up, the champions of collaboration and an interactive 
perspective argue that if public and private parties are involved in joint decision-
making from the phases of exploration and planning, it results in expansion of the 
scope of the project. This is because it allows an interweaving of the objectives and 
interests of both parties and provides an opportunity to look at problems and 
solutions from various perspectives. Besides scope expansion, interactive processes 
support collaborative IORs right from the start and link the ambitions and goals of all 
parties involved, which makes partnerships effective in achieving their goals. 
Conversely, lack of collaborative IORs between public and private parties at these 
initial stages results in identification of the solutions too quickly by the 
commissioning party (public sector) due to which the opportunities for scope 
expansion are neglected (Klijn and Teisman 2000; 2005; Koppenjan 2005). 
The logic of connection and division also varies considerably in the ways PPPs are 
managed. It is argued that collaborative IORs during project set-up result in high 
levels of ambition and commitment to intensive co-production during the whole 
process. On the other hand, IORs with strong emphasis on ex ante goal setting and 
division of responsibilities through contracts result in limited co-production 
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occurring prior to the tendering process followed by interactions that are mainly for 
regulation and monitoring purposes. This is the reason that hierarchical 
accountability is a main feature of contractual PPPs whereby private parties are held 
accountable for the terms agreed in the contract and monitored by public sector party 
to meet the conditions of the contract (Klijn and Teisman 2005; Teisman and Klijn 
2002). On the contrary, reciprocal accountability in PPPs characterised by 
collaborative IORs makes each partner accountable to others for its actions and 
potential impact on the partnership (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Klijn and Teisman 2000). 
In line with the above views, contractual PPPs are characterised by project 
management and collaborative PPPs by process management (Edelenbos and Klijn 
2009; Mandell 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Agranoff and McGuire 2003). 
Project management focuses on clear goals and solutions identified by the initiating 
actor (Mantel 2005) and is primarily concerned with ‘controlling the project 
internally with less emphasis on the environment (stakeholders) of the project’ 
(Edelenbos and Klijn 2009: 314). Process management, on the other hand, does not 
strive to identify clear goals and solutions at the outset. Rather it brings different 
stakeholders together from the start and is more concerned with managing 
interactions among different actors throughout the life-cycle of a project (Mandell 
2001; Klijn and Teisman 2005). 
Due to its focus on a unilateral specification of problem and solution, scope 
reduction and lack of private parties’ involvement in the initial phases, contractual 
PPPs are often associated with risk avoidance behaviour from both sides. However, 
collaborative PPPs and joint project development are argued to be an important 
opportunity to understand different competing interests and thereby increase the level 
of coordination between the parties involved. This is seen as an effective way to 
encourage risk sharing behaviour among parties (Klijn and Teisman 2003; Van Ham 
and Koppenjan 2001; Edelenbos and Teisman 2008). 
The debate on contractual and collaborative PPPs is inconclusive when it comes to 
the question about which type leads to better outcomes for a PPP (Edelenbos and 
Klijn 2009). Not surprisingly, each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses. 
Clear contracts have the advantage of boosting efficiency due to their emphasis on 
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performance and outcomes (Savas 2000; Martin 2005). Furthermore ex ante 
specification of roles and responsibilities and clear identification of the ways in 
which performance of each party will be assessed are claimed to improve 
accountability (Johnston and Romzek 2005) which is raised as an important issue to 
be addressed in PPPs (Broadbent and Laughlin 2003; Hodge and Greve 2007). The 
advocates of contracting consider it essential to specify clear goals and obligations of 
each party so as to avoid the problems of information asymmetry, adverse selection 
and moral hazards (Hart 2003). 
On the other hand, the adherents of collaborative PPPs argue that in complex cases 
characterised by uncertainty there are more chances that goals and performance 
criteria change over time and hence ex ante frameworks do not work (Osborne 2000; 
Edelenbos and Teisman 2008). Also collaborative IORs make it possible to increase 
the commitment of all stakeholders and thus improve the chances of substantive 
improvements. Not involving stakeholders in the initial stages may result in lack of 
commitment and opposition to many decisions (Klijn and Teisman 2005). 
The advocates of collaborative PPPs argue that collaboration allows partnerships to 
take benefit of the comparative advantages of both the private and public sectors in 
ways that deliver synergistic benefits (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and Teisman 2005; 
Peters 1998). Klijn and Teisman (2005), for instance, identify a rising scale of 
surplus value from simple cost savings to substantive improvements and innovative 
products. It is argued that contractual PPPs usually result in simple cost savings only 
and that substantive improvement and innovative products and services only become 
possible with collaborative IORs. 
The concept of synergistic outcomes (also referred to as added value or collaborative 
advantage) is especially fuzzy when it comes to partnerships. ‘Because each 
partnership is unique in its composition and programmatic goals’, explains 
Brinkerhoff (2002b: 225), ‘it is impossible to identify specific cross cutting 
indicators’. Nevertheless, the literature offers useful indicators that can be utilised to 
specify the synergistic outcomes of partnerships more generally. In this framework, 
synergistic outcomes are operationalised using two commonly used indicators. First, 
the added value created by a PPP that could not be achieved by each partner working 
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alone. This may include qualitative or quantitative outcomes that were not possible 
without forming a partnership. This indicator is difficult to confirm because 
attribution is problematic. Many scholars have dealt with this problem by primarily 
(though not exclusively) using perception- and consensus-based views about the 
value added by a partnership (Thomson et al. 2009; Brinkerhoff 2002a; Chen 2010). 
Using this approach the value added by a PPP is measured by the extent to which 
partner organisation perceive that the outcomes achieved were possible due to the 
partnership. The second indicator of synergistic benefits used in this thesis is the 
extent to which partner organisations perceive that they are able to meet their own 
organisational objectives through a PPP arrangement. This is especially important 
given that entering a partnership arrangement requires huge effort on the part of each 
partner organisation and unless each partner organisation is able to meet its 
organisational objectives for joining the partnership there is a constant threat to the 
sustainability of the partnership (Cropper 1996; Gray 2000; Brinkerhoff 2002a). 
Although the binary classification of IORs (as contractual or collaborative) in the 
PPP literature is potentially useful as an initial heuristic and it identifies some useful 
dimensions to investigate IORs, a need for a richer conceptualisation of IORs 
remains. In the following discussion the conceptual framework for this research 
draws on the frameworks and typologies of IORs developed in the literature on 
international development and not-for-profit sector to enhance the understanding of 
the complexity of IORs. 
Further conceptualisation of IORs in PPPs 
As noted by Lewis (2000: 253), the increasing interest of the researchers in not-for-
profit organisations has resulted ‘in the growth of two parallel worlds of research 
literatures, one dealing with Western industrialised countries and another with 
international development work and third world’. Whilst most of the PPP literature 
relates to the former, the latter has paid more attention towards understanding the 
complexity of IORs and it offers many typologies and classifications of IORs. 
Although the main focus of these typologies is to identify dimensions to understand 
government-NGO relationships (Najam 2000; Lewis 1997; Young 2000; Coston 
1998), they also offer possible ways to study IORs in PPPs. In an effort to review the 
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various typological classifications of government-NGO relationships, Teamey (2007: 
54) mentions that most of them are ‘theoretical think pieces that did not refer to 
specific empirical research’. Using some of these classifications to understand the 
IORs in PPPs in this research is an opportunity to ground them in some empirical 
evidence. 
Some of the typologies characterise different types of IORs in 2x2 matrices while 
others arrange them on a continuum across one or more dimensions. For example, 
Coston (1998) suggests an eight-point typology of government-NGO relationships 
along a continuum which runs from repression to collaboration. IORs are analysed 
along three dimensions: the government’s resistance or acceptance of institutional 
pluralism; the degree of formality in relationships; and the balance of power in 
relationships. The analysis results in eight main relationship types: repression, rivalry 
and competition (all of which involve government resistance to institutional 
pluralism); and contracting, third-party government, cooperation, complementarity 
and collaboration (where government accepts institutional pluralism). Since the 
formation of PPPs in itself symbolises government acceptance of institutional 
pluralism to some extent, the type of IORs characterised by government resistance to 
institutional pluralism are not relevant to this thesis. These eight relationship types 
are intended to provide a ‘point of reference’ to compare and contrast different 
relationship types. Coston (1998) proposes that active participation on the part of all 
actors can cause movement from one relationship to another towards the right side of 
the continuum. 




Najam (2000) proposes four main types of NGO-government relationship – the four 
Cs of cooperation, co-optation, complementarity and confrontation (see Figure 3.2).  
Each type is based on two dimensions: the preferred goals (ends) and preferred 
strategy (means) of the actors involved. Najam argues that we need to focus on the 
resulting relationship of inter-organisational arrangements rather than looking at the 
individual attributes of different actors to obtain robust understanding. He does not 
consider that these types are mutually exclusive, which means that more than one 
type of relationship can exist within a particular PPP arrangement. 
Figure 3.2: The four Cs of NGO-government relations (Najam 2000) 
  
 
Brinkerhoff (2002b) has identified two dimensions for analysing IORs: mutuality 
and organisation identity. These two dimensions are used to plot four types of IORs – 
partnership, contracting, extension, and co-optation & gradual absorption (see Figure 
3.3). Mutuality refers to interdependence among different organisations in such 
relationships. When high, it emphasises equality in decision-making and mutually 
agreed aims and values. It acts as an incentive or motivating factor to enter into 
partnership and promotes a sense of ownership. Organisation identity refers to an 
organisation’s unique identity, values, mission and constituencies. Organisation 
identity also represents the comparative advantage of participating organisations that 





Figure 3.3: Partnership model (Brinkerhoff 2002b) 
         Mutuality 
                Low                          High 
High 
Organisational identity 
            Low 
 
Following Brinkerhoff, the analysis of IORs in this research recognises that 
mutuality and organisation identities are useful dimensions to characterise IORs in 
PPPs. But in contrast to Brinkerhoff, the analysis does not consider only high levels 
of mutuality and organisation identity as defining dimensions of a partnership 
relationship. 
The typological classifications of Coston (1998), Najam (2000) and Brinkerhoff 
(2002b), with respect to government-NGO relationship, are useful in making further 
sense of the complexity inherent in IORs. Drawing on these typologies, the 
conceptual framework for this thesis recognises the possibility of cooperative and 
conflictual IORs in addition to the contractual and collaborative IORs. Each is 
described in more detail below. The resulting fourfold conceptualisation of IORs is 
set out in Table 3.2.  
Collaborative IORs 
Based on the conceptualisation of collaborative PPPs in Table 3.1 and other 
dimensions that are often associated with collaborative IORs, the construct of 
collaborative IORs is operationalised using five indicators: participative decision-
making, shared power arrangements, reciprocal accountability, joint determination of 
partnership activities and trust (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Klijn and Teisman 2005; 
Thomson et al. 2009). Participative decision-making is manifested through the extent 
to which partner organisations take other partner organisations’ opinions seriously, 
brainstorm to find solutions to address the problems faced, and jointly agree on 












inter-organisational arrangements between pursuing individual organisational 
mission to maintain own identity and achieving collective partnership goals. The 
indicators that reflect shared power arrangements are the extent to which 
organisations in PPP relationships share information and resources, acknowledge 
each other’s contribution, work together to achieve collective goals and work 
through differences to arrive at win-win solutions. Reciprocal accountability 
manifests the extent to which interdependent (as opposed to sequential or 
hierarchical) coordination exists. It includes regular reporting among partners and 
access to performance information of the partnership. Joint determination of 
partnership activities involves clarity of roles and responsibilities, participation of all 
partner organisations in planning and review meetings, partners’ satisfaction with 
opportunities to participate according to their agreed roles based on their comparative 
advantages and well-coordinated programme activities. Finally, trust manifests itself 
as a belief that other partners will honestly engage in any negotiations to reach 
agreement, can competently deliver their obligations to the partnership, will make 
efforts in good-faith to act according to the commitments (both explicit and implicit), 
and will not take excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is 
available (Cummings and Bromiley 1996). 
These indicators are strongly influenced by the notion of improving equality in 
partnerships. By promoting collaborative IORs it is assumed, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that the resulting balance of IORs will be symmetrical (a principal-
principal relationship) and no one party to the partnership will be dominant. 
Contractual IORs 
In this research contractual IORs are conceptualised as almost the opposite of 
collaborative IORs (as described in Table 3.1), and hence represent lack of 
participative decision-making, asymmetrical power arrangements, hierarchical 
accountability, a priori design of partnership activities by one party/organisation and 
lack of trust. Lack of participative decision-making is reflected when partners 
perceive that there are not enough opportunities to take part in the decision-making 
process about the partnership or if they exist their opinions are not taken seriously by 
others. Moreover, partners feel that decisions are communicated or enforced without 
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any consideration of whether they agree or not. Asymmetrical power arrangements 
refer to the dominance of one party over other(s). In these situations the intrinsic 
tension between pursuing individual organisational mission to maintain own identity 
and achieving collective partnership goals is resolved by those with less power 
compromising their organisational identity in favour of the dominating partner, 
which in turn hinders the sub-ordinate organisations from meeting their own 
missions and reduces organisational autonomy. Hierarchical accountability is 
demonstrated through the extent to which one party in a partnership is accountable to 
the other for its actions and impact on the partnership. In contractual IORs, 
hierarchical accountability is typically established through monitoring and 
performance-reporting requirements enforced by the dominating partner. A priori 
design of partnership activities represents a situation where the specifics of the 
partnership programme and activities are designed by one organisation which 
specifies the organisational characteristics and contributions sought in other partners 
(Klijn and Teisman 2005). There is great reliance on standard operating procedures 
to coordinate programme activities in contractual IORs. Lack of trust is manifested 
by the risk of being deceived that the other partners may pursue their own self-
interest at the cost of the goals of the partnership (Van Slyke 2007). 
Given the initial disposition of distrust, PPP characterised by contractual IORs 
manifests ‘coercive and compliance-based monitoring and reporting mechanisms and 
uses incentives and sanctions for achieving goal alignment’ (Van Slyke 2007: 166). 
This resembles the tenets of agency theory which typically features the asymmetrical 
balance of IORs (dominance of principal over agent). 
Cooperative IORs 
The literature tends to use ‘cooperation’ in many different ways. In his framework of 
NGO-government relationships Najam (2000), for example, refers to cooperative 
IORs when the goals and preferred strategies of the government and NGO are 
synchronised. To him, cooperative IORs are a synonym for collaborative IORs. He 
draws on Waddell’s (1998) conceptualisation of collaboration in adopting ‘a more 
relaxed definition’ of collaboration. This is mainly because he does not consider 
‘perfect power symmetry between NGOs and government as a pre-requisite for 
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collaboration or cooperation’ (Najam 2000: 384).  Another view is offered by Coston 
(1998) who distinguishes between cooperation and collaboration on the basis of 
balance of power between the government and NGOs. She places much more 
importance on symmetrical power relationships and thus collaborative IORs have to 
manifest greater power symmetry. Cooperation, to her, is a milder notion and this is 
the reason that she places it before collaboration on her continuum of IORs.  
Similar to Coston’s conceptualisation, the conceptual framework for this thesis 
considers collaboration and cooperation as distinct types of IORs. Cooperative IORs 
are defined as relationships where none of the partners consider that its intentions or 
actions are challenged by other partners. This means that in cooperative IORs there 
might be situations when one organisation calls all or most of the shots and is 
dominant. Nevertheless it is in the interest of others or they are willing to accept the 
lead of a more dominant organisation due to the importance they place on developing 
trust. In cooperative IORs, the benefits of choosing to work together are perceived as 
exceeding the concerns that are particularly related to loss of autonomy and control. 
This is why the organisations are more willing to adapt and are less concerned about 
organisation autonomy even in the situations of asymmetrical power relations. 
In terms of accepting the lead of the dominant partner, this conceptualisation of 
cooperative IORs concurs with Brinkerhoff’s (2002b) characterisation of IORs as 
‘extension’ or ‘co-optation and gradual absorption’. However, the conceptualisation 
of cooperative IORs is different to these two in this thesis. Whilst Brinkerhoff argues 
that these type of IORs result in subtle loss of organisation identity and hence make it 
difficult to attain any synergistic outcomes, the cooperative IORs described in this 
thesis manifest a careful balance between willingness to adapt and maintain one’s 
own organisation identity so as to contribute comparative advantages to the 
partnership. 
Conflictual IORs 
Conflictual IORs are likely to occur in situations when there is a tendency on the part 
of one organisation to dominate whereas other organisation/s are not willing to 
accept the dominance. As expected this results in friction among partners due to 
difference in preferences about how to manage the partnership. Whilst the one trying 
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to dominant prefers to maintain contractual IORs, others are resistant to dominance 
and prefer more collaborative relationships. The result is a situation similar to tug-of-
war to gain power and influence so that the partnership reflects the identity of one 
party. Lack of satisfaction with the decision-making and coordination process, 
concerns over the loss of organisation autonomy and resistance to relinquishing 
autonomy and control creates an ongoing conflict between different parties to 
maintain their own distinct organisation identities. 
There is some similarity between conflictual IORs and Najam’s (2000) idea of ‘co-
optation’ in that both parties in a relationship attempt to influence each other and that 
these type of IORs are likely to be unstable. Because in the long run, either one of the 
parties will convince the other party and the IORs will change into cooperative or 
collaborative IORs, or the situation will worsen and turn into open confrontation and 
termination of partnership relationship. However, Najam’s definition of co-optation 
restricts the concept to instances where both parties have similar preferred strategies 
but dissimilar goals. Within the context of this thesis, conflictual IORs are not 
limited to dissimilar goals and instead also include what Najam calls 
complementarity within conflictual IORs. In Najam’s (2000) conceptualisation, the 
difference between the two types of relationships is that co-optation represents 
preferring dissimilar goals but similar preferred strategies and complementarity is a 
combination of dissimilar means but similar goals. However, in this thesis both these 
combinations represent instances where conflicts are likely among interacting 
partners and hence are labelled as conflictual IORs. 
The review of the government-NGO relations have furthered the conceptualisation of 
IORs in this thesis by adding two more types of IORs that are likely in PPPs to the 
ones suggested by the PPP literature (as described in Table 3.1). Ideally, it would be 
useful to be able to plot cooperative and conflictual IORs as two new columns on 
Table 3.1, but the detail within the literature does not permit that. Instead the main 
features of cooperative and conflictual IORs are summarised in Table 3.2 and for 
comparison purposes some of the main characteristics of collaborative and 
contractual IORs within PPPs are distilled from Table 3.1. Accordingly, Table 3.1 
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will be used as an analytical tool to compare and contrast the case studies presented 
in this thesis in conjunction with the features from Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Further conceptualisation of IORs 
IORs Indicators 
Collaborative  Participative decision-making 
 Shared power arrangements 
 Reciprocal accountability 
 Joint determination of partnership activities 
 Trust 
Contractual  Lack of participative decision-making 
 Asymmetrical power arrangements 
 Hierarchical accountability 
 A priori design of partnership activities by one 
party/organisation 
 Lack of trust 
Cooperative  Eager to develop trust 
 Willingness to adapt  
 Lack of concerns about organisation autonomy even in 
asymmetrical power relations 
Conflictual  Lack of satisfaction with the decision-making and 
coordination process 
 Concerns over the loss of organisation autonomy 
 Resistance to relinquishing autonomy and control 
 
The above discussion of different possible dimensions and types of IORs and their 
implications for the synergistic outcomes of PPPs suggests some arguments that can 
be explored in the selected educational PPPs in Pakistan. If PPPs are set-up and 
managed through a contractual approach, it is likely that the balance of IORs will be 
asymmetrical which restricts the achievement of synergistic outcomes. The 
realisation of synergistic outcomes in PPPs seems to be more likely when PPPs are 
set-up and managed more collaboratively with the involvement of all partners so that 
the resulting balance of IORs is symmetrical. 
The theories and concepts used to analyse the factors that shape IORs within PPPs 
are discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
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3.3 Contextual factors 
Contextual factors operate at the macro-level and are said to be beyond a particular 
case (Batley 2008). They constitute the context in which public and private sector 
organisations operate. Also sometimes referred to as environmental factors, they are 
often seen as influential determinants of forming inter-organisational arrangements in 
both the PPP and broader IOR literatures (Murray 1998; Thomson and Perry 2006; 
Wood and Gray 1991; Osborne and Murray 2000). Most of this literature focuses on 
these factors as antecedents to the formation of the inter-organisational arrangements 
(Oliver 1990; Bryson et al. 2006; Murray 1998; Doz 1996; Alter and Hage 1993). 
While this offers background insights to the formation of partnerships, it neglects the 
ongoing connection between the contextual factors and the nature of IORs. 
Contextual factors need to be examined not only as antecedents but also as factors 
that unfold and interplay with other factors during the development and operation of 
PPPs. For instance, Chen’s (2010) evaluation of inter-organisational collaborations in 
Los Angeles County’s Family Preservation Program found that contextual factors 
influenced the outcomes of the partnerships but that the effects of these factors was 
mediated by different process variables (such as joint decision-making, resource 
sharing, joint operations, trust building and organisational autonomy). That is, 
contextual factors not only helped to explain the formation of partnerships but also 
continued to influence the nature of IORs. Based on the existing literature, the more 
important and frequently referred to contextual factors are: interdependence; 
institutional pressures; reputation; and the different backgrounds and identities of 
public and private actors. In line with the research objectives, this thesis examines 
the effects of these factors in two ways: 1) the ways in which they stimulate the 
formation of PPPs, and 2) the ways in which they influence the ongoing nature of 
IORs. The discussion of each of the above mentioned contextual factors in the 
remainder of this section considers both of these issues. 
 Interdependence 3.3.1
Interdependence is widely mentioned as an important contextual factor that 
facilitates the formation of different types of inter-organisational arrangements 
(Levine and White 1961; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Alter and Hage 1993; Dyer and 
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Singh 1998), including those involving public and private sector organisations 
(Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002; Kickert et al. 1997). 
Pfeffer and Salancik have defined interdependence as follows:  
Interdependence is the reason why nothing comes out quite the way one 
wants to. Any event that depends on more than a single causal agent is an 
outcome based on interdependent agents… interdependence exists 
whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions 
necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome 
desired from the action  (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: 40). 
One of the main reasons that organisations are interdependent is resource scarcity 
(Pfeffer 1992). In situations where resources are relatively in excess to demand, 
interdependence is reduced and there are less or no incentives to enter inter-
organisational arrangements. Though resource scarcity can facilitate the formation of 
inter-organisational arrangements of many types, PPPs in particular are often driven 
by situations where each sector working alone has failed to address a public policy 
problem (Bryson et al. 2006; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002). 
Besides being an antecedent to PPP formation, interdependence and resource scarcity 
have some important implications for the nature of PPPs and IORs which are often 
neglected by the PPP literature. The IOR literature notes that interdependencies may 
induce cooperative or competitive motives (Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
Cooperative motives are anticipated by exchange theory (Levine and White 1961) 
whereas resource dependence theory suggests that a power seeking behaviour by 
partner organisations will result in a desire to compete (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Thus, interdependencies are found to predict the formation of partnerships but they 
do not straightforwardly predict the nature of IORs, rather they influence them 
indirectly depending on the motives of the organisations involved (discussed in 
section 3.4 on motives to enter partnerships). 
 Institutional pressures 3.3.2
Institutional pressures constitute a set of factors related to the context in which 
partnerships are embedded. These pressures significantly affect the formation as well 
as the long-term sustainability of partnerships (Sharfman et al. 1991; Bryson et al. 
2006). Much of the existing literature pays attention to the ways in which 
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institutional forces are seen as a group of pressures that can either promote or impede 
the formation of partnerships (Murray 1998; Sharfman et al. 1991; Oliver 1990). 
Under this approach institutional pressures are seen as forces that exert pressure on 
organisations to conform to prevailing norms and rules in order to achieve legitimacy 
(Dimaggio and Powell 1983). 
Institutional theory asserts that institutional environments force organisations to 
appear legitimate and conform to prevailing social norms. One way an organisation 
may respond to these institutional pressures is by entering a partnership relationship 
with those organisations that have an established reputation, image, visibility and/or 
prestige. Alongside enhancing legitimacy, an organisation may be inclined to form 
partnerships simply as a result of isomorphic pressures which involve mimicking or 
imitating social norms for its own survival and acceptance (Dimaggio and Powell 
1983; Scott 1995; Oliver 1991; Dacin et al. 2007). 
An organisation’s decision to enter a partnership is also influenced by its dependence 
on funding agencies which are increasingly promoting and requiring partnerships as 
a condition to receive funding. Such dependency on funding bodies has long been 
recognised as affecting organisational strategy, including willingness to form 
partnerships (Oliver 1990; Alter and Hage 1993). With respect to the ways in which 
funding agencies or donors influence IORs, Chen (2010) found: 
When an organization seeks to build up its legitimacy by complying with 
funding agency requirements, working with respectable partners and 
creating opportunity for future collaborations, it may well make 
investments in collaborative processes for interorganizational 
coordination, information management, and addressing accountability 
issues, which help demonstrate such legitimacy. Because of these 
investments, relation-specific assets would be accumulated by partners, 
including better shared decision making, operations, resource exchange, 
and increased trust, respect, and shared values and norms (Chen 2010: 
389). 
Chen’s findings are a rare example of empirical evidence that sheds light on the 




Before entering partnership arrangements organisations also pay attention to the past 
performance of potential partners. With respect to PPPs, public sector managers 
often use reputation as a mechanism for identifying partners and evaluating their past 
performance (Van Slyke 2007). Parties with good reputation of past performance are 
more likely to be selected as partners.  Applying agency theory, reputation helps 
public sector managers to mitigate the risks of opportunistic behaviour by private 
sector partners (Van Slyke 2007). This is the reason that reputation is often referred 
to as a contract enforcer or bonding mechanism in agency theory literature (Milgrom 
and Roberts 1992). 
As well as facilitating the formation of inter-organisational arrangements, reputation 
is also a factor that influences the nature of IORs. Working together with partners 
with a good reputation is found to improve joint decision-making and trust-building 
processes (Chen 2010), and trust is seen as a central component of collaborative 
IORs (Huxham and Vangen 2005; Bryson et al. 2006; Thomson and Perry 2006). 
Bryson and colleagues mention trust as ‘both the lubricant and the glue’ that 
facilitates collaborative working and holds partnerships together (Bryson et al. 2006: 
47).  
Van Slyke (2007) has investigated contracting relationships between government and 
not-for-profits in New York State and found a causal relationship between reputation 
and trust. He states that reputation is a factor that can ‘transform contractual 
relationships from a hierarchical and control-oriented principal-agent relationship to 
a more involvement-oriented principal-steward arrangement’ because of its positive 
role in building trust (Van Slyke 2007: 174). He goes on to suggest that level of trust 
and forms of monitoring are also interlinked. Lower levels of trust result in more 
frequent and demanding forms of monitoring whereas higher levels of trust result in 
less frequent monitoring thereby influencing the nature of IORs in partnerships. 
 Sector differences 3.3.4
In addition to the above mentioned contextual factors that affect the formation of all 
types of alliances and inter-organisational arrangements, cross-sector partnerships 
such as PPPs are characterised by partners belonging to different sectors. As 
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mentioned in the previous chapter, the debate about whether the public and private 
sectors are more different or similar has existed for decades with no agreement so 
far. 
The existing PPP literature talks about the sector differences of partners both as a 
potential benefit and challenge for PPPs. On one side different identities are seen as 
beneficial as they allow partnerships to benefit from the expertise of both private and 
public sectors in ways that deliver synergistic benefits (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and 
Teisman 2005; Peters 1998). On the other side, different identities are referred to as a 
challenge and source of complexity in PPPs. From the latter perspective it is argued 
that public and private sector actors have different values, strategies and core 
objectives. For instance, based on their analysis of the Dutch PPPs, Klijn and 
Teisman (2003) found that the different background of public and private partners is 
a source of tension and a barrier to achieving the added value of PPPs. They draw on 
Jacobs’ (1992) description of the public and private domains as two ethical systems 
with different ‘moral syndromes’. In this respect, the public and private domains are 
characterised by a ‘guardian’ and ‘commercial’ syndrome respectively. The public 
sector is considered to have values such as respecting tradition and hierarchy, 
devoted to a self-defined public cause, controllability of process and approach, and 
emphasis on risk avoidance. The private sector, on the other hand, possesses values 
congruent to the commercial syndrome such as devoted to consumer preferences, 
controlled by shareholders on the basis of results, emphasis on market opportunities 
and innovation, and willingness to take on market risks (Klijn and Teisman 2003: 
143). Sector differences are reflected in the vision and mission, and culture and 
structure of organisations and have implications for the nature of IORs which will be 
discussed further in section 3.5 on organisational factors. 
  
The discussion of contextual factors in this section highlights that although these 
factors support the formation of PPPs (as suggested by the extant literature), it is not 
always possible to predict the effect of these factors on IORs in PPPs. Instead most 
of these factors interact with partners’ motives to enter PPPs in the process of 
shaping IORs. For example, the contextual factor of interdependence may stimulate 
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motives to cooperate or compete, and these motives in turn influence the nature of 
IORs. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw out some explicit proposals regarding some 
contextual factors. For instance, it is expected that institutional pressures and 
partnering with the organisations of good reputation are more likely to support the 
collaborative IORs, but sector differences are likely to impede collaborative IORs in 
PPPs. 
3.4 Motives to enter partnerships 
As mentioned earlier, the PPP literature often mentions contextual factors as an 
antecedent to PPP formation. What tends to be overlooked in the PPP literature are 
the different partner motives for entering partnerships, which may affect responses to 
contextual factors and influence the nature of IORs. For this reason the conceptual 
framework for this thesis pays particular attention to these motives. The broader IOR 
literature has paid attention to the motives which influence organisations to establish 
inter-organisational arrangements (e.g. Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; 
Levine and White 1961). This section uses both the IOR literature and the PPP 
literature to understand how contextual factors interplay with partner motives and 
what the implications this are for IORs.  
This section mainly draws on a framework developed by Oliver (1990) that was 
introduced in Chapter 2. In short, she suggests six different motives for the formation 
of inter-organisational arrangements: asymmetry, reciprocity, legitimacy, stability, 
efficiency and necessity. Although she focuses on these as motives that persuade 
organisations to establish inter-organisational arrangements, they also have 
implications for the resulting nature of IORs. 
Oliver’s (1990) uses ‘asymmetry’ to describe a desire to exert power and control 
over the resources of others. However, please note that the motive of ‘asymmetry’ 
will be referred to from now on as ‘power acquisition’. This is to avoid confusion 
with the use of ‘asymmetry’ to explain the balance of IORs. 
In the context of interdependence and resource scarcity, IOR researchers have 
identified two distinct motives to enter inter-organisational arrangements: reciprocity 
and power acquisition. Oliver (1990: 245) proposes that IORs are characterised by 
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‘balance, harmony, equity, and mutual support’ in the case of reciprocal motives and 
by ‘coercion, conflict and domination’ in cases where power acquisition motives are 
more prominent. Although we have different explanations of motives, there is no 
indication in the literature which helps to predict which motive will actually manifest 
itself in particular situations. 
The main indicators of motives of power acquisition found in the literature are: 1) 
attempt to increase control over crucial resources, 2) exerting control over the rules 
governing exchange, 3) resistance to adapting according to the needs of others, 4) the 
ability to choose a "do without" strategy, and 5) resistance to relinquishing autonomy 
and control (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Oliver 1990; Wood and Gray 1991). 
In contrast, the main indicators of reciprocal motives are: 1) a desire to cooperate and 
exchange resources,  2) mutual agreement to abide by shared rules, 3) willingness to 
adapt according to needs, 4) tolerance for sharing power, and 5) partners’ perception 
that the benefits of choosing to cooperate exceed concerns, particularly about the loss 
of autonomy and control (Wood and Gray 1991; Oliver 1990; Levine and White 
1961). 
Another motive that has received considerable attention by scholars is the need to 
enhance organisational legitimacy. Chen (2010) identifies three reasons why 
organisations enter partnerships to enhance their legitimacy: to meet funding agency 
expectations or requirements; to enhance organisational reputation; and to build 
future relationships. Partnerships are seen as desirable thing to do that is either 
encouraged or enforced by the donors and funding agencies (Murray 1998; Bryson et 
al. 2006), or they serve as a means to build future relationships with respectable 
organisations which may enhance an organisation’s ability to gain future contracts or 
to achieve organisational goals. All these reasons to enter inter-organisational 
arrangements are often described as institutional pressures (Chen 2010).  
Following DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) argument, institutional theory predicts a 
passive role for organisations as they undergo the process of isomorphism in order to 
conform to the rules and expectations of their institutional environment. This means 
that the environment imposes constraints on organisations that affect their practices. 
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It is important to note that although conformity could be argued to be an active 
organisational response to institutionalisation, it is referred to as passive relative to 
the active resistance and manipulative behaviour of the organisations in cases of non-
conformity (Oliver 1991). This implies that when organisations enter partnerships for 
the purpose of increasing legitimacy they adapt themselves so as to appear consistent 
with the ways in which legitimate organisation operate. In this way isomorphic 
pressures can stimulate organisations to seek support from partners whose level of 
legitimacy is deemed higher than their own (Oliver 1990), and this is said to  
facilitate a reciprocal interplay between partners. 
The phenomenon of isomorphism is said to pose limits to organisation identity and 
the added value of partnerships. In their comparison of traditional and radical health 
sector not-for-profits, Brainard and Siplon (2002) note a significant degree of 
isomorphism in the case of traditional health advocacy not-for-profits who seek 
substantial support from government to the point that they were criticised as being 
indistinguishable from the public-sector health establishment, and hence lost their 
unique organisation identity. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002) argue that loss of 
organisation identity, as a side-effect of isomorphism, can lead to a diminished 
capacity of a partner to maximise its contribution in the longer run; thus affecting the 
added value of the partnership. 
Although it is conventional in the existing literature to ground issues concerning 
legitimacy in institutional theory, Oliver (1991) argues that organisational motives to 
enhance legitimacy can be explained by both institutional and resource dependence 
theories. Resource dependence theorists suggest that motives to enhance legitimacy 
may also be linked to power acquisition motives based on the expectations that 
establishing a link with a reputable organisation will increase an organisation’s 
power and influence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In this perspective, legitimacy is 
seen ‘as one more resource to be acquired’ through forming inter-organisational 
arrangements (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: xvi). Oliver (1991) has captured the key 




Both proponents of institutional and resource dependence perspectives, 
therefore, assume that organizational choice is possible within the 
context of external constraints, but institutional theorists have tended to 
focus on conformity rather than resistance, passivity rather than 
activeness, and preconscious acceptance rather than political 
manipulation in response to external pressures and expectations (Oliver 
1991: 149). 
Organisations may also enter into inter-organisational arrangements so as to achieve 
stability in the flow of resources. From this perspective, enhanced legitimacy is seen 
as a resource (Phillips et al. 2000) that helps to reduce uncertainty in the flow of 
funds. Hence, entering partnerships ‘serve as coping strategies to forestall, forecast, 
or absorb uncertainty in order to achieve an orderly, reliable pattern of resource 
flows and exchanges’ (Oliver 1990: 246). 
Putting together the expectations of institutional and resource dependence theories, it 
can be proposed that on the one hand entering partnerships may be an adaptive 
response to achieve stability in the flow of resources, including legitimacy, and it 
may drive organisations to jostle for more power and influence. On the other hand, 
environmental uncertainty and interdependence may induce organisations to enter 
partnerships with reciprocal motives supressing power plays ‘in the hopes that 
equity, reciprocity, and harmony will facilitate stability’ (Oliver 1990: 247). This 
suggests the intentions to enhance legitimacy and ensure stability can ultimately be 
linked to the motives of power acquisition or reciprocity. 
While all the above motives to enter partnerships are linked to contextual factors, the 
motive of efficiency is said to be internally rather than externally driven (Oliver 
1990). The formation of partnerships for the purposes of efficiency relates to an 
organisation’s desire to improve its input-output ratio. The PPP literature refers to it 
as the ‘make-or-buy’ decisions of government (Skelcher 2005; originally Osborne 
and Gaebler 1992). From this perspective, governments can either pursue societal 
goals directly through public employees and infrastructure (the make decision), or 
choose to interact with the private sector (the buy decision). Skelcher (2005) sees 
increased efficiency as one of the theoretical rationales for PPPs. 
The motive of efficiency is equally relevant to private sector parties too and it is 
theoretically rooted in Williamson’s (1979; 1985) transaction cost perspective. As 
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explained in Chapter 2, TCE focuses on matching the economic institutions, such as 
firms, intermediate structures and markets, with economic interactions so as to most 
efficiently organise a particular transaction. With respect to inter-organisational 
arrangements, transaction cost theory suggests that organisations will choose to enter 
such arrangements in an attempt to become more efficient and economise on the 
costs of transactions. Thus ‘the impetus to pursue mutually beneficial relations [and 
hence reciprocal motives] may be greater if an organization anticipates that greater 
internal efficiency will result from the relationship’ (Oliver 1990: 248). In somewhat 
similar vein, Chen (2010: 389) argues that when an organisation seeks to reduce 
transaction costs it is followed by collaborative IORs with ‘lower monitoring costs, 
easier communication, more joint decision making and operations, and better 
resource sharing’. 
The PPP literature looks at efficiency motives from a different perspective. It looks 
at competitive tendering and contracting-out as a route towards the efficiency gains 
which are expected as a result of changes in management practices and working 
conditions (Skelcher 2005; Edelenbos and Klijn 2009). This process requires the 
public sector to take the position of a commissioning party that defines project 
specifications, evaluates bidders’ offers and monitors the performance of the 
suppliers. This type of arrangement places the public and private parties in the roles 
of principal and agent respectively (Lane 1993) and they are typically characterised 
by asymmetrical balance of IORs. The different perspectives offered by the IOR and 
PPP literatures with respect to efficiency motives make it difficult to come to a clear 
conclusion about how efficiency motives will affect the nature of IORs in PPPs. 
The motives of reciprocity, power-acquisition, legitimacy, stability and efficiency 
clearly relate to the voluntary interactions amongst partnering organisations but 
necessity motives are distinct because of their mandated nature. The term mandate 
generally refers to ‘prescriptions… legally binding obligations and responsibilities’ 
(Cropper 1996: 87). Necessity motives are particularly important when discussing 
PPPs because in many cases partnerships are the result of mandates from higher 
authorities, for example, government and funding bodies (Armistead and Pettigrew 
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2008). Such mandates make it necessary for organisations to establish partnerships 
so as to meet legal or regulatory requirements. 
Although there is a relative paucity of studies on mandated partnerships, Armistead 
and Pettigrew (2008) provide a detailed account of the characteristics of a mandated 
partnership as compared to voluntary partnerships. In nutshell, they have argued: 1) 
mandated partnerships tend to follow a set of prescriptions or check lists which might 
satisfy mandating bodies but fail to address the dynamics of partnership performance 
and the causes of partnership failure, 2) mandated partnerships impede the process of 
collaboration between partners due to being prescriptive in nature, and 3) the 
prescriptive nature of partnerships implies hierarchical authority that is often an 
extension of state power and control. 
In summary, the discussion of partner organisations’ motives to enter PPPs suggests 
various ways of understanding the nature and dynamics of IORs in PPPs. If the 
organisations are driven by necessity or by a desire to acquire power this is likely to 
impede the collaborative IORs, whereas a desire to exchange resources (reciprocal 
motives) is more likely to support collaborative IORs in PPPs. The discussion 
regarding the motives of legitimacy, stability and efficiency points in two different 
directions in that they can play either a supportive or restraining role in developing 
collaborative IORs in PPPs. It is possible to link these motives to either power 
acquisition or reciprocal motives, which in turn influences how these motives shape 
IORs. 
3.5 Organisational factors 
This section aims to understand to what extent and how the nature of IORs is 
affected by the internal aspects of the organisational life of partner organisations. 
Though scholars studying partnerships and other inter-organisational arrangements 
often discuss and analyse organisational factors, their focus is primarily on the 
organisational characteristics of the inter-organisational arrangement. For instance, 
while theorising collaboration
4
 practice, Huxham (2003) discusses leadership, 
                                                 
4
 Here the use of the term ‘collaboration’ is in line with Huxham’s conceptualisation and refers to 
‘working across organisational boundaries’ (Huxham 2005: 4). 
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structures and common aims (along with power and trust) as themes in collaboration 
and examines them at the collaboration level. 
However, a defining characteristic of PPPs (and any other inter-organisational 
arrangement) is the dual identity that partners share: they have their own distinct 
organisation identity as well as a partnership identity. While this is widely recognised 
in both the partnership and IOR literatures (Wood and Gray 1991; Huxham and 
Vangen 2005; Thomson and Perry 2006), little attention has been given to analysing 
organisational factors at the level of individual partner organisations and the ways in 
which these can influence IORs. 
There are two reasons why there is a need to examine organisational factors at the 
level of individual partner organisations. First, this level of analysis sheds light on 
dynamics within partner organisations which can help to gain understanding of the 
ways these organisations are influenced by the contextual factors. Secondly, this 
level of analysis helps to understand what happens at the partnership level and the 
reasons underlying various issues.  
Scholars within the field of international development have paid considerable 
attention to understanding the internal dynamics of organisations. But much of this 
literature is limited to studies of not-for-profits, describing their different types; their 
governance structure and the role of their boards and trustees (Stone 1996); 
leadership (Hailey and James 2002); and culture (Lewis et al. 2003). Moreover, 
within this stream of literature the main focus tends to be on the reasons for the rise 
of government-NGO relationships (Batley 2006; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Mayhew 
2005) and the typologies of government-NGO relationships (Coston 1998; Najam 
2000; Brinkerhoff 2002b). Little attention has been paid to the study of 
organisational factors beyond NGOs. Nevertheless, the NGO studies provide insights 
into the ways NGOs operate and make decisions to form a relationship with the 
government, and the possible types of relationships they can develop with the 
government. 
This section discusses some main internal aspects of public and private sector 
organisations that are likely to influence IORs in PPPs. In the case of some factors it 
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is useful to distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit private sector 
organisations. The most important organisational factors identified in the existing 
literature are organisation identity; culture and structure; leadership; and sources of 
revenue. Each of these is discussed below. 
 Organisation identity 3.5.1
Organisation identity comprises an organisation’s mission, goals, core constituencies 
and underlying values. As mentioned earlier individual organisations in a partnership 
have dual identity: partnership identity and their own identity. This usually leads to a 
tension between pursuing an individual organisational mission to maintain one’s own 
identity and achieving partnership goals. Thomson and Perry (2006: 26)  refer to this 
tension as ‘the process of reconciling individual and collective interests’ and it is a 
recurring theme in the existing literature. Brinkerhoff (2002a; 2002b) examines 
organisation identity at two levels. First is the organisation’s mission, goals and 
constituencies and with respect to this the ‘maintenance of organisation identity is 
the extent to which an organisation remains consistent and committed to its mission, 
core values and constituencies’ (2002b: 23). Secondly, organisation identity refers to 
the comparative advantages of the sector an organisation belongs to. 
Partnerships are often seen as exchange relationships whereby each partner is chosen 
and assigned responsibilities according to the comparative advantage that each is 
presumed to contribute to the partnership. These exchange relationships are also 
discussed in the strategic alliance literature (e.g. Levine and White 1961; Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994) and from a resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). Technically, if organisation identity is lost, comparative advantage is lost and 
there would be nothing unique on the part of that partner to contribute to the 
partnership. In such a case there is no rationale for justifying the huge efforts 
required for partnership working (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Brinkerhoff 2003). 
The above rationale is said to apply equally to organisations in the public and private 
sector. Nevertheless, the ways in which each partner maintains its identity differs not 
only between public and private sector partners but also differences between private 
for-profit and not-for-profit organisations. Moore (2000) compares for-profit, not-
for-profit and government organisations and argues that the concept of value varies 
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significantly across these three sectors. Generally speaking, the principal value 
delivered by for-profits is often measured in financial terms. However, value in the 
case of not-for-profits is measured in terms of contribution to the cause that the 
organisation embodies. Similar to not-for-profits, the principal value in the case of 
public sector organisations is defined in terms of mission rather than financial 
indicators. Due to similar values, not-for-profits are often considered more suitable 
for partnerships with the public sector (Rosenau 2000; Lovrich 1999). However, not-
for-profit organisations are distinct from public sector organisations in some 
important ways. For instance, they lack the coercive powers of government and 
usually they have fewer constraints than government organisations (Schaeffer and 
Loveridge 2002). They also differ significantly with respect to sources of revenue 
(Moore 2000). 
The mission of not-for-profits tends to define the value that they intend to produce 
for their stakeholders and for society at large and is ‘set out in substantive rather than 
financial terms’ (Moore 2000: 190). Though they need financial resources to pursue 
their mission, their ultimate objectives are not monetary. In the case of for-profit 
organisations, the mission is usually translated in ‘the form of financial targets for 
the organization as a whole, along with a business plan that describes how a 
company plans to compete in various product and service markets’ (Moore 2000: 
183). Because missions represent what is considered as value to an organisation, they 
form the basis of individual partner organisations’ course of action in partnerships. 
Moreover, when the mission of an individual partner organisation is not in line with 
the partnership goals it becomes a source of conflict between partners (Thomson and 
Perry 2006).  
Since organisation identity serves as a basis to achieve the added value of 
partnerships, it is considered important to make sure that potential partners possess 
the comparative advantages required for a partnership. For these reasons organisation 
identity can be used to assess the contribution that organisations can make as 
partners, which can have implications for the nature of IORs. 
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 Organisational culture and structure 3.5.2
Organisational culture refers to ‘beliefs, values, attitudes, and perceptions widely 
shared throughout an organization regarding what it stands for and how it should 
operate’ (Murray 1998: 1194). Based on the work of Schein (1992), Murray (1998) 
argues that organisational culture can influence an organisation’s beliefs about and 
attitudes to other parties. In this respect, culture may constitute shared attitudes about 
partners, their trustworthiness and the contributions that they can make to a 
partnership. Likewise, culture influences an organisation’s readiness and acceptance 
of the need to make adjustments and changes while working in a partnership. Murray 
(1998: 1194) suggests that ‘intense pride in the organization’s reputation, traditions, 
and so on can breed an implicit belief in superiority, which may effectively block any 
compromises that must be made in developing a joint venture with others’. 
The challenges of collaborative working are said to be exacerbated when 
participating organisations have different organisational cultures. Huxham’s (1996a) 
theory of collaborative advantage stresses: 
Differences in organizational culture and procedures can aggravate the 
situation further because seemingly straightforward tasks can be carried 
out quite differently in different organizations. Differences arise because 
individuals make unwarranted assumptions about the way things are 
carried out in partner organizations, or because of the time needed to 
make arrangements for even trivial matters to the satisfaction of all 
concerned… For these reasons, collaborations, at best, tend to need to 
spend unusual amounts of time in reaching understandings and 
agreements compared to other situations, and at worst become embroiled 
in misunderstandings and conflict (Huxham 1996a: 5). 
The above argument suggests that organisational culture has important implications 
for the IORs embedded within inter-organisational arrangements. This is especially 
important and challenging in the case of PPPs where public and private sector 
partners are likely to have quite distinct organisational cultures (Klijn and Teisman 
2003). 
Another related organisational factor that is an important determinant in shaping the 
nature of PPPs and IORs is organisational structure. Murray (1998) draws on some 
influential studies of organisational structure, such as those of Mintzberg (1979) and 
Galbraith (1973), and suggests that some structural forms have more potential to 
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facilitate collaborative efforts than others. He mentions ‘professional bureaucracies’ 
and ‘conventional bureaucracies’ as the ones that impede collaborative work. The 
former consist of a large group of professionals who are trained to believe that work 
should not be changed by anyone except their own professional bodies. The latter are 
characterised by a typical Weberian conceptualisation of bureaucracy with 
centralised control, hierarchy of authority and high levels of formality (Mintzberg 
1979). Public sector organisations operate under the authority of the state and are 
typically characterised as conventional or professional bureaucracies, they tend to 
seek dominance within PPP arrangements and are often reluctant to relinquish their 
power and control. This is mentioned as a threat to synergistic outcomes by the 
proponents of high levels of collaboration in PPPs (Teisman and Klijn 2002; Klijn 
and Teisman 2003). 
 Leadership 3.5.3
The concept of leadership has long been prominent in the business management 
literature and has been studied in great detail. In much of this work, the role of 
leadership in coping with change has been given special attention (Kotter 1996; 
Schein 1992). Within this literature, leadership is defined as ‘a set of processes that 
creates organizations in the first place or adapts them to significantly changing 
circumstances’ (Kotter 1996: 25). Historically, leadership has not gained that much 
attention in public sector organisations (Van Wart 2003) due to a general belief that 
leadership cannot be practiced to any great extent because of the low levels of 
control that public managers have over the external forces of politics and regulatory 
processes (Orazi et al. 2013). However, with widespread public management reforms 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) and a general shift from managerialism to leaderism 
(O'Reilly and Reed 2010), public sector leadership has become more prominent in 
the field of public management and administration during last two decades.  
Although potential differences between leaders and managers are often discussed and 
emphasised in the organisation theory and behaviour literature (e.g. Watson 1983; 
Zaleznik 2004; Kent 2005), this distinction is not made in this thesis. Instead 
leadership is conceptualised after Vangen and Huxham (2003: 62) who describe 
leadership as ‘the mechanisms that make things happen… [and] may include both 
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visionary and more mechanistic aspects’. Hence, the focus is on individuals who 
enact leadership and make things happen in PPPs. 
Studies of leadership and change management are relevant in the context of 
partnerships because entering a partnership arrangement is a change that each 
interacting organisation experiences. The attitude of leaders towards the need for 
partnership, their negotiation skills and their perception about the trustworthiness of 
other parties in a partnership arrangement plays a significant role (Murray 1998). 
Like any organisational change the inability of leaders to prepare their organisation 
for partnership process can result in many problems or even partnership failure. 
Vangen and Huxham (2003) discuss two sets of leadership activities: ‘the spirit of 
collaboration’ and ‘towards collaborative thuggery’. The former involves activities 
that ‘seem to be highly facilitative and are concerned with embracing, empowering, 
involving and mobilising members’ (Vangen and Huxham 2003: 66). The latter, 
however, finds that leaders are ‘adept at manipulating agendas and playing the 
politics’(Vangen and Huxham 2003: 70). They argue that both sets of leadership 
activities can be enacted in parallel and leaders are likely to switch between them as 
and when required. 
The role of organisational leadership in partnerships is important from another 
perspective too. As discussed above, PPP scholars often emphasise the need to 
maintain the organisation identities of individual organisations in order to deliver 
synergistic outcomes (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and Teisman 2005; Peters 1998). In the 
context of increasing interdependencies developing over time (Ring and Van de Ven 
1994)  it can be expected that strong leadership within each partner organisation will 
be important in enabling it to hold on to its own organisation identity. From this 
perspective, it seems that leadership plays an important role in shaping the nature of 
IORs and enabling the achievement of synergistic benefits. 
According to Schein (1992), leadership and organisational culture are intractably 
linked and influence each other. He takes a developmental view of organisational 
growth and argues that founding leaders are much more confident and powerful in 
instilling their views and assumptions into organisational culture. This is why there is 
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a close connection between a leader’s ideas and an organisation’s way of operating in 
founder-led organisations (Hailey and James 2002). Though leaders continue to play 
an important role once the organisations have matured, at this later stage they are 
influenced more by organisation design and structure, as well as by interaction with 
the external environment (Schein 1992). 
 Sources of revenue 3.5.4
Many IOR scholars have argued that sources of revenue are related to organisational 
autonomy to make decisions (e.g. Alter and Hage 1993; Moore 2000). The common 
wisdom has been that it is important to respond to the preferences of those who 
provide revenues to an organisation. Sources of revenue are typically different for 
for-profit, not-for-profit and public sector organisations. Moore (2000) explains that 
the main source of revenues in the case of for-profit organisations are from the sale 
of products and services to willing customers. Not-for-profit organisations are 
usually reliant on charitable contributions. Public sector organisations obtain their 
revenues mainly from taxing the public. Moore (2000) acknowledges that these 
differences are becoming less pronounced and each sector is increasingly relying on 
diverse revenue sources, but they are still important. He argues that: 
It follows that the strategies embraced by these organizations will be 
responsive to the expectations and demands of quite different groups. 
For-profit firms will attend to what customers want. Nonprofit firms will 
attend (at least in part) to what their donors expect. Government 
bureaucracies will attend to what citizens and their representatives have 
mandated them to achieve (Moore 2000: 186). 
This suggests that there will be some conflict of priorities implicit in partnership 
arrangements. Such tensions are acknowledged in the PPP and IOR literatures 
(Wood and Gray 1991; Brinkerhoff 2002b; Alter and Hage 1993; Thomson and 
Perry 2006; Huxham 1996b). Some scholars argue that this is why there is a need for 
high levels of collaboration in PPPs and other inter-organisational arrangements. 
They refer to collaboration as a mechanism for ‘finding common ground’ (Gray 
1989) so that each organisation can justify its participation in partnership in terms of 
its contribution to their own objectives.  
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However, what tends to be ignored in this argument is that the organisations vary 
greatly in their degree of dependence on one or more sources of revenue. Alter and 
Hage (1993) mention multiple versus single sources of revenue and argue that 
multiple sources of revenue are more desirable because when resources come from a 
single source then that source will want to control the organisation and is likely to 
result in tighter controls on the use of funding than would be the case when there are 
multiple sources of revenue. 
 
Broadly speaking, the discussion of organisational factors in this section suggest that 
the fundamental features of public and private parties (such as leadership, 
organisational culture and structure) tend to differ which pose many challenges in 
developing collaborative IORs in PPPs. However, when the organisation identities 
(manifested in organisation’s mission, goals, core constituencies and underlying 
values) of partner organisations are compatible with the mission of the partnership, 
the chances of building collaborative IORs may increase. 
3.6 Conceptual framework for the research: integrating the 
concepts 
This chapter has thus far reviewed different factors that can help to understand and 
explain IORs in PPPs and their potential implications for the outcomes of PPPs. 
These factors are often discussed in the context of different models which serve to 
highlight their interaction. Murray (1998), for instance, has developed a framework 
consisting of four sets of factors that affect the probability of success in inter-
organisational collaborations in the not-for-profit sector. These are the type of 
collaboration sought; the characteristics of the organisations entering into the 
collaboration; the process of developing and implementing collaboration activities; 
and contextual factors. Similarly, Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) have presented a 
framework consisting of initial conditions; process; structural and governance 
components; contingencies and constraints; and outcomes to guide the design and 
implementation of cross-sector partnerships. Thus both frameworks examine what 
makes partnerships successful and in what ways these factors affect the outcomes of 
partnership efforts. Some other scholars have also offered similar frameworks that 
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focus on antecedents, processes and outcomes (e.g. Wood and Gray 1991; Thomson 
and Perry 2006; Bryson et al. 2006; Chen 2010). These frameworks have focused on 
the ways in which antecedents and processes influence the outcomes of inter-
organisational arrangements. However, the main focus of these frameworks is on the 
factors leading to the formation of partnerships, and the effects of antecedents and 
processes on the outcomes. 
While the above offer important insights on the formation of partnerships and the 
factors affecting the outcomes, they underplay the connection between the contextual 
factors and the nature of IORs. The influence of partners’ organisational factors and 
their motives for involvement is also often underplayed in these frameworks. They 
seem to pay more attention to the characteristics of the resulting inter-organisational 
arrangements rather than the internal dynamics of participating organisations and the 
effects of these on IORs. 
Similarly, frameworks explaining the developmental process of PPPs and other inter-
organisation arrangements are useful as heuristic device but they tend to pay 
insufficient attention to the wider context in which inter-organisational arrangements 
develop (Baker 2007). They have limited power to explain the impact of contextual 
factors on the developmental process of IORs. Those scholars studying contextual 
factors argue that partnerships are significantly affected by external factors and hence 
partnerships need to be examined within their context (Teamey 2007; Lewis 1998). 
Contextual factors not only affect outcomes but they also influence the nature of 
IORs both directly and indirectly via partners’ organisational factors and their 
motives for entering PPPs. 
This chapter seeks to respond to these limitations by integrating the insights from a 
wide range of literature to develop a conceptual framework that will be used to 
examine the case studies. Based on the four building blocks that were identified in 
Chapter 2, this chapter has extended the review of the existing literature to develop 
the conceptual framework for this thesis. The resulting conceptual framework 
incorporates an examination of IORs in PPPs over time, the contextual factors that 
influence these, partners’ motives for entering partnerships, the organisational factors 
affecting partner organisations, and the outcomes of PPPs. Understanding the ways 
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in which different factors interact and influence IORs, and hence the nature of PPPs, 
lies at the centre of this framework. The conceptual framework is summarised in 
Figure 3.4 and this will be used to examine the case studies presented in Chapters 5, 
6 and 7. 















The broad anticipated relationships between the boxes in Figure 3.4 are shown by the 
arrows. The existing literature examined in this chapter has suggested some more 
specific relationships between the detailed factors, motives, IORs and outcomes. 
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This chapter has drawn on the existing literature to discuss the nature of IORs in 
PPPs and the factors that have been found to shape these, along with their 
implications for partnership outcomes. The result is a conceptual framework that 
characterises the IORs in PPPs as collaborative, contractual, cooperative and/or 
conflictual. IORs are envisaged as dynamic and the character of these may well 
change as a PPP develops and matures. These sets of factors identified as potential 
shapers of IORs in PPPs are contextual factors (interdependence; institutional 
pressures; reputation; and different backgrounds and identities of public and private 
actors); partners’ motives for entering into a PPP (power acquisition, reciprocity, 
legitimacy, stability, efficiency and necessity); and features associated with partner 
organisations (organisation identity; culture and structure; leadership; and financial 
autonomy). The conceptual framework proposed at the end of this chapter suggests 
that the extent of partnership success (particularly the achievement of synergistic 
outcomes) will be mediated by the nature of the IORs shaped by the above 
mentioned factors. 
The existing literature offers some limited predictions about how IORs will differ 
according to partners’ motives for entering into a PPP. If organisations enter into a 
PPP due to a desire to acquire power or because partnership working is mandated, it 
is probably not surprising to find that this is likely to impede the development of 
collaborative IORs. Conversely, a desire to exchange resources (reciprocal motives) 
is more likely to support collaborative IORs. Partnering with organisations because 
of their good reputations is also said to be more likely to result in collaborative IORs. 
However, the findings and arguments associated with most of the shaping factors 
listed in Figure 3.4 are fairly inconclusive. That is, depending on a combination of 
circumstances, they can play a supporting or restraining role in developing 
collaborative IORs. 
The emphasis within the literature has been to try and explain the factors associated 
with collaborative IORs. The reason why there is such a focus on collaborative IORs 
is because much of the literature predicts that synergistic outcomes are more likely to 
result from collaborative IORs than relationships that are contractual. Indeed some of 
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the literature proposes that synergistic outcomes can only be achieved when there are 
high levels of collaboration and symmetrical balance of IORs (e.g. Klijn and 
Teisman 2000; 2005). 
The next chapter discusses the operationalisation of the conceptual framework 
developed in this chapter. It focuses on the methodological approach employed in 




Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in this research. The chapter 
is divided in two main sections. Section 4.2 is about the decisions made with respect 
to the overall methodology. It starts with a description of the case study approach as 
a research strategy and outlines the main strengths of this approach. It is then argued 
that because of the complex nature of IORs in PPPs and the philosophical position 
adopted in this research, the case study approach is a particularly suitable strategy. 
This is followed by the discussion of the methodological issues in qualitative case 
study research and the efforts of scholars to clarify conventional wisdom and 
misunderstandings about qualitative research and case studies. The ensuing sub-
section introduces the arguments around suitable criteria to judge the quality of case 
study research and outlines the steps taken in order to foster quality in this research. 
Section 4.3 is focused on the research design developed for this research and 
includes sub-sections on the use of the conceptual framework, planning for data 
collection, the initial and second phases of data collection, and data analysis. Finally, 
the chapter engages with some ethical considerations for carrying out this research. 
4.2 Deciding on the overall methodology 
This section is about the main decisions that were taken in relation to 
operationalising the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter. It is 
organised in three sub-sections: case study methodology, methodological issues in 
qualitative case study research and criteria to judge the quality of case study 
research. 
 Case study methodology 4.2.1
This study aims to understand the nature of IORs in PPPs and the ways in which 
different factors affect them along with their implications for partnership outcomes. 
The review of the existing literature on PPPs and IORs (in Chapters 2 and 3) 
suggests that in order to understand and explain what influences and shapes IORs in 
PPPs one needs to examine the context in which partner organisations are embedded. 
In light of these insights, the previous chapter incorporates contextual factors into the 
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conceptual framework for this study. This framework serves as a guide in relation to 
what empirical data needs to be collected to address the research questions. 
A case study approach was adopted for this study because it is appropriate for 
research that aims to investigate a multifaceted phenomenon within its context to 
gain a rich understanding of the context and process being enacted (Yin 1994; Stake 
1995; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). It allows researchers to carry out a holistic 
treatment of real life events and this is argued to have contributed ‘uniquely to our 
knowledge of individual, organisational, social and political phenomena’ (Yin 1994: 
2). This feature differentiates a case study approach from other research strategies 
such as experiments or surveys which either extract data from their context or have 
limited ability to investigate context. 
A second important strength of the case study approach is that it supports the use of a 
conceptual framework to guide data collection and analysis. Experts on case study 
research, such as Yin and Stake, have recommended developing a theory about what 
is being studied and have mentioned it as an integral and challenging aspect of the 
research process. A conceptual framework bridges from what is established in the 
literature to what needs to be researched and what type of data should be collected. 
Finally, a case study methodology is flexible and offers a palette of methods due to 
its compatibility with both qualitative and quantitative methods (Stake 1995; Yin 
1994). Case studies can be used for various purposes - exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory - depending on the nature of research questions, and they can be 
deductive or inductive in nature (Yin 1994). The approach offers single and multiple 
case designs both of which have the potential for analytic generalisation (Small 
2009; Yin 2014). Although both single and multiple case designs can be successful, 
Yin (2014) has recommended conducting multiple case studies (even with two cases) 
unless there are strong reasons for the choice of a single case study. He argues that 
the findings become more powerful in multiple case study designs and criticism 
stemming from the uniqueness of single case studies becomes milder when 
undertaking two or more case studies. 
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For the purposes of this research, a multiple case design using qualitative methods 
has been adopted. As pointed out by Bryman and Bell (2011), this research design is 
very popular and widely used in business and management research. The same is true 
for public management research too. Within the public management realm, McGuire 
and Agranoff, for example,  have adopted a case study methodology to study 
network management and have suggested that ‘qualitative research through 
comparative case studies can provide insight that quantitative research cannot offer’ 
(McGuire and Agranoff 2007: 37). 
The research has been carried out from what Hammersley (1992) has labelled a 
‘subtle realist’ perspective. This occupies ‘a middle ground in terms of [an] axis, 
with [naïve] realism at one end and anti-realism [or relativism] at the other’ (Bryman 
and Bell 2011: 401). Naïve realism assumes the existence of independent and 
knowable social phenomenon that is a part of an external reality. Hammersley rejects 
the notion that researchers can have direct access to such phenomenon and, in effect, 
can act as a mirror on the social world to reproduce reality for others. Instead, subtle 
realism retains from relativism (or social constructivism) that all knowledge is based 
on assumptions and is a human construction, but it disavows the total abandonment 
of the idea of independent and somewhat knowable social phenomena. Thus, subtle 
realism rejects the dichotomy between naïve realism and relativism. The accounts 
presented in this research should be treated as one of the possible representations of 
social reality, rather than as absolute version of that social reality. The researcher has 
made efforts to strengthen and support these accounts by using multiple sources of 
evidence and data triangulation which will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
 Methodological issues in qualitative case study research 4.2.2
Although the salience of case study methodology is well recognised and it is 
accepted as a credible form of empirical inquiry, it has long been stereotyped as ‘a 
weak sibling among social science methods’ (Yin 1994: xiii). Flyvbjerg (2006) has 
summarised the problems with the conventional wisdom about case study research in 
terms of five misunderstandings or oversimplifications: 
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(a) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (b) 
one cannot generalize from a single case, therefore, the single-case study 
cannot contribute to scientific development; (c) the case study is most 
useful for generating hypotheses, whereas other methods are more 
suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; (d) the case study 
contains a bias toward verification; and (e) it is often difficult to 
summarize specific case studies (Flyvbjerg 2006: 219). 
Similarly, Yin (1994) also reviews the issues associated with case study 
methodology. Both Flyvbjerg and Yin have rejected conventional wisdom about the 
case study approach and have labelled it as ‘wrong or misleading’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 
241). These methodological issues were said to be further exacerbated when case 
studies employed qualitative methods instead of the quantitative ones. It is not long 
ago that researchers undertaking qualitative case studies faced huge suspicion and 
needed to convince reviewers that their research was reliable. Some even tried to 
establish the legitimacy of their work by presenting qualitative data in an apparently 
quantitative manner (Pratt 2009). Though there are some fields which have been 
slow to get over the ‘paradigm wars’, the accepted standards of ‘good research’ have 
undergone many changes over time (Bryman and Bell 2011; Hammersley 2008). 
Scholars, such as Yin (1994; 2014); Stake (1995); Eisenhardt (1989b); Miles and 
Huberman (1994); Hammersely and Atkinson (1993; 2010); and Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), struggled hard to establish the legitimacy of qualitative case studies. They 
sought to uncouple research methods from philosophical positions, making case 
study and qualitative methods more accessible to budding scholars with different 
epistemic orientations. It is due to the efforts of these scholars that we can 
confidently use a qualitative case study methodology without having to write many 
pages to establish the credibility and legitimacy of our research just because it is 
based on this method of social inquiry.  In this connection, it is worth repeating the 
insight of Kuhn (1987) quoted in Flyvbjerg (2006): 
A discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies 
is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and that a 
discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. In social science, a 
greater number of good case studies could help remedy this situation 
(Kuhn 1987 quoted in Flyvbjerg 2006: 242). 
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Nevertheless, there is still a need to be systematic and explicit about the whole case 
study process, from design to data collection, and through to analysis and drawing 
conclusions. The adaptiveness and flexibility of qualitative research should not 
compromise the rigor of the research process. 
 Criteria to judge the quality of case study research 4.2.3
The three concepts of validity, reliability and generalisability are the most prominent 
criteria to evaluate the quality of research in social sciences, including business and 
management research (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008; Bryman and Bell 2011). 
However, there are some discussions about interpreting these quality criteria in social 
research, especially with respect to qualitative and mixed method research (Bryman 
et al. 2008). Some scholars (e.g. Mason 1996; Yin 1994) have adapted these concepts 
according to different disciplinary and methodological conventions but the concepts 
still remain close to the meaning that they generally have in the quantitative research. 
Social constructivists, however, have argued for alternative criteria to evaluate 
research quality in qualitative research. In their seminal work, Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) have offered a new quality language and have substituted reliability and 
validity with trustworthiness (comprising of credibility, transferability, dependability 
and confirmability) and authenticity. 
In accordance with the subtle realist tradition, this research follows Miles and 
Huberman (1994) who see ‘goodness criteria’ as overlapping and have paired the 
traditional terms (or tests) with those proposed by constructivist and naturalistic 
researchers. Miles and Huberman (and others) advise researchers to actively employ 
strategies throughout the research process (from planning, data collection and 
through to analysis) to address the threats to these tests (Miles and Huberman 1994; 
Yin 2014; Maxwell 2013). The four tests commonly used in social science research 
are: 
 Construct validity/ objectivity/confirmability 
 External validity/ transferability/fittingness 
 Internal validity/ credibility/authenticity 
 Reliability/ dependability/auditability 
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Construct validity/objectivity/confirmability encapsulates an appropriate 
operationalisation of the concepts under study to ensure that the research is actually 
measuring or examining the concepts it claims (Mason 2002). This has been 
particularly challenging with case study research (Yin 2014). The conventional view 
about case studies argues that case study researchers are ‘sloppy’ and ‘subjective’ in 
the research process and have a bias toward using concepts so as to verify their 
preconceived notions (Yin 2014; Flyvbjerg 2006). Nevertheless, some useful 
strategies are identified in the extant literature to address these issues and increase 
construct validity in case studies such as using multiple sources of evidence and 
maintaining a chain of evidence. These strategies are employed in this research to 
ensure construct validity. 
The study has developed its understanding of IORs in PPPs from a review of the 
established literature on PPPs (e.g. Klijn and Teisman 2005; Hodge et al. 2010; 
Skelcher 2005), inter-organisational relations (also referred to as the alliance 
literature e.g. Oliver 1990; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Alter and Hage 1993) and 
mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literature (e.g. Schein 1992; Kotter 
1996). A conceptual framework based on the literature review is outlined in Chapter 
3. In that chapter efforts are made to examine each theoretical construct from 
different aspects to meet the test of construct validity. For example, the literature 
proposes that the IORs are shaped by the views of individual actors which are in turn 
shaped by their formally designated roles in partner organisations and the structure, 
culture and leadership of those organisations. Accordingly four organisational factors 
are included in the conceptual framework. Hence, the conceptual framework itself 
can be regarded as a measure to increase the construct validity of the research. 
Moreover, construct validity is fostered during data collection by the triangulation of 
multiple sources of data/evidence providing multiple measures of the same 
phenomenon, as suggested by Yin (1994; 2014). These sources will be discussed in 
greater detail in section 4.3 but mainly include documents and semi-structured 
interviews. 
The test of external validity/transferability/fittingness is concerned with the question 
of whether the research findings can be generalised beyond the specific research 
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context. Although external validity is of interest to quantitative researchers, many 
qualitative researchers either reject generalisability as relevant to qualitative research 
or do not pay enough attention to it (Schofield 2000).  In quantitative research 
generalisability is established by selecting a sample which is representative of the 
population under study and usually consists of a large number of sampling units. As 
a result an inference is made about the whole population based on a statistically 
representative sample, a process known as statistical generalisation. Yin (2014) has 
argued that this type of generalisation is not applicable to case studies because cases 
are not analogous to ‘sampling units’ and are too small in number to represent the 
population. However, this does not necessarily mean that the results of case studies 
cannot be generalised. Rather another type of generalisation - analytic generalisation 
- is relevant to case studies and should be strived for. Mason (2002) calls this 
theoretical generalisation and considers it as a distinct way to generalise in 
qualitative research. 
Within this thesis external validity is maximised by using multiple case studies and 
using the logic of analytic generalisation. The aim is to corroborate, modify, reject or 
advance the theoretical concepts and relationships incorporated in the conceptual 
framework for this study. Though the conclusions drawn are essentially based on the 
analysis of data collected from specific case studies, the generalisations made are at a 
conceptual level which is fundamentally above the specific cases. Although authors 
such as Lincoln and Guba (1985) actively reject generalisation as a goal of 
qualitative research, their suggestion is that researchers should provide rich accounts 
of the details as a means of maximising external validity, which is also incorporated 
in this thesis. 
Internal validity/credibility/authenticity is mainly a concern for explanatory or causal 
studies and not for the exploratory or purely descriptive studies (Yin 2014; Saunders 
et al. 2012). It deals with the question of whether an observed causal relationship is 
actual or spurious. Based on Yin’s advice, this research has employed the tactics of 
pattern matching and explanation building to augment internal validity. Additionally, 
the multiple case study design has further strengthened the internal validity by 
allowing a cross-case analysis of findings. 
94 
 
The final test of reliability/dependability/auditability is concerned with the issue of 
whether the research process is repeatable with the same results. The main objective 
of reliability is to minimise the researcher’s biases and errors during the research 
process. The idea behind reliability criteria is that if a careful researcher conducts the 
same case study repeating the same procedures as outlined by the earlier researcher, 
the investigation should yield the same findings and conclusions (Yin 2014). 
However, this idea is rejected by qualitative researchers conducting social research 
due to its ‘scientific criteriology’ (Mason 2002). They have questioned the possibility 
of replicating social research since it is not possible to ‘freeze’ the social setting and 
circumstances of the initial study (Bryman and Bell 2011; originally LeCompte and 
Goetz 1982). 
Nevertheless, if later researchers analyse the data and feel that there is not enough 
evidence to support the conclusions, the researcher should seriously question the 
reliability of the research. As long as the conclusions drawn by the later researchers 
are not inconsistent with the earlier account, the differences in the reports would not 
generally subdue the reliability (or indeed the validity and generalisability) of the 
research (Schofield 2000). This means that although qualitative data collection is 
often hard to repeat, the researcher can make data analysis possible for other 
researchers. For this purpose there is a need for what Mason (2002: 186) calls 
‘checking up on yourself and showing how you got there’ which requires 
systematically documenting the procedures followed during the course of research. 
The reliability of findings is fostered in this thesis by using an interview guide, 
recording the interviews and producing verbatim transcriptions of most of the 
interviews. Furthermore, the anonymised interview transcripts and some important 
documents have been exported into NVivo (a computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software package). The use of NVivo in this research will be discussed in 
greater detail later in section 4.3. 
4.3 Developing the detailed research design 
Blaike (2010: 15) defines research design as ‘an integrated statement and 
justification for the technical decisions involved in planning a research project’. This 
section discusses the main decisions that have been made while designing this 
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research and it is divided in five sub-sections: use of a conceptual framework, 
planning for data collection, initial and second phases of data collection, and data 
analysis. 
 Use of a conceptual framework 4.3.1
As mentioned earlier a conceptual framework based on the established literature is 
developed for this research. The framework highlights several theoretical concepts 
and factors that can be used to characterise and explain IORs. It directs attention to 
what needs to be examined within the scope of the thesis. The discussion of the 
existing literature also highlights some of the theoretical propositions that are 
embedded within it about the drivers of different IORs and the implications of the 
resulting IORs for partnership outcomes. For example, the literature suggests that 
synergistic outcomes can only be achieved in PPPs with high levels of collaboration 
and a symmetrical balance of IORs. This theoretical proposition provides guidance 
about an avenue for analysis and some suggestions about relevant empirical 
evidence. 
A grounded theory technique could also have been useful for this research because it 
investigates complex and under-researched phenomenon, such as IORs in PPPs. The 
advocates of grounded theory, such as Glaser and Strauss (1967) and more recently 
Corbin and Strauss (2008), have argued that it is a useful and preferred method for 
investigating complex, under-researched topics because it allows the development of 
theory through induction that closely matches the data. Even though grounded theory 
has changed a lot over years (Bryman and Bell 2011; Saunders et al. 2012), this 
rationale for the technique seems to remain the same. The reasons why this study has 
used a conceptual framework to guide data collection and analysis rather than 
adopting a grounded theory approach are discussed below. 
The foremost rationale for this choice is that although IORs are not given enough 
attention in the PPP literature, there is a substantial IOR literature that shares many 
similarities with the PPP literature and it has investigated IORs in detail. Hence, this 
research assumes that it is worthwhile using the extant literature to guide 
investigation of IORs in PPPs. However, it should not be assumed that the use of a 
conceptual framework inevitably leads to evidence that does not match and focus on 
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the theoretical constructs in the framework being ignored (Flyvbjerg 2006). The 
conceptual framework is a device or mechanism to help identify relevant information 
and provide guidance about the sources and types of data within the scope of study. 
Without such guidance there is a danger that a researcher might be tempted to collect 
‘everything’ (Yin 2014) and can be easily overwhelmed by a huge amount of data 
(Miles and Huberman 1994; Maxwell 2013). Nevertheless, a conceptual framework 
and its associated constructs are not meant to be set in stone. Hence, the data 
collected are not only intended to verify or otherwise constructs and propositions but 
also to refine them and to understand what these concepts mean for actors operating 
in practical situations. This requires maintaining an open mind while working with a 
conceptual framework. 
The advocates of grounded theory argue that they are able to produce accounts that 
are closer to empirical reality by continually referring to the original data. However, 
the use of conceptual framework does not necessarily obstruct this process. Similar 
to a grounded theory approach, qualitative findings based on a conceptual framework 
often evolve through a continuous interaction between theory and data. In line with 
this, this research has incorporated the idea of progressive focusing as opposed to a 
deductive-inductive divide. The idea of progressive focusing was first discussed by 
Parlett and Hamilton (1972), who recognised the need for an approach where 
‘researchers systematically reduce the breadth of their enquiry to give more 
concentrated attention to the emerging issues’ (Parlett and Hamilton 1972: 18). This 
perspective was later refined by Stake (1981) who described progressive focusing as: 
Progressive focusing requires that the researcher be well acquainted with 
the complexities of the problem before going to the field, but not too 
committed to a study plan. It is accomplished in multiple stages: First 
observation of the site, then further inquiry, beginning to focus on the 
relevant issues, and then seeking to explain (Stake 1981: 1). 
The ways in which this thesis has employed the idea of progressive focussing is 
discussed in sub-section 4.3.5. 
 Planning for data collection 4.3.2
It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that the provision of public services has undergone 
many changes as a result of public sector reforms in Pakistan. There has been a shift 
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from pure hegemony of government towards greater participation of the private 
sector in the delivery of public services (Government of Pakistan 2004a). Despite 
these changes there is limited literature on PPPs in Pakistan. That is, there is much 
activity but not much research on PPPs in the context of Pakistan. The Punjab 
province was chosen as the geographical context for the study, mainly because it is 
the second largest province and is at the forefront of PPP initiatives in the country 
(School Education Department 2011). It was also chosen because of the researcher’s 
access to case study site and competence in the local language, which allowed 
interviews to be conducted in respondents’ mother tongue. 
Given the dearth of research on the education sector of Pakistan and the lack of 
information about the nature of PPPs it was decided to conduct interviews with the 
key informants followed by an initial case study. The key informant interviews were 
carried out between June and August 2011. The evidence from these interviews 
corroborated the researcher’s understanding gained from reviewing the existing 
literature on education reforms in Pakistan, that there are two main models of PPP in 
education prevalent in Pakistan: one is where the public sector supports the private 
sector to provide access to quality education; and the other is when private sector 
organisations adopt state schools and take charge of a wide range of responsibilities 
(sometimes in essence managing and operating state schools in partnership with 
government staff). 
No method of collecting empirical data is without weakness and the choice of 
methods should be based on their ability to gather data that allows the researcher to 
answer the research questions. It was decided to conduct interviews with the key 
informants because an interview allows active interaction between an interviewee 
and the researcher. Since the main purpose of these interviews was to explore and 
develop a greater understanding of the field, the interviews were conducted using a 
semi-structured design (Kvale 1996; Patton 2002). An interview guide was prepared 
in advance which helped the researcher to remain focused and explore all aspects 
relevant to the study (see Appendix A). Nevertheless, keeping in view the 
exploratory nature of the initial interviews, the interviewees were provided with a 
great deal of flexibility. This allowed the researcher to pick up on the things that 
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were mentioned by the interviewees which were not a part of the interview guide but 
were relevant to the study (Bryman and Bell 2011). Some useful contacts were also 
mentioned during these interviews which made it possible to access important sites. 
One of these contacts was the Chairman of the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), 
who made it possible to collect data from PEF and its partners. He advised the PEF’s 
Director HR to issue a letter of permission to conduct research. This made data 
collection quite swift by resolving access issues at various schools and partner 
organisations. 
Keeping in view that the aim is to undertake a systematic study of IORs in 
educational PPPs of Pakistan so as to contribute to a deeper understanding of their 
key characteristics, what shapes them and what their implications are for outcomes, it 
was decided to use a multiple case study design and choose at least one organisation 
from each model of PPP practiced in the Punjab education sector. However, given 
the large number of private sector organisations involved in the second model of PPP 
(23 according to the official list of adopted schools made available by the 
government on the request of the researcher), two case studies (of CARE and ITA 
PPPs) were selected. These were selected because they were pioneers and had 
adopted the highest number of state schools in Punjab. 
 Initial phase of data collection and analysis (June–October 2011) 4.3.3
Interviews were conducted with four key informants (details provided in Appendix 
B) and later one of the four PPP programmes operated by an autonomous public 
sector organisation, the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), was selected as an 
initial case study. The former interviews were mainly exploratory in nature to get to 
know the field whereas the latter had the main objective of what Wolcott (1990: 47) 
refers to as ‘make sure all parts [of the research design] are properly in place before 
tightening’. 
PEF belongs to the first model of educational PPPs in the Punjab province. There are 
similar organisations in other provinces of the country too. The idea of ‘public-
private partnership’ lies at the heart of PEF’s working and functions and part of its 
vision is ‘the promotion of quality education through Public Private Partnership’ 
(PEF 2012). One of its four programmes, Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS), was 
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selected as an initial case study for this phase of data collection in order to evaluate 
the effectiveness of data collection methods and to highlight any access, ethical or 
political issues that might be encountered (Yin 2014; Maxwell 2013). 
In all, 17 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 9 FAS school partners and 
8 officials from PEF (full list of respondents is provided in Appendix B). The 
analysis of the data collected in the initial phase provided insights into conceptual 
framing of the study and resulted in a revision of the conceptual framework (more is 
said about this under data analysis). The initial data collection phase provided some 
important learning points that had to be considered when refining subsequent data 
collection plans and the research design. These points are summarised below: 
 Referral from a senior official within an organisation makes it easier to gain 
access to the respondents, especially those who are sceptical of research 
and/or have tight schedules. Both friends and family contacts should be 
utilised to overcome the barriers to access and establish rapport with a senior 
official at each case study organisation who is willing to act as a project 
sponsor. The researcher’s position as a lecturer at a large public sector 
university in Pakistan undertaking PhD at an established foreign university 
was useful to build rapport. 
 Document collection and analysis is useful not only to triangulate findings 
from multiple sources of evidence, and hence establishing construct validity, 
but also to provide information about the things that have taken place prior to 
the research and hence establishing a retrospective view. 
 Although most of the respondents were quite open to sharing their 
experiences and stories, there were some who seemed to be actively involved 
in political point scoring and asked the researcher to convey their viewpoints 
to the higher authorities while conducting interviews with them. This 
highlights the importance of being reflective during data analysis, to verify 
statements and to avoid taking words at face value. 
 Second phase of data collection (November 2011–April 2012) 4.3.4
There are myriad of qualitative methods which could have been used for this 
research such as participant observations, focus groups and interviews of various 
types. Many scholars (e.g. Patton 2002; Yin 2014) have advised to use a combination 
of different sources of evidence because each source of data has strengths and 




Since the data collected during the initial phase is a part of formal data collection and 
is included in the final analysis, subsequent data collection will be referred to as the 
second phase of data collection. As mentioned in the previous section, the initial data 
collection phase refined the choice of data collection methods and the conceptual 
framework. Nevertheless, it did not necessarily compromise the comparability of 
data collected across the two phases of data collection. Data collection from the three 
remaining PPP programmes operated by PEF (other than FAS) was carried out in the 
second phase. Due to these continued interactions with PEF in the second phase, it 
was possible to fill in any data gaps in the initial case study (FAS). 
The second phase of data collection was carried out between November 2011 and 
April 2012. It used a combination of documentary sources and semi-structured 
interviews as the primary means of collecting data. These are discussed below. 
Documentary sources 
Almost every case study researcher collects some type of documents (Stake 1995; 
Yin 2014). This research explicitly included documentary sources as a part of the 
research strategy and has continued to collect documents throughout the period of 
data collection (and even afterwards via internet). The documents collected 
throughout the course of this research (see Appendix C for the list of important 
documents) can be categorised as follows: 
Level 1: documents that give information about the overall policy framework and 
approach of the country towards the idea of PPPs. Examples include ‘Pakistan policy 
on PPPs’ and ‘White paper on PPPs’. 
Level 2: documents that are especially relevant to the education sector and getting to 
know the context more precisely. ‘National education policy’, ‘Public-private 
partnerships in Pakistan’s education sector’ and ‘Education sector reforms (ESR)’ 
are some of the examples in this category of documents. 
Level 3: comprises documents relevant to the case study organisations such as 
printed brochures, information booklets, lists of adopted schools, memorandums of 
understanding (MoUs) etc. 
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All these documents were studied both before and during the second phase of data 
collection. This has been identified as a strength of document collection by Yin 
(2014: 107) in that they allow researchers to retrieve data at their convenience. It is 
important to mention that not all of these documents were collected before the 
second phase of data collection. Further documents, especially the level 3 
documents, were collected while negotiating access and conducting interviews in 
each case study organisation. Some of these documents were publically available 
while some others such as lists of adopted schools with contact details, official 
correspondence with partners, and minutes of meetings were made available on 
request. 
Document collection and analysis was useful in many aspects. First, it helped the 
researcher to situate herself in the context. For example, in the case of CARE the 
study of information available on their website, some news items and the documents 
such as ‘The CARE model’ and ‘CARE achievement history’ provided what Patton 
(2002: 294) calls a ‘behind-the-scenes look’. This helped to look at the process 
through which the organisation evolved, its mission and goals, and its philosophy 
towards work. The first interview conducted within CARE was with its Head of 
Academics who forwarded many of these documents via email prior to the interview 
and advised reading them beforehand to make efficient use of time. These documents 
were rich in information and answered many exploratory questions prior to the 
interview. 
This example identifies the second important way in which documents proved useful 
in that they can help to make efficient use of the available time when interviewing 
busy people. The study of documents and information available online helped to 
avoid basic information gathering questions such as how many state schools have 
been adopted by CARE, in which districts etc. Furthermore, they stimulated several 
paths of inquiry that could be pursued through the semi-structured interviews. The 
documents were used alongside interviews to contextualise personal views and focus 
on themes that might have been ignored if the interviews had been conducted without 
access to the documents. 
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The documentary sources helped to identify potential interviewees too. To illustrate, 
the review of ‘The CARE model’ highlighted that improving the management of 
adopted state schools lies at the heart of CARE’s partnership model. In order to 
manage adopted schools, there are three tiers of managers (details provided in the 
CARE-Lahore District Government (LDG) case study) who are allocated a fixed 
number of schools and they are responsible for the uplift of education and better 
management of adopted schools. This information was useful in deciding that the 
research must take into account not only senior management’s views but also the 
middle level and school level managers’ views for a more rounded view of the IORs 
in CARE-LDG PPPs.  
Finally, although the type of documents were not necessarily the same for all three 
case studies, the documentary sources provided valuable data for the cross-case 
analysis by comparing mission and objectives, type of projects undertaken, 
organisational structure and MoUs. For example, by examining different MoUs it 
turned out that they had a different approach both towards partnership and towards 
allocation of roles and responsibilities to each partner. 
Although documentary evidence provides an invaluable source of data, it is 
important to recognise that it is not without problems. Some scholars have advised 
that case study researchers should be very critical and act as ‘vicarious observers’ 
when using documentary sources (Yin 2014: 108). While reviewing documents it is 
important to keep in mind that they are ‘constructed in particular contexts, by 
particular people, with particular purposes, and with consequences - intended and 
unintended’ (Mason 2002: 110). It is, therefore, important to keep reminding oneself 
that a literal reading of documents should not extend to believing that they are direct 
representations of ‘reality’ or straightforward ‘factual records’ (Mason 2002). 
In light of these suggestions, several questions were kept in mind while carrying out 
the review and analysis of documents during the course of this study. These involved 
asking critical questions such as what is the source of the documents, what was the 
purpose for preparing them, for whom were they prepared, who was involved in the 
process, how are they used, by whom and so on. Answering most of these questions 
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required more data to be collected because it is unlikely that all this information will 
appear in the documents themselves. 
Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews are typically classified as structured, semi-structured or unstructured 
(Bryman and Bell 2011; Saunders et al. 2012). Structured interviews, sometimes 
referred to as ‘quantitative research interviews’, are usually associated with positivist 
and hypothetico-deductive approaches and are seen as similar to the use of a survey 
questionnaire. Although these involve some degree of social interaction between the 
researcher and the interviewee, the researcher aims to follow standardised procedures 
to avoid any bias. By comparison, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, also 
sometimes labelled as ‘qualitative interviews’, do not follow standardised 
procedures. Unstructured interviews as the name signifies represent the extreme 
opposite of structured interviews which are not directed by any list of questions or 
topics to be covered. Semi-structured interviews can be placed somewhere in the 
middle of the other two types as they straddle the two extremes. For semi-structured 
interviews, the researcher typically produces an interview agenda or guide that lists 
the themes and/or questions to be explored in the interview. Nevertheless, they adopt 
a rather flexible approach whereby the questions may vary from one respondent to 
another depending on the flow of the conversation. 
This research opted for semi-structured interviews and the majority of the research 
data was collected by this method. This type of interview is particularly appropriate 
when the researcher has identified a specific area of study but wishes to be open to 
explore further propositions emerging from the data. This enables an examination of 
the areas that are identified as relevant by the literature whilst remaining close to the 
social reality, what is referred to as ‘bridging the social distance’ by Silverman 
(2010: 120). In this way, semi-structured interviews retain some degree of similarity 
between interviews which is useful while undertaking comparisons (Kvale 1996). 
Kvale (1996: 6) argues that the research interview is a conversation that has 'a 
structure and a purpose'. This perspective undermines the use of unstructured 
interviews and instead favours semi-structured interviews. Structure helps to avoid 
data overload and lack of comparable accounts, that often result from unstructured 
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approaches (Miles and Huberman 1994). This becomes especially important when 
carrying out multiple case research (Yin 2014). 
More or less all interviews were based around a single set of questions that 
constituted the interview guide (see Appendix A). While preparing the interview 
guide, Yin’s (2014: 35) logic of linking data to key constructs and propositions was 
followed. The interview questions were prepared in a manner so that they reflected 
the relevant concepts and themes identified in the literature review, thus laying the 
foundations for thematic analysis. For instance, there were six questions in the 
interview guide that aimed to collect data around the theme of collaboration in PPPs, 
each of these questions covered the indicators of collaborative IORs identified in the 
existing literature. 
However, in order to avoid premature closure and remain open to any emergent 
issues not yet covered around any theme, the final question provided an opportunity 
for interviewees to have the final say (Patton 2002). For example, the final question 
that followed the theme of collaborative IORs asked respondents: what does 
collaboration in the partnership mean to you? Such questions either confirmed that 
all relevant indicators were already covered or led to rich empirical data that could be 
used for theory development which will be covered in greater detail while discussing 
data analysis. 
The use of semi-structured interviews also enabled the researcher to make sure that 
the respondents understood the questions (Greener 2011). Given that many 
respondents had problems in understanding the English language, clarifications were 
made by the researcher when respondents expressed difficulties in understanding 
some terms, which helped to foster the construct validity of the research. 
All interviews were carried out face-to-face and generally lasted between 60 and 90 
minutes. In most cases a prior appointment was fixed and the interviews were carried 
out within the given timeslot. Building on the learning points from the initial data 
collection phase, the researcher actively looked for and was successful in identifying 
a project sponsor in each case study: PEF chairman, CARE chairperson and ITA 
Director Programmes. Their support helped to overcome access barriers. All project 
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sponsors assigned a middle-level manager to support the data collection process. 
This person helped to schedule appointments with the interviewees and provided 
further details, including important documents. 
The issue of research access was however complicated by the fact that each case 
study organisation has public or private sector partners who must also be willing to 
be a part of the research in order to examine IORs from both perspectives; otherwise 
the evidence would be biased towards one party only. This represents the main 
challenge associated with data collection for this research and is similar to the 
accounts of others researching PPPs. Johnson (2004), whose research is about the 
development of coordination and co-governance within three partnership 
programmes in the UK, has expressed concerns in her PhD thesis which mirror the 
challenges and approach of this research too. She states: 
A major difficulty was the many different kinds of actor present in the 
partnerships, from mainstream public sector representatives; councillors; 
council officers, partnership managers; voluntary and community sector 
representatives and representatives from the community itself. The 
implementation situation as such has to be reconstructed from this 
multitude of views. It has to be interpreted through the different ways 
that people subjectively experience working in this area and the aim has 
been to show the situation as it is with all its complexity. The narrative is 
a version of events, not complete but hopefully, full enough to gain 
sufficient understanding (Johnson 2004: 144).  
In a similar vein this research also aims to capture a multitude of views to investigate 
and understand IORs in the selected PPPs. Individual interviews are treated as an 
elicitation of the subjective experiences of interviewees (Silverman 2010). Although 
the critique from social constructivists (or relativists) about how far is it appropriate 
to think that people attach ‘a single meaning’ to their experiences is acknowledged, it 
is precisely the variation in the views and experiences of the respondents that the 
research aimed to surface rather than a single objective 'truth'. The outcome that is 
sought out of this process is what Kvale (1996: 2) argues as an 'inter view', literally a 
view created by the interaction between the two persons also referred to as 
reflexivity. 
In practical terms, efforts were made to interview a range of different respondents 
from many walks of life within each case and a range of different cases. In the first 
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case study, due to the dominant position of PEF, it was not difficult to arrange 
interviews with the private sector partners of PEF. One of the programme officers, 
assigned as the focal person by the project sponsor, was helpful in making contact 
with the partners that were selected by the researcher from the list of partners to 
represent variations across factors such as private for-profit and not-for-profit 
partners, number of years in partnership, and whether partner schools were situated 
in developed or slum areas. 
In the other two case studies, CARE and ITA, some difficulties were faced in 
contacting the relevant public sector officials at different levels (district and schools). 
The link persons at both CARE and ITA were the ones who negotiated access at 
school level. The school level interviews were conducted in the schools. It was 
decided to conduct interviews with the school head teacher (from the government 
side) and the CARE or ITA school coordinator (from the private sector side). This 
choice was because most of the matters related to the PPP management were mainly 
dealt by these actors. In the case of PEF, the school-level interviews were conducted 
with the school owner and/or the head teacher, who was typically found to be at the 
forefront of the PPP interactions. 
The interviews with the district education officials posed more difficulties. Each 
participant had to be contacted individually by the researcher and most of these 
interviews were made possible only after a couple of cancellations in the scheduled 
appointment time. This was mainly due to the unstable nature of their work, which 
required them to attend non-scheduled meetings at the eleventh hour. In some cases, 
even after several attempts, it was not possible to conduct interviews with some 
officials, such as Executive District Officer (EDO) for education and District 
Coordination Officer (DCO) of Lahore District Government (LDG). These 
interviews, if conducted, would have provided an opportunity to analyse IORs at 
higher levels of the LDG. Some interviews took place because of opportunism and 
favourable circumstances - i.e. the individuals happened to be in their office at the 
time of contact and were eager to get to know the research. As mentioned earlier, the 
researcher’s position as a lecturer at a large public sector university in Pakistan 
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undertaking PhD at an established foreign university was the main factor that 
enabled access, especially in these interviews. 
Most of the interviewees were only interviewed once but in some situations the 
interview had to be stopped until the next appointment due to the emergent nature of 
some other tasks on the part of the interviewee. This had both a positive and negative 
impact on the quality of data. On one hand, it allowed the researcher to look into the 
responses and prepare probes and follow-up questions for the next meeting. On the 
other hand, it disturbed the flow of conversation and the researcher had to put in 
efforts to provide a recap of the discussion in the follow-up interview. Moreover, it 
also incurred more costs to the researcher in terms of traveling expenditure. 
Increasingly many scholars have taken for-granted the use of recording devices 
during research interviews. Silverman (2010: 199), for example, comments ‘it goes 
without saying that your interviews should always be recorded…the old days of pen 
and paper recording are long gone!’ The majority of interviews were recorded in 
order to retain the actual words of the interviewees. However, following Yin’s 
(2014) advice, recording was not considered as a substitute for active listening. In 
fact, notes were also taken during the interviews and were used for preparing probes 
or new questions as they came to the researcher’s mind. Furthermore, note-taking 
was also useful for recording observations and especially the non-verbal cues (Patton 
2002). 
Despite many challenges the interviews were considered successful. In all, 90 semi-
structured interviews were conducted throughout both phases of data collection. 
Although a complete list of interviewees is provided in Appendix B, a summary on 
interviewee numbers for each case study along with a broad indication of the posts 




Table 4.1: Summary of interviewees 
Case study Number of interviews Designations 
PEF’s PPPs Total: 40 
17 with PEF officials; 




Deputy Managing Director Operations 
Directors of all four PPP programmes 
Programme coordinators 
Programme Monitors 
Partner school managers/owners 




20 with CARE officials; 
8 with government head 
teachers 
Chairperson 
Head of Academics 
Head of Management 
Area managers 
Cluster Managers 
Academic Internal Coordinators 
Internal Coordinators  
Government head teachers 
ITA-LDG PPPs Total: 11 
4 with ITA officials; 
7 with government head 
teachers 
Director Programmes 
Provincial Programme Coordinator 
District Manager 
Education Promoter 




Total: 7 Deputy Secretary Secondary Education 
District Education Officers  
Deputy District Education Officer  
Assistant Education Officer 
 
Most of the interviewees were willing to give their time and were enthusiastic in 
telling stories throughout the course of interview. Most of the time they seemed to 
give honest opinions even when the researcher expected that they might obscure the 
truth. Some interviewees were eager to know more about the research and asked 
many questions before the researcher left. It was during those informal conversations 
that they expressed their interest in the research. Some of them appreciated the style 
of the researcher and acknowledged that the questions were designed well ‘to get 
inside their heads’. 
Although the researcher guaranteed anonymity in order to protect them from possible 
harm, most of the interviewees were not much concerned about concealing their 
identities. However, a couple of respondents were wary of the research and hesitated 
to be recorded. One of them was a government head teacher at a CARE adopted 
109 
 
school and the other was a district education official. As a result these two interviews 
were not recorded and the researcher relied on her memory and note-taking. More 
detailed notes were taken immediately after these interviews in order to avoid 
memory lapse. 
Documents and interviews: bringing together multiple perspectives 
Every fieldwork project usually involves more than a single method for data 
collection (Patton 2002). When a qualitative researcher is in the field it is likely that 
they talk with the people, observe them and look at the available documents. 
Multiple sources of evidence are advocated by many scholars because none of them 
are without weakness and together they help to overcome the pitfalls of one another. 
Moreover, using a combination of different methods fosters the validity of the 
research by triangulating the findings. 
In the context of this research, only limited participant observation was formally 
possible and it included observing two meetings of PEF and its partners. However, 
the research interviews were conducted in natural or real life settings. The researcher 
visited the PPP schools which provided ample opportunities to observe the 
participants at work. At times the interviewees had to put the researcher on hold to 
deal with some other tasks at work and sometimes they referred to those tasks as an 
example of what they were saying during the interviews. 
During the course of the fieldwork the researcher used a research diary to record any 
observations. The following is one excerpt from the research diary:   
The way people at PEF talk shows their superiority in relationships, it 
seems as if there is power imbalance in favour of PEF. While taking time 
for interviews with partner schools, PEF officials say “the school owners 
will be made available for the interview by PEF” -- this indicates that 
PEF can give orders to their partners. This is against the non-hierarchical 
nature of IORs promulgated in the PPP literature. 
This excerpt exemplifies how the researcher recorded any relevant observation 
during the fieldwork. It is clear from the above passage that the dominant position of 
PEF did not initially fit with some of the propositions from the literature about 
successful PPPs. Working iteratively between different sources of evidence enabled 
the researcher to use this information to refine ideas about the necessity of 
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collaborative IORs in PPPs. This observation was later corroborated by the analysis 
of the PEF partnership MoUs and interviews with PEF and its partners. Taken 
together these multiple sources of evidence helped data triangulation and reinforce 
confidence in the claims made by the research. 
 Data analysis 4.3.5
It is generally accepted that in qualitative research, informal data analysis starts as 
soon as the researcher enters the field (Eisenhardt 1989b; Miles and Huberman 
1994). The research process with respect to this study confirms these views but this 
section of the chapter focuses on formal data analysis after collecting most of the 
data.  
Keeping in view the huge amount of data (90 semi-structured interviews and many 
documents) collected for this research, it was decided to use a Computer 
Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software package (CAQDAS) in order to 
manage and document the process more efficiently and effectively. NVivo was 
chosen for this research as a suitable CAQDAS due to its availability and 
recommendation by colleagues. The literature that reviews the use of CAQDAS (e.g. 
NVivo, Atlas.ti, NUS*IST, Ethnograph) in qualitative research discusses a number 
of advantages in relation to both transparency and methodological rigour. CADQAS 
such as NVivo is helpful to enhance the trustworthiness and reliability of qualitative 
research by making the process more transparent and creating an audit trail 
(Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012; Bazeley and Kackson 2013). 
The use of CAQDAS, however, is not without criticism. A number of concerns have 
been raised with respect to employing CAQDAS for qualitative data analysis. 
Among the more important issues are the distance created between the researcher 
and data, extensive coding or what Richards (2002: 269) call ‘coding fetishism’ 
whereby a researcher codes excessively to the detriment of other analytic and 
interpretive activities due to the ease of coding in a software. There are also fears that 
computers will take over the analysis process and will make qualitative data analysis 
more akin to quantitative approaches (Bazeley 2007). These arguments established 
that the use of NVivo is not without problems and one has to be careful that 
CAQDAS in itself is not a guarantee to establish the rigour of research findings. 
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In order to understand the software and deal with the possible issues, the researcher 
utilised available resources such as workshops, training materials available online 
and in library and webinars. These were useful to become familiar with the software 
and they offered some guidance on dealing with the above issues. For example, with 
respect to the problem of excessive coding, and hence less emphasis on analytic 
activities, the tools in NVivo such as memos, annotations and ‘see also’ links provide 
ample opportunities for the researcher to reflect, link ideas and record the ways in 
which her thinking developed. 
Since semi-structured interviews were the main source of data for this research, the 
formal data analysis started with transcribing the research interviews. As mentioned 
earlier, almost all interviews are digitally recorded, therefore as a first step the 
recordings of all semi-structured interviews were imported in NVivo. Transcribing 
verbal data is time-consuming and sometimes boring too but it provides a good 
opportunity to get familiar with the depth and breadth of the content (Ritchie and 
Spencer 2002; Braun and Clarke 2006). Since most of the interviews were conducted 
in the mother tongue of the respondents, Urdu, there were additional challenges to 
translate them into English while transcribing. Nevertheless, the researcher’s 
experience in both languages helped to tackle problems such as sociocultural 
differences and imposing a foreign culture, that are often associated with translating 
interview data (Xian 2008). 
There was one particular advantage of transcribing the interviews inside NVivo 
(rather than doing it outside and then importing them) in that it makes retrieval of the 
actual verbal data easy by automatically recording the time span with respect to 
transcript sentences making the researcher closer to the actual data. In many cases 
the researcher listened to important parts of the interview time and again to get a 
better sense of the context and non-verbal data which are argued to be ‘erased’ when 
using transcripts (Miles and Huberman 1994). While transcribing the researcher took 
notes in memos about the key ideas, recurrent themes and any hunches that seemed 




All interviews conducted in CARE-LDG and ITA-LDG PPPs were transcribed. 
However, due to the larger number of interviews in the case of PEF’s PPPs some of 
the interviews were not transcribed. The themes and codes arising from the 27 
transcribed interviews were checked by listening to the digital recordings of the 
remaining 13 interviews.  Additional examples were obtained from these interviews 
but no new themes or codes emerged which needed to be added to the original 
analysis. 
While most of the interviews were in Urdu, all the documents collected in the course 
of this research were available in English. Some of the key documents (especially 
level 3 documents such as MoUs, terms and conditions, minutes of meetings and 
field notes from process observation) were also imported into NVivo for analysis. 
The initial list of codes mainly comprised of etic (outside) issues brought in by the 
researcher based on theoretical constructs from the conceptual framework and 
reflected in the interview guide. However, with more and more transcription and 
analysis emic (inside) issues of the actors in the field also emerged. This resulted in 
additional codes that were added to the initial list of codes. The list of codes kept 
growing as the transcription progressed from one interview to the other and from one 
case to another. In order to keep track of the codes, these were labelled as etic or 
emic in the description box of each code (referred to as node in NVivo). 
The emic codes were both an opportunity and a challenge in themselves. While they 
helped to expand or adapt the concepts as originally given in the conceptual 
framework, they required the researcher to move back and forth between analytical 
insights and alternative theoretical explanations in an imaginative and interpretive 
manner. For example, the conceptual framework identified some indicators of 
collaborative IORs in PPPs. In order to examine the level of collaboration in PPPs, 
the interview guide included questions on these indicators.  This resulted in number 
of codes around level of collaboration which included those suggested by the 
literature (etic issues) and also other indicators that emerged from the data (emic 
issues). This resulted in a number of iterations between theory and data which lies at 




Although progressive focusing has an advantage in that it combines the use of 
existing theoretical constructs with the possibility of accommodating surprising 
patterns, sometimes it becomes difficult to report the emic issues in the ways that are 
consistent with the etic issues. Accordingly, whilst the progressive focussing 
approach has enabled a plausible way to investigate and explain the IORs in 
educational PPPs in Pakistan, there have been some problems in presenting some 
inductive themes in this thesis. For example, the culture and structure of partner 
organisations did not come across from the literature as factors that shape the IORs 
in inter-organisational arrangements. The existing research often discusses these 
factors as the characteristics of inter-organisational arrangements rather than of 
partner organisations. Consequently, partners’ organisation culture and structure 
were not a part of the initial framework for this thesis. They emerged as the factors 
that in combination with other factors influence IORs in PPPs. Because they came 
through inductively, the nature of the comments around these factors in the 
subsequent chapters of thesis might vary in terms of consistency as compared to 
some other factors. 
 Ethical considerations 4.3.6
Ethical issues are important throughout the research process in order to establish the 
ethical integrity of the research and the researcher (Saunders et al. 2012). Concerns 
about the ethical considerations of qualitative research have commonly focussed 
around three aspects: the informed consent of respondents; confidentiality and 
anonymity of interview material; and the consequences of the research (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009). 
Informed consent was taken verbally from each interviewee and while doing this 
Patton’s (2002: 407) advice of keeping it ‘simple, straightforward and 
understandable’ was followed. The basic message that was communicated while 
obtaining informed consent is stated as a preamble in the interview guide (see 
Appendix A). After taking consent, interviews were digitally recorded for subsequent 
analysis. As mentioned earlier, only two interviewees did not allow recording of the 
interview and their request was acknowledged accordingly. 
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In order to ensure the confidentiality of the interviewees, the transcripts of interviews 
were assigned a code that reflected the case study organisation and the generic 
designation rather than the specific individual. For instance, the code CARE-CM-01 
indicates that this interviewee belongs to CARE, has the designation of Cluster 
Manager and is assigned number 1 to distinguish it from other cluster managers 
interviewed for this research. All quotations cited in this thesis reflect these assigned 
codes to protect the confidentiality of the interviewees. Whilst the use of codes is a 
useful technique to make quotations confidential and non-attributable, it also 
provides useful information to the reader about the designation and the 
corresponding organisation of the interviewee. 
Traditionally, researchers are advised to mask the names of case study organisations 
by giving them pseudonyms. But the presumption to disguise case study 
organisations and even respondents is increasingly challenged by the research 
participants who insist on ‘owning their own stories’ (Patton 2002: 411). All three 
case study organisations (CARE, ITA and PEF) took pride in their identities and 
insisted on using their real names. As far as the interviewees were concerned most of 
the private sector interviewees were indifferent towards whether the researcher used 
their real names or not. Many public sector officials, on the other hand, requested 
that their privacy be protected. Accordingly, this thesis refers to the case study 
organisations with their actual names and has protected the privacy of the 
interviewees by assigning them codes. 
In short, there appeared to be no particular ethical problems with this research and 
the case study organisations gave consent to collecting data both from within the 
organisation and from their partners. No one was forced into an interview and only a 
few took the option to refuse. As mentioned earlier, a project sponsor in each case 
study organisation assigned a middle-level manager to support the data collection 
process. Whilst this helped the researcher to gain access to different parties, 
occasionally this created a false impression that the researcher was some kind of 
managerial or official spy. In such situations, the participants were given further 
information about the research and its aims. Nevertheless, participants were told that 
their anonymised viewpoints would be used in research outputs and they could be 
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communicated to the organisational leadership as recommendations for programme 
improvement. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the methodology for this research and has argued that a 
qualitative case study research design has strengths that make it well-suited to the 
investigation and understanding of IORs in PPPs. Nevertheless, undertaking 
qualitative case study research is not simple and, at times, it is not possible to specify 
the time required for different tasks (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 1994). This 
study took more time than was originally expected and hence posed some practical 
issues such as limited funding. Whilst the guidance and advice available in textbooks 
are helpful in this respect; the process needs to be redefined by individual researchers 
to suit their particular circumstances. Furthermore, the iterative nature of the research 
is stressful at times and requires persistence throughout the research. Nevertheless, 
these efforts are worthwhile because qualitative research allows the researcher to 
enter unexplored avenues of study. Qualitative researchers need to combine 
methodological knowledge with intuition in order to carry out a rigorous (but not 
rigid) dialogue between data and theory, and be flexible in accommodating emerging 
ideas. Miles and Huberman (1994: 309) have rightly pointed out that ‘qualitative data 
analysis is a craft… and [it] comes in many varieties and flavours’. 
In terms of maintaining the quality standards, the different tactics that have been 
suggested by Yin (1994) and others (especially qualitative researchers) have been 
employed to ensure that findings are valid and reliable. The use of documents and 
semi-structured interviews has enabled a reasonably holistic account of the case 
studies and a fairly deep exploration of conceptual issues. In line with the advice of 
scholars (e.g. Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Yin 2014), this chapter has provided a 
transparent account of the research process. It has discussed in detail the reasons 
behind choices, the situations that were difficult and problematic, and the ways in 
which practical considerations resulted in changes in the research design. As 
Sinkovics and Alfoldi (2012: 827) state, ‘Transparency is necessary for 
accountability, as it allows an informed discussion about the analytical process and 
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helps to ask questions about the congruence between methodology, the data analysis 
and the findings’. 
In the next three chapters the case studies undertaken for this research are discussed. 
They are the initial ‘fruits’ of the research methods discussed in this chapter. Each 
case study is discussed in a separate chapter using a similar format. They start by 
introducing the case, followed by sections on the PPP set-up; implementation and 
management; and outcomes. The main focus of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 is to describe and 
understand the nature of IORs during different stages of the partnership along with a 
discussion of PPP outcomes in each case study. The description of the nature of IORs 
and factors shaping these IORs in the individual case study chapters provides the 
basis for the analysis in Chapters 8. That analysis addresses the second research 
question on how we can characterise the nature of IORs and understand the influence 
of different factors on IORs in PPPs. The third research question on the implications 
of different IORs for the achievement of synergistic outcomes is dealt in more detail 
in Chapter 9. That chapter focuses on explaining the research findings and links them 




Chapter 5 CARE-LDG PPP 
5.1 Introduction 
This case study looks at the dynamics of IORs in a PPP arrangement called the 
‘Adopt-a-School’ programme. The partners are the Cooperation for Advancement, 
Rehabilitation and Education (CARE) and Lahore District Government (LDG). The 
partnership started in 1998 and consists of 210 state schools that have been adopted 
by CARE to uplift the standard of education services. The chapter is divided into five 
main sections. It begins by introducing both organisations involved in this PPP in 
sections 5.2 and 5.3. This is followed by a description of the ‘Adopt-a-School’ 
programme in section 5.4. The process through which this PPP was set-up, 
implemented and managed is explained in the section 5.5 and 5.6. The main focus 
throughout these two sections is to explain the IORs between CARE and LDG and 
what factors shape them. Section 5.7 summarises the outcomes of CARE-LDG PPP 
in order to review the synergistic benefits achieved by this partnership. 
5.2 An introduction to CARE 
CARE foundation is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) registered as a 
charitable trust. After the devastating floods in the Sheikhupura district of Punjab, 
CARE was established in 1988.  At that time Seema Aziz, founder of CARE and a 
renowned industrialist, along with a few other concerned citizens decided to work 
together for the rehabilitation of the district and help the victims of flood. It was then 
that the idea of building a school in the area came to them. In 1991 CARE opened 
the doors of its first school. That school was a huge success with 250 children 
registering themselves on the very first day (CARE 2012b). Slowly and gradually 
CARE started building more schools in areas where there was no state school. 
Another chapter for CARE started in 1998 when it entered a PPP arrangement with 
the City District Government of Lahore to adopt 10 schools in the city. This 
partnership expanded and CARE continued to adopt state schools. In 2012, CARE 
managed 225 schools comprising 210 state schools and 15 of its own schools, It was 
educating 150,000 children in partnership with district governments (CARE 2012b). 
The majority (151) of the 210 adopted state schools were in the Lahore district. 
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CARE is led by its founder Seema Aziz who is the chairperson and Managing 
Trustee of CARE. The organisation structure of CARE will be discussed in greater 
detail later in this chapter but at its core, managers at various levels seek to improve 
and monitor the level of education in CARE’s own and adopted state schools. 
The mission of CARE Foundation is to build a nation by ‘empowering children with 
solid education’. Education is considered to be the only way to break the vicious 
circle of poverty in the country. The leader of CARE emphasises the importance of 
an equal education for every child in the country. CARE aims to provide ‘quality 
marketable education’ in line with the current needs. However, realising that 
providing education to all children is beyond the resources of any private for-profit 
or not-for-profit organisation, CARE emphasises working in partnership with 
government to strengthen the existing system of education. This mission is reflected 
in the interview with the Head of Academics at CARE: 
We are not going to set up a separate system for us. Our whole aim has 
always been not to set up a totally different system but to work within the 
existing system because unless you do that you can’t bring about change 
from within (stressing). So we are trying to do that, we are trying to 
achieve that change from within (CARE-HoA). 
CARE’s leader and founder, Seema Aziz, is wary about taking donor money. In her 
interview, Seema raised concerns about approaching international donor agencies for 
funding. This makes CARE distinct from the broader NGO community who are 
largely dependent on foreign donor agencies to implement many of their initiatives. 
As Seema explained: 
We have to understand that we have (stressing) to get away from this 
wicked foreign donor concept. We believe that foreign donor money, the 
money which has strings attached, is not what our country needs. I firmly 
believe that with that foreign charity money the destiny of nations would 
never change. The destiny of nations changes with the struggles of their 
own people, with their efforts and with their own sacrifice (CARE-
Chair). 
Another reason for scepticism towards foreign funding is lack of sustainability. 
CARE’s Head of Management argued that such funding is usually for some ‘specific 
projects and for a specified time period which does not suit the mission of CARE’ 
(CARE-HoM). What makes CARE different from other organisations is the long 
119 
 
term relationship which they maintain with children studying in their schools. They 
call them the ‘CARE family’ and children who are not able to continue their 
education due to financial issues are given scholarships to carry on their education at 
reputable institutes. CARE also operates an alumni society which organises events 
and nurtures the CARE family. 
Seema believes in the capacity of the country and its people to address their needs. 
She argues that it is not lack of resources that is the main obstacle to quality 
education for everyone but the mismanagement of resources at different levels. This 
is the reason that CARE strives to improve the management of adopted schools. She 
supported her views by giving examples from the lifestyle of people in Pakistan: 
See a pizza is at the price of 700-800 rupees and a child’s education is at 
500 rupees, what’s problem with us? We have to look inside us, is there 
any lack of money in this country? See marriage ceremonies, see 
people’s lifestyles, if every one of us thinks that I have to give some of 
my money back to the nation then (stressing) we will get over our 
problems (CARE-Chair). 
She added: 
Mismanagement mismanagement (stressing). This country doesn’t 
have a shortage of money by the way; it’s mismanaged. We can fix 
everything in the same amount of money, with the same amount of 
money (stressing), may be some will be left (smiling) (CARE-Chair). 
She argues that it is the duty of every well-off person in the society to help the under 
privileged get the fundamental right of access to quality education. CARE’s sources 
of funding match these claims as instead of relying on funding by donor agencies 
CARE actively pursues reaching the people of Pakistan, including expatriates, to 
generate funds. Moreover, CARE is increasingly involved with the corporate sector, 
including multinational and local corporations working in the country, to mobilise 
their funding in order to achieve its mission and goals. 
5.3 An introduction to LDG 
On the government side the organisational set-up comprises three different levels: 
province, district and school. Although PPP partners interact with the government 
officials at all three levels, most of the interactions tend to take place at the district 
and school levels, and these were the focus for data collection. At the provincial 
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level, there is a School Education Department (SED) headed by the Minister of 
Education and its core team comprises hierarchically organised officials who are 
responsible for all matters related to the delivery of education in the province. 
The provinces are further divided into districts, and the elected representative, 
Nazim, is the person in charge of the administration of the whole district. The District 
Coordination Officer (DCO) works under the Nazim and is responsible for district 
level administration. The DCO implements and directs the approved plans of the 
district government, takes actions for improvement in service delivery and to achieve 
the goals assigned in the approved plans of the districts (UNESCO 2006). Education 
service delivery is one of the many responsibilities of the DCO. Different service 
delivery areas are grouped into departments (such as education, health, community 
development, finance and planning, IT, agriculture, law, literacy and revenue) and 
placed under Executive District Officers (EDOs). The respective EDOs of all 
departments are accountable to the DCO. 
The EDO Education is the person in charge of education service delivery in a district 
and he/she is assisted by a team of officials (see Figure 5.1). The number of officials 
at this level varies from one district to another. In the Lahore district there is a team 
of six District Education Officers (DEOs) and eighteen Deputy DEOs. Further down 
the hierarchy is the frontline level which comprises government head teachers and 
teachers working in state schools. 
The present system of district government (Nazim, DCO and EDO) was introduced 
in 2001 (Government of Punjab 2001). Under this system, administrations are 
accountable to elected councils and ultimately to the electorate. The purpose of the 
reform of the system was to take decision-making closer to the people. This should 
ensure that planning and development are carried out in accordance with local needs. 
Prior to 2001, it was the provincial government that was mainly responsible for the 
provision of services. The district is now the operational tier of governance and the 
focus of all service development activity (UNESCO 2006). 
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Figure 5.1: LDG organisational structure for education service delivery 
 
5.4 ‘Adopt-a-School’ partnership programme 
The ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme was initiated in Sindh province in 1997 by Anita 
Ghulam Ali who was the Managing Director of the Sindh Education Foundation 
(SEF) at that time. The programme was basically aimed at improving the state 
schools by inviting different sectors of the society such as NGOs, concerned citizens, 
the corporate sector and educationists to adopt state schools. In 1990 a situation 
analysis of education in Sindh, carried out for UNICEF, revealed the apathy of 
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school improvement was the adoption of these schools. Professor Anita Ghulam Ali 
presented her proposal to the then minister for education which resulted in the 
Adopt-a-School programme being accepted at provincial government level. It was 
launched in the same year with the adoption of some government schools in the 
district of Karachi (Jamil 2001; SEF 2012).  
The programme received national recognition and was replicated in the Punjab 
province in 1998. Most adopted schools in Punjab province are in the Lahore district. 
According to the official list of adopted schools provided by the Lahore education 
department a total of 363 state schools were adopted up to 2009, out of which 162 
were adopted by CARE (Education Complex 2009). 
In addition to the data collected for this research, it is also useful to draw on some 
existing studies that have examined the Adopt-a-School programme. One such study 
that has compared the programme in both provinces, Sindh and Punjab, found that 
the conception of the programme is different in the two provinces: 
In Sindh the program began on an academic note and was initiated by an 
educationist. In Punjab on the other hand, the program began on an 
administrative note through a directive issued by the education 
department to its implementing bodies (Shams 2001: 70).  
Shams (2001) documents sharp difference in the way the programme is implemented 
and managed in Sindh and Punjab: 
In Sindh the SEF [Sindh Education Foundation] played a pivotal role in 
launching the program and maintaining its role as an intermediary as well 
as leading the initiative at all levels. It is managing the entire program 
along with support from the education department as well as adopters… 
Regardless of the measure of success, this seems to be a positive feature. 
In Punjab the Education Foundation or any other government body had 
no such role to play and as such the program management is left to the 
discretion of concerned departments and individuals. The education 
department officials at various levels in Punjab are not entirely clear 
about this program and where it will eventually lead. They have been 
unable to communicate the program concept to teachers, many of whom 
continue to harbor suspicions, such as that the adopting NGO will take 
over the school and will privatize it and those in service will lose their 
jobs etc. (Shams 2001: 70). 
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Although the comparison of both provinces is out of the scope of this research, it 
nevertheless suggests some possible reasons for the nature of IORs in the CARE- 
LDG partnership and it is also useful in developing a retrospective view of the 
situation. As discussed later in this chapter, the interviews conducted with head 
teachers of the adopted schools and CARE officials confirm that there were huge 
suspicions about the programme initially and as a result government staff at adopted 
schools protested against the adoption of state schools. However, interviewees 
usually reflected that this was the situation in the first year of partnership. With the 
passage of time the IORs have changed in many schools and the level of cooperation 
has increased significantly. 
5.5 PPP set-up 
The PPP between CARE and LDG was initiated at the district level and commenced 
with signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that specifies the roles and 
responsibilities of CARE and the district government. CARE is one of the pioneer 
organisations adopting state schools in 1998. The strong position of CARE’s leader 
as an industrialist helped her to gain access to key LDG officials and create a group 
of supporting people. This enabled her to set up a partnership with LDG and adopt 
some state schools. The Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All 
agenda also provided a conducive environment for the formation of educational 
PPPs. 
The CARE-LDG PPP was agreed between CARE’s leader, the Nazim and the DCO 
of LDG. CARE produced a draft MoU and both parties reported reaching agreement 
after discussing and negotiating the terms with each other. As CARE’s Head of 
Management mentioned: ‘It is with mutual consent, we get into discussion and 
discuss it many times… in a partnership both have to agree’. 
The main features of the CARE-LDG MoU are outlined in Box 5.1. The MoU 
supports a balanced bargaining position between LDG and CARE and it is necessary 
for both parties to consult each other before undertaking any important action (such 
as infrastructural changes, transfer of staff, etc.) in the adopted schools. This makes 
ongoing interaction between the public and private sector partners a permanent 
feature of this PPP. Furthermore, the terms of MoU are kept flexible and ‘can be 
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extended or reduced with mutual consents of the parties’ (Clause 1, CARE-LDG 
MoU). 
Box 5.1: Main features of the CARE-LDG MoU 
Responsibilities of the LDG 
 
That the DG will deliver complete and habitable school in accordance with mutually agreed 
criteria and the CARE shall adopt the aforesaid schools (Clause 1, CARE-LDG MoU). 
 
The utility bills, purchase of Registers, Blackboards, Chalks, Dusters, and Consumables for 
the science laboratories shall be paid through school funds (Clause 11, CARE-LDG MoU).  
 
Necessary repairs of buildings shall be the responsibility of the “District Government”, 
whereas repairs and replacement of installation and fixtures shall be made by the “District 
Government” from the school funds according to the prevalent practices (Clause 13, CARE-
LDG MoU). 
 
All transfers both in and out of the CARE adopted “District Government schools” would be 
done in consultation and [with the] prior approval of CARE (Clause 16, CARE-LDG MoU). 
 
Responsibilities of CARE 
Management of the entire affairs of the above-referred schools shall exclusively vest in 
CARE… subject to the overall supervision and control of the “District Government” within 
the formalities of this agreement (CARE-LDG MoU). 
 
The provision of fully equipped science laboratories within each and every adopted school 
shall be responsibility of “CARE”. Any such item of inventory so introduced by “CARE” 
shall be marked as “Property of CARE” and [it will] be responsible for its maintenance and 
upkeep (Clause 12, CARE-LDG MoU). 
 
The CARE may introduce English as a medium of instruction and may also add 
supplementary books for this purpose (Clause 14, CARE-LDG MoU). 
 
CARE may provide teacher-training opportunities for the teaching as well as the 
management staff of its adopted school in order to raise the standard of education and 
introduce new teaching methodology (Clause 17, CARE-LDG MoU). 
 
Whereas it is CARE’s responsibility to uplift the standard of education, CARE must evaluate 
and prepare appraisal reports for all including Government staff. Such performance & 
evaluation reports about the performance of Government staff would carry reasonable weight 
and importance both in CARE and [in the] District Government Education Department 
(Clause 18, CARE-LDG MoU). 
 
 
5.6 PPP implementation and management 
During the whole process of the PPP set-up, all interactions were between CARE’s 
leader and the Nazim and District Coordination Officer (DCO). The MoU was signed 
by the DCO. The EDO Education, who is the person in charge of education service 
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delivery at the district level, was not involved in the development and agreement 
process of the MoU. The non-involvement of district education officials at this stage 
was an important factor in enabling CARE to envision the goals of partnership and 
take up the roles and responsibilities they wished to pursue to achieve these goals. 
The research findings are consistent with previous studies (Shams 2001; Bano 
2008b) and there is no evidence of any serious effort on the part of those involved in 
the MoU agreement process to clarify the scope and objectives of the programme 
with district education officials. This resulted in lack of understanding about the 
scope of the programme among education department officials. One of the DDEOs 
expressed her concerns about not being involved in the process, she argued: 
Agreement is done at higher level and even we don't know what it is. We 
are not involved in setting up the MoU. We have given this suggestion 
that before doing the agreement we should be asked what we want (Gov-
DDEO-04). 
It is important to look at the expectations of CARE and LDG from the partnership 
arrangement. On the government side, it is clear from the interviews with 
government officials working in the district education department and schools that 
although they want to improve the educational standards in the state schools, in most 
cases all they expect from the private sector is to contribute financial (or more 
generally the material) resources to uplift the quality of education in adopted schools.  
Most education department officials, including those at school level, do not think it is 
acceptable to let adopters intervene in matters related to academics and management 
of schools, such as lesson planning, attendance and punctuality of teachers or pupils, 
etc. This is why the adopters are typically seen as an interference and as encroaching 
on the authority of government officials when they try to implement initiatives 
directly aimed at improving the quality of education and management in adopted 
schools. The comment below is quite typical in explaining the perceived need for the 
partnership and especially the role of the private sector partner: 
What we need from partnership is that in order to provide quality 
education we get AV aids, give us multimedia, give us IT lab, give us IT 
teachers, give us sweepers where required, give learning based toys to 
children, things like that. We don't need interference, they should give us 
one trainer who should come after a month or 15 days and train in art and 
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craft, activity based learning, doing art work and how to decorate the 
school. That's it! This is what we want (Gov-DDEO-04). 
Comments such as this one are consistent with the key indicators used by the federal 
and provincial governments to measure the quality of education. For instance, the 
indicators of education improvement at federal level are the number of schools, 
enrolment figures, number of teachers and availability of physical facilities such as 
school buildings, condition of school buildings, level of construction work, 
availability of electricity, drinking water, toilets and boundary walls, and number of 
classrooms (Government of Pakistan 2011: v). 
The perceived need for partnership is different from CARE’s perspective. In line 
with their mission ‘to empower children with quality marketable education’ and their 
belief that state schools are mismanaged, CARE looks at the partnership as a means 
to improve quality of education by improving management at schools. Their main 
emphasis is on improving the school administration and discipline, monitoring 
teachers in class rooms, examining the notebook checking done by teachers, ensuring 
attendance of children and staff, designing and providing curriculum or any other 
learning material for teaching, providing training to teachers, introducing 
mechanisms for quality improvement such as lesson planning, monthly exams to 
assess children learning, keeping a track record of child learning outcomes, and 
implementing stated rules and regulations. 
Hence, the partners had and have different expectations from the partnership. 
However, given that CARE took the lead in developing the MoU, it is not surprising 
to find that the MoU reflects the vision of CARE. Contrary to the expectations of the 
LDG officials in the education department, the CARE-LDG MoU puts the 
responsibilities for providing the material and financial resources for state schools on 
LDG or directly on schools (from their allocated funds). There is only one clause 
(No.12) related to the provision of science labs that makes CARE responsible for the 
provision of material inputs. The rest of CARE’s responsibilities are related to the 
provision of professional and managerial support (see Box 5.1). 
The lack of clarity about the PPP goes further down the hierarchy and created doubts 
and insecurities in the minds of head teachers and other staff working at school level. 
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This obstructed trust and relationship building when the programme was 
implemented in schools. There are some cases of strong resistance from schools to 
working in partnership with CARE. One of CARE’s cluster managers shed light on 
the situation at the time the first batch of state schools were adopted: 
Let me tell you the history when CARE started entering government 
schools, there was great resistance from government schools. Obviously 
those government schools were there in that area for quite long and so 
they managed to get the community at their side and tried their best to 
make CARE leave, why? Because they didn't know (stressing) that for 
what purpose we are coming (CARE-CM-04). 
In this environment of confusion and suspicion, when CARE officials walked into 
adopted schools for the first time, they were seen as someone who would eventually 
take over the schools. The suspicions and insecurities of staff at adopted schools 
were further reinforced when they were subjected to monitoring by CARE officials 
(a responsibility of CARE under clause 18 of the CARE-LDG MoU). The PPP 
model devised by CARE comprises a team of managers who are responsible for 
monitoring the quality of education delivered in adopted schools. This PPP model is 
explained in the next sub-section and is also summarised in Figure 5.2. The response 
of head teachers towards CARE’s PPP model and the IORs in day-to-day routines 
and in critical incidents are described in the sub-sections 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 respectively.  
 CARE’s PPP model and points of interaction 5.6.1
After the formal adoption of state schools, CARE usually provides missing facilities 
including libraries, science labs, furniture and classrooms. Furthermore, in order to 
address the shortage of teachers CARE hires and provides its own teachers to 
supplement government teachers in adopted schools. The number of CARE teachers 
in each adopted schools varies according to the requirements of each school. One of 
the CARE teachers is designated as head of CARE teachers and is given the title of 
Internal Coordinator (IC). The CARE IC teaches and has additional management 
responsibilities in adopted schools. This involves regular monitoring of the school, 
record keeping and data management including attendance records, movement 
register and teacher evaluation. The ICs also observe teachers while conducting 
classes, looking at the lesson plans and reviewing the teaching methodology. Such 
responsibilities are carried out mainly by the ICs in collaboration with senior staff of 
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CARE who visit the adopted schools on a regular basis. They undertake a Training 
Need Analysis (TNA) and arrange training in relevant areas. 
The school head teacher is a government employee and is the one who officially 
controls and governs school affairs. The head teacher is in direct contact with the 
district education department through District Education Officers (DEOs) and their 
team (see Figure 5.1 for the details of government structure at district level). Though 
the CARE IC is supposed to work under the supervision and in collaboration with the 
school head teacher, there is in effect a dual management structure and this often 
produces a conflict of control between CARE and school head teachers.  CARE 
teachers and especially the ICs are in direct contact with CARE’s central office. 
Government head teachers report to the district education department through their 
own chain of command. The CARE IC has no direct connection with the district 
government. CARE gives some autonomy to ICs to enable them to handle problems 
at the school level. In situations where ICs are unable to manage problems by 
themselves, they report the matter through CARE’s chain of command explained 
below (see Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: CARE’s chain of command for managing the ‘Adopt-a-
School’ programme in Lahore district 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, the organisational structure of CARE for managing the 
‘Adopt-a-School’ programme comprises several tiers of field managers. As 
mentioned above there are ICs in every adopted school. In some schools, usually big 
ones with high enrolment figures, ICs are accompanied by an Academic Internal 
Coordinator (AIC). Formally, AICs are given the sole responsibility for looking into 
academic matters whereas the ICs perform managerial duties. However, the 
interviews with AICs and ICs did not confirm this division of duties and they 
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The adopted schools are clustered according to their geographic locations and each 
cluster consists of no more than 6 schools. A cluster manager oversees schools in 
each cluster and he/she is responsible for all aspects of the schools and for 
communication between the school and CARE’s central office. A cluster manager 
usually has no teaching responsibilities and is mainly responsible for the 
management and monitoring of schools. Several clusters combine to form an area. 
An area manager is empowered to handle all aspects of schools in the area and deals 
with any issues as they arise. Then there is the central office with two different 
departments led by the Head of Academics and the Head of Management who 
interact with the district government at senior levels. 
What comes out quite strongly during data analysis is the consistency of statements 
across CARE officials at various levels. In some cases the examples they provided in 
response to some questions were the same as the ones provided by Seema herself. 
Even the ICs (who are at the lower level of management) quoted her words and 
sentences, which demonstrates Seema’s influence on managers at different levels in 
CARE.  One factor that explains this consistency is a family like organisational 
culture at CARE. Most of the area managers joined CARE many years ago as 
teachers. That was a time when Seema’s involvement with the organisation was at its 
peak. It was also interesting to see that all four area managers who were interviewed 
were responsible for schools that they joined as teachers, subsequently getting 
promoted to cluster and then area managers. 
 The response of head teachers towards CARE’s PPP model 5.6.2
As mentioned earlier the district education officials were not involved in the process 
of negotiating and agreeing the MoU. On top of that there are hardly any education 
officials and head teachers who have read the MoU. They consider it out of their 
domain, one DEO responded as follows when asked about the MoU: 
We are not involved in setting up the agreement, it is done by our senior 
officials and we don't know much about it (Gov-DEO-01). 
One of the Assistant Education Officers (AEOs) commented:  
No I have not seen that (the MoU), that is the government’s and CARE’s 
matter.  Our officers must have done it with care, whatever direction they 
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give we act according to that. The head teachers have no concern with 
that agreement; they are concerned with directions (from their 
department) (Gov-AEO-01). 
Head teachers provided responses similar to their managers. One of the typical 
responses is cited below: 
No, those agreements are not for us, what is that agreement and on which 
conditions it is made is all [district] office job, it’s not our task, and there 
is nothing for us to do in that. So I don’t feel any necessity to look at the 
MoU (CARE-HT-04). 
Given lack of understanding of the MoU, it is not surprising that there are clashes of 
expectations at the school level. The research found varied responses from 
government head teachers about the CARE-LDG PPP. Many interviewees expressed 
concern about the dual management arrangements. At one extreme there are some 
who consider that there is a clear conflict of control between the school 
administration led by the head teacher and CARE. They complain that the roles and 
responsibilities given to CARE’s ICs bring them to a par with head teachers and in 
some cases they perceive ICs to be trying to supersede them in decision-making. 
They often raise concerns about the low qualification and non-professional attitude 
of teachers employed and trained by CARE. They criticise the monitoring practices 
of CARE as a non-productive intervention in the school’s processes that at times may 
even be detrimental to a school’s performance. The following is a typical comment 
that reflects the viewpoint of head teachers who are against CARE’s monitoring: 
See CARE teachers are not as qualified as the government teachers who 
are inducted through a proper process. I’ve seen that the turnover rate of 
CARE teachers is very high, they come and they leave after three months 
or so, this doesn’t happen in the government sector. In government sector 
a teacher is there for 25 years, so there is a proper criteria and process. 
On top of that CARE teachers think themselves more superior to us; they 
also observe teachers in classes which disturbs the whole class. At times 
they think they are superior and know better and we know less which 
can’t be tolerated (CARE-HT-02). 
At the other extreme there are head teachers who consider CARE’s monitoring as the 
added value of the partnership. They mention that having two types of teachers, 
government and CARE teachers, creates a healthy competition and encourages each 
group to improve their performance, which is beneficial for school and pupils. The 
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quotes below represent the value that these head teachers attach to the enhanced 
checks and balances in adopted state schools: 
CARE is a sort of check on us and we are check on them. If I find 
something wrong with them I can talk to Mrs. Aziz or can complain to 
the area manager. Similarly they through their area manager can 
complain to our higher officials. Due to this double check no one can 
escape their duties (CARE-HT-05). 
Another head teacher added: 
Because of the presence of both of us my staff feel his (CARE ICs) 
pressure and his staff are also conscious that I am sitting here… so they 
want to do best of the best. You can consider it a sort of a competition 
between government and CARE teachers which improves the 
performance of both. They all are very alert (CARE-HT-04). 
Given that the head teachers are the main actors from the public sector involved in 
the partnership relationship on day-to-day basis, they have a strong impact on the 
IORs in the ‘Adopt-a-School’ PPP arrangement. While previous studies usually 
report conflicting IORs between CARE and government staff in adopted schools 
(Shams 2001; Shah et al. 2005; Bano 2008b), one of the main findings of this 
research is that the IORs vary from one school to another depending on the initiative 
and attitude of the head teachers towards partnership and school management. This 
diversity is demonstrated with some typical examples of adopted schools in Box 5.2. 
As mentioned earlier, one possible reason for the lack of consistency between this 
finding and the existing studies is the difference in the time periods for the studies. 
Drawing on the interview with a CARE cluster manager: 
I would say that the relationships have changed a lot with the passage of 
time, now people have realised what CARE wants, they’ve seen CARE’s 
work and it’s only due to CARE’s work… see it is natural if we have a 
guest at our home who says that I would live here and moreover I would 
check you and all that, then resistance is inevitable. But now they have 
realised that actually they are in benefit, CARE is giving them benefit 
and no loss so now they have realised. Now there are only few schools in 
which there are problems but if you’d have come for this research 5 or 10 
years ago the situation was very difficult, there were many problems and 
lots of efforts were required (CARE-CM-03). 
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This change in the IORs over a period of time was mentioned by many other CARE 
officials and some head teachers too who were working in the adopted schools since 
the time of adoption. 
Box 5.2: IORs in CARE adopted schools 
Passive acceptance (School-03) 
 
School-03 was amongst the first ten schools which were adopted by CARE in 1998. In this 
school semi-structured interviews were conducted with the Cluster Manager and the 
Academic Internal Coordinator (AIC) from the CARE’s side, and the school head teacher 
and deputy head from the government side. An important theme that emerged from the 
analysis of all these interviews was a lack of coordination between CARE and government 
staff due to the passive role of the head teacher. Whilst CARE’s AIC mentioned that the 
head teacher ‘doesn't interfere or create hurdles and normally agrees to his decisions’, he 
emphasised that ‘the head teacher should have an active role for better outcomes’. This 
attitude of the head teacher results in low levels of conflict in this school. Nonetheless, the 
Cluster Manager highlighted that ‘whatever I ask him to do he always says okay but takes no 
initiative to implement those decisions which results in delays and miscommunication 
between CARE and government teachers’. 
 
The government deputy head explained that CARE is somewhat able to dominate in this 
partnership because ‘no one takes initiative from the government side, CARE is working as 
an independent authority and whatever decision CARE officials take is accepted’. He clearly 
mentioned that ‘although CARE officials are required to work under the supervision of the 
head teacher but he is unable to lead’. The head teacher expressed his support for the 
partnership but was reluctant to answer many questions. 
 
When asked about the added value of the partnership, the Cluster Manager said that ‘there 
could be much more added value if there had been a strong bond between both parties’. He 
further mentioned that ‘the role of the head teacher is quite central to the whole partnership 
model but unfortunately he is not performing his role. If it would have been possible all 
nearby private schools would have closed and this school would have been running in double 
shift but this is not like this rather we have to bring our children to school with great efforts’. 
Conflictual IORs (School-02) 
 
School-02 was adopted by CARE in 1998. The officials interviewed from this school 
included the Academic Internal Coordinator (AIC) and the Internal Coordinator (IC) from 
the CARE’s side, and the school head teacher from the government side. Although this 
school was adopted by CARE in 1998, the current head teacher was appointed in 2009. 
 
During the interview, the head teacher mentioned that state schools face many problems such 
as over-crowding in class rooms due to shortage of class rooms and teachers, but she was 
reluctant to acknowledge the contribution of CARE is this respect. At times when she 
referred to the facilities provided by CARE (such as provision of furniture, computers etc.), 
she commented that ‘this was not from CARE but some donors that CARE brought in’. She 
appreciated the increased interest of the government to raise the standard of state school and 
claimed that ‘now there is no difference between adopted and non-adopted schools’. She 
argued, ‘There is no need of partnership, I don't know about the situation at the time when it 
was adopted but now there is no difference whether CARE is there or not’. She also seemed 
to be unhappy about the monitoring of teachers undertaken by CARE. ‘Although it is 
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important to guide the teachers, we do guide them and CARE officials too but there shouldn't 
be too much interference, sometimes they (CARE officials) criticise a lot and that’s not 
good,’ she stated. She mentioned low levels of trust between both parties and gave an 
impression as if she is working in partnership as some mandated obligation. When asked 
about the process of decision-making, she emphasised that ‘whatever decision I have to take, 
I will take that myself and there is no role of CARE in it. They may be informed later but the 
decision I have to take, I take that and I consult my EDO and DEO for these’. 
 
An important line of argument that came across from the interviews from CARE’s side was 
the need to get things done by playing the politics. Both AIC and IC seemed to realise that 
the head teacher has more power to get things done and that they often have no direct powers 
to enforce their ideas on government teachers but that they can play a substantive role 
through the head teacher. They enacted this role by actively convincing the head teacher 
towards their own agenda while simultaneously giving her the due respect. The AIC shared 
her experience by narrating an instance when there was an issue on preparing test papers and 
CARE’s central office decided that the test papers needed to be reset. Since the directive 
came from CARE and it required the school to do the same exercise twice, the head teacher 
got upset and considered it as an unnecessary burden.  The AIC explained, ‘Initially there 
was a little conflict but later on she (head teacher) cooperated. Sometimes it happens that she 
has a difference of opinion somewhere but we motivate her in such a manner that she gets 
convinced. The main thing is that there should be a proper way to talk’. Elaborating on 
dealing with conflicts the IC mentioned that ‘when things become impossible to settle at 
school level, they are taken up by the higher management of CARE. Then they approach 
district officials and higher authorities to make them (staff at adopted schools) understand 
and cooperate with us’. 
 
Despite conflictual IORs in some instances, there is evidence of added value in terms of 
increases in the enrolment levels and improvement in exam results. The head teacher 
acknowledged, ‘Our results are very good due to special attention on children and this is 
with the efforts of both CARE and us’. 
Collaborative IORs (School-08) 
 
School-08 was adopted by CARE in 2004. The officials interviewed from this school 
included Area Manager and IC from the CARE’s side and the school head teacher from the 
government side. 
 
The head teacher of the school was supervising this school in the capacity of Assistant 
Education Officer (AEO) since 2000 and in the year 2011 he was appointed as the head 
teacher of the school. Hence, this head teacher has a long experience of working with CARE 
both as an AEO and as a head teacher. He was of the view that there is a need for the private 
sector to help overcome the deficiencies in state schools and seemed to acknowledge the 
contribution of CARE with open heart. ‘For example for this school let me tell you that 
student strength is 1700 and there are 20 government teachers in all and CARE has provided 
20 teachers, so in order to overcome such deficiencies the government wants someone to 
come so that the school can function properly, so that’s the need’, he explained. He seemed 
to have trust in the CARE’s team and stated, ‘I have trust on them, I know them when I was 
AEO and if they say something which I feel is for the betterment of the school then I accept 
it and try to implement it’. 
 
CARE’s area manager, who was managing this school since 1998, was also appreciative of 
the head teacher and mentioned that it is very important that the head teacher plays an active 
role in the partnership. He argued, that ‘the head teachers who are not capable and don’t 
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want to show their incapability show full cooperation with us. They close their minds and 
say that whatever you say is correct, this is passive role and this is extremely dangerous for 
us. However, in this school either I convince him (the head teacher) or he convinces me and 
both of us have the objective to benefit children, which is a healthy attitude’. He talked about 
the high level of trust in this partnership and did not feels any need for verification or follow-
up if something is decided between him and the head teacher. ‘It is not possible that we 
mutually decide something and he doesn’t do that so this is my trust on him that whatever I 
have discussed with him will be implemented,’ he explained. 
 
The IC also mentioned the important role of the head teacher in building collaborative IORs. 
She mentioned, ‘This is the quality of our head teacher that he doesn’t keep any difference 
between government teachers and CARE teachers. If I complain about some teacher, he 
doesn’t call him in front of me, he calls the teacher in my absence and make him understand. 
This makes my job easier and helps to avoid conflicts’. She also talked about frequent 
meetings that are held in the school in order to cover the syllabus and highlighted team work 
as a factor to achieve the added value of the partnership. 
 
There is evidence of significant synergistic outcomes in this school. The school is running in 
double shifts due to increase in the enrolment level which has increased from 600 pupils at 
the time of adoption to 1700 pupils. The number of class rooms has also increased from 3 to 
16, out which 8 have been constructed by CARE. The school was upgraded from a primary 
school to a middle school and the head teacher mentioned substantial improvement in exam 
results too. 
 
 The IORs in practice: in day-to-day routines and in critical 5.6.3
incidents 
Although there are examples of joint decision-making and joint determination of 
programme activities in many CARE adopted schools, the fieldwork shows that it is 
CARE who mainly controls the relationship. Although CARE officials working at 
school level get into frequent discussions with head teachers and other school staff to 
implement their initiatives, these are designed a priori at CARE’s central office. The 
discussions held at schools usually involve familiarising government staff with the 
initiatives planned by CARE and seeking acquiescence from them. During these 
discussions CARE officials stick to their own point of view and put the emphasis on 
convincing head teachers about the benefits of the initiatives. Head teachers react to 
this approach differently and this results in varied IORs in adopted schools, as 
mentioned in the previous section. 
The overall approach of CARE officials is to resolve any conflict with the head 




We have always tried to make everyone a team… and we also made a 
policy of no confrontation and no criticism right from the start (CARE-
Chair). 
Nevertheless, she emphasised: ‘but I told them we need to stand in here; we are here 
to serve our children’ which means that while following a policy of no confrontation, 
CARE officials need to stick to their point of view. They keep on persuading 
government officials, via discussions at both district and school levels, about the 
benefits of implementing CARE’s initiatives. As CARE’s Head of Management 
added in her interview: 
The problems and hindrances keep on appearing but we overcome them 
with communication. It is not like there are no problems, there are many 
but we don’t take them as problems and stick to our aim and then they 
don’t remain a problem for us (CARE-HoA). 
The same approach is visible in many instances narrated by CARE’s ICs during their 
day-to-day interaction with head teachers. Most ICs shared experiences of where 
things might have led to conflict but they managed the situation through discussion. 
An IC related an incident when the government teachers and head were reluctant to 
take ‘zero period’, which was introduced by CARE to give extra time to students 
before the starting time of school. It was especially aimed at children who were about 
to take their board exams. She explained: 
We handled them very carefully and told them that see if we don’t take 
zero periods children are so weak and they will fail and the result of your 
school will be bad which will affect your ACR (Annual Confidential 
Report). She listens to us but the thing is that we also give preference to 
ma’am (the head teacher) in every matter; we do ask her and discuss 
everything with her (CARE-IC-04). 
The above comment is an example where CARE IC managed a complex situation by 
carefully playing the politics (giving preference to the head teacher as she is the one 
who has the authority) whilst also manipulating the agenda (imposing her own 
understanding of the issue and setting the agenda about how to improve the exam 
results). In these type of situations, either such matters are resolved at school level or 
they turn into major disputes. In the latter situations, CARE officials take matters to 
the district education office to get them resolved according to their plan. 
Consequently, some head teachers feel that their opinions and views are not given 
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any importance in decision-making, which restricts the trust building process in those 
cases and tends to result in conflicting IORs. 
CARE has been active in interacting with the district officials who are in charge of 
the district administration throughout all stages of the partnership from PPP set-up to 
implementation and through to management. Although these interactions were 
limited to the Nazim and DCO during PPP set-up phase, after the formal adoption of 
state schools CARE management reported having regular fortnightly meetings with 
the EDO Education and his team and a monthly meeting with the Nazim. The 
importance of regular communication with district government officials is explicit in 
the following excerpt from the interview with CARE’s Head of Academics: 
We have great coordination with the EDO education, we have had 
monthly meetings, fortnightly meetings for years and years… the EDOs 
over the years have given us a lot of time, we have had regular meetings 
with the EDOs to solve any issues in the adopted schools (CARE-HoA). 
Despite several attempts, it was not possible to interview the EDO education of LDG 
due to his busy and unpredictable schedule of meetings (an issue discussed in 
Chapter 4) and hence his views on coordination cannot be produced here. 
Nonetheless, it is clear from the interviews with two DEOs and an AEO that CARE 
officials keep interacting with the district education department regularly and keep 
government officials updated on the work carried out in adopted schools. 
CARE officials are of the view that active interaction at the higher levels is 
especially important in gaining respect in the eyes of head teachers. An area manager 
who has worked with CARE since 1998 was of the view that it becomes easier to 
implement CARE’s initiatives in the schools if they are reinforced by district 
education officers. He gave an example of when the participation of government 
teachers in CARE’s training workshop increased once CARE managed to get it 
notified from the LDG education department. He argued: 
It is a psyche at all government side that if they think that the other 
person has the authority then all he says is very good but if they feel that 
the other person doesn’t have the authority then all he says is rubbish and 
wastage of time (CARE-AM-04). 
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Besides having a lot of interactions with the district level officials, CARE officials 
often expressed their frustration regarding the public sector education system. 
Drawing on Seema again: 
There are many internal tussles within the government, the power 
struggle is huge, they are not able to decide themselves that what matters 
are to be dealt at the district level and what has to be done by the 
provincial government, no one takes the responsibility and make crazy. 
So it’s really unmanaged, they do not know how to manage things, the 
system is too centralised (stressing). The changes in the government are 
so unpredictable and there is no connection between those who make 
policy and those who implement policy (CARE-Chair). 
CARE officials take pride in the work CARE has undertaken in the adopted schools 
and consider it as their main strength. CARE officials seem to believe that the state 
schools are badly managed and state monitoring system is not targeted on the right 
indicators. One of the CARE area managers explained: 
If you call a DCO and even if you call chief minister he will come and 
see whether cleanliness is there? Are teachers in the classes? If yes, that’s 
perfect for them… they are not concerned with what the child has done in 
the note books and how much he has learnt, they think if cleanliness is 
there in school and teacher is in the class that’s all (stressing). Whereas 
CARE says that work starts after all this is done (stressing), like for 
example you should conduct their training that how to teach and how to 
move ahead (CARE-AM-01). 
In line with the vision of CARE’s leadership, improving the management of adopted 
schools lies at the heart of CARE’s partnership model. Due to their day-to-day 
interaction with the adopted schools, CARE officials encountered some practices of 
the government teachers which were a cause of conflict. A typical example is that of 
some government teachers bringing their children to schools. These government 
teachers used to ask some of the school students to take care of these children. CARE 
stopped such activities in adopted schools which resulted in conflicts at times. 
The management initiatives undertaken by CARE were generally considered by 
government head teachers as stepping into their domain and this became a reason for 
conflict in most cases during the initial years of partnership. Some of the head 
teachers at adopted schools complained that CARE officials used to consider 
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themselves superior and more knowledgeable and did not take into account their vast 
experience. These views are reflected in the following interview excerpt: 
Initially the administrators that were placed here from CARE portrayed 
themselves as if they have an Aladdin lamp and will force others to work 
as they wished. Naturally they had to face huge reaction because 
government teacher is ‘public sector’s son-in-law’ and would not retire 
before 60 years of age, so that was natural. But the current IC has a very 
mature attitude and she is taking work from the same teachers in such a 
nice way (CARE-HT-07). 
The term ‘public sector’s son-in-law’ is an analogy used by the head teacher to 
represent the strong position of the government teachers whose terms of employment 
give them a lot of job security. 
Besides developing collaborative IORs in many schools over time, the attitude of 
CARE officials that they ‘can fix everything’ is still seen as a barrier to building 
trust. Head teachers are generally happy about the facilities provided by CARE but 
certain initiatives directly aimed at uplifting quality of education such as conducting 
their own exams in addition to board exams, obliging government teachers to use 
CARE supplements and the monitoring of government teachers are sometimes seen 
as interference in the domain of school administration. In an interview with an AEO 
it was clear that he was generally supportive of the idea of partnership and 
appreciated CARE’s contribution in adopted schools. Nevertheless, he pointed out 
his concerns: 
Actually the thing is that they (CARE) are doing good work but they try 
to become a parallel administrator which head teachers don’t like, they 
are happy with the facilities they provide but don’t allow them (CARE 
officials) to rule (Gov-AEO-01). 
5.7 PPP outcomes 
There are many examples of the value added by CARE-LDG PPPs which could not 
have been achieved by each party working on its own. Interestingly, some added 
value of the partnership was possible even in the schools where there were 
conflictual IORs. This was possible due to the enhanced checks and balances. 
However, the added value was not achieved in one school where the head teacher 
played a passive role (as discussed in Box 5.2). This shows that it is essential for 
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both parties to actively participate in partnership in order to produce significant 
synergistic outcomes. 
Both CARE and LDG possess some strengths and weaknesses, and these PPPs allow 
both partners to take advantage of each other’s strength. Interestingly, there are 
certain instances where the 'weakness' of one sector is usually the 'strength' of the 
other which makes a very good case for the value added by the partnerships. The first 
example in this regard is CARE’s use of state infrastructure to pursue their mission. 
As already pointed out no private sector organisation could ever have resources to 
provide education services to all. This fact was well recognised by the leadership at 
CARE and they saw partnership with LDG as an opportunity to pursue their goals. 
This is reflected in the following excerpt from the interview with one of CARE’s 
cluster manager: 
Madam (Seema) started with her own schools initially and then she 
realised that rather than spending a lot why not improve the existing 
ones, if you get a running setup it is far more cost effective to improve, 
and that was a good decision (CARE-CM-01). 
Similar views were given by CARE’s Head of Management: 
To provide quality marketable education to underprivileged children is 
our mission and we are especially focusing on government schools 
because we know that most of the people send their children to 
government schools and they have vast infrastructure so we are targeting 
government schools (CARE-HoM).  
So this is an example where LDG’s existing infrastructure is seen as the strength of 
the public sector. There are also examples where strengths of CARE were adding 
value to partnership by overcoming weakness in public sector system. For example, 
it was mentioned by many head teachers that government procedures are slow with 
respect to the provision of teachers in schools due to the long recruitment process. 
On the contrary, CARE can provide teachers in a short period of time. According to 
an AEO, the main reason for this is that the government jobs are long-term and 
teachers once selected stay engaged for their lifetime whereas the private sector jobs 
are mostly contract based which is usually on a short-term basis and hence hiring and 
firing is easier. That is why the government has to be cautious while recruiting and it 
takes more time. The provision of teachers by CARE, as a main input for education 
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service delivery, is a synergistic benefit of the partnership and is acknowledged by 
all government officials both at district and school levels. One of the head teachers 
voiced her views as: 
When they (CARE) work with us, they provide missing facilities, 
teaching and non-teaching staff which is an advantage. Usually if there is 
a shortage of teaching staff in state schools, the head teachers write to the 
government and you know government sector is so big and education 
department is so huge that they can’t address the needs of every 
institution instantly. CARE facilitates us with providing staff and by the 
grace of God we have a lot of staff in our school after partnership with 
CARE (CARE-HT-07). 
Taking advantage from each other’s strengths has resulted in enhanced capacity and 
influence of both CARE and LDG in this PPP arrangement. There is evidence of 
enhanced organisation identity of each partner. Working in state schools has 
enhanced CARE’s organisational identity manifold as it has improved CARE’s 
image, visibility and profile both in the community and the education sector. This has 
resulted in increased funding options for CARE which is an added value of the 
partnership. 
The organisational identity of LDG has also been enhanced by entering into PPP 
arrangement. CARE has contributed to the provision of missing facilities in adopted 
schools. These improvements helped to increase school enrolment rates significantly 
so that it became difficult to accommodate the increased number of pupils in the 
existing buildings. In such situations the adopted schools started accommodating 
children in double-shifts. This has improved the image of LDG. In many schools 
there is also evidence of improvements in the exam results. 
It is not possible to quantify the value added by CARE-LDG PPPs due to non-
availability of relevant and robust data. Nonetheless, according to CARE’s Head of 
Academics, in Lahore district the enrolment rate of adopted schools has increased by 
41.7% since the time of adoption and the exam passing rate is 20% higher in adopted 
schools as compared to non-adopted state schools (CARE 2012a). However, it would 
not be fair to give all the credit to CARE as the fieldwork clearly shows that many 
government head teachers were eager to bring improvements in their schools and 
looked at the partnership with CARE as a good opportunity to do so. 
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With respect to partners’ ability to achieve their own organisational objectives, both 
LDG and CARE official generally consider that they have the same overarching 
objective, which is to improve access to quality education in Pakistan. The CARE-
LDG PPP has enabled both of them to make progress against this objective. The fact 
that CARE is now expanding and adopting state schools in other provinces is another 
indicator that CARE-LDG PPP has facilitated CARE in meeting its objectives. 
5.8 Conclusion 
CARE-LDG PPP has been established in view of the inability of both CARE and 
LDG to generate enough resources by themselves to pursue their mission and goals. 
The fact that both CARE and LDG have a common objective of improving access to 
quality education - albeit with differences in their approach and perceptions - has 
facilitated both organisations to work in partnership. Differing perceptions of 
partners towards the goals of partnership is a source of tension in CARE-LDG PPP 
during PPP implementation and management stage. Nevertheless, CARE was 
successful to take up the roles and responsibilities they wish to pursue in partnership 
arrangement due to the non-involvement of district education officials in PPP set-up 
phase.  
As such the development of IORs in the adopted schools was a dynamic process as 
IORs changed from one stage of the partnership to another and also within one stage 
over time. The IORs were typically characterised by lack of trust and conflicts in the 
initial years of the partnership but gradually the IORs changed when partners got to 
know each other and started building trust. Furthermore, the IORs in CARE-LDG 
PPPs were diverse as they varied from one school to another depending on the 
initiative and attitude of the head teachers towards partnership and school 
management. 
There are many examples of the value added by CARE-LDG PPPs which was not 
possible by each party working on its own. However, the synergistic outcomes 
became possible only with the active participation of both sides (CARE and 
government officials) and there is an example where no added value was produced in 




Chapter 6 ITA-LDG PPP 
6.1 Introduction 
This case study looks at the nature of the IORs and the factors shaping them in a PPP 
arrangement, called the Whole School Improvement Programme (WSIP). It involves 
Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aaghai (ITA) and the Lahore District Government (LDG). The 
partnership started in the year 2000 and consists of 12 state schools that have been 
adopted by ITA to uplift the standard of education services. The chapter begins by 
introducing ITA in section 6.2. This is followed by a description of WSIP in section 
6.3. The process through which this PPP was set-up, implemented and managed is 
explained in the sections 6.4 and 6.5 respectively. While explaining the PPP process, 
particular attention is paid to understanding and explaining the nature of IORs and 
the factor shaping these IORs. Finally, section 6.6 outlines the outcomes of ITA-
LDG PPP in order to review the synergistic benefits achieved by this partnership. 
6.2 An introduction to ITA 
ITA also known as the ‘Centre of Education and Consciousness’ is a non-
governmental organisation registered as public trust. With its head office in Lahore, 
ITA has branch offices in 23 districts across four provinces of Pakistan and two fund 
raising offices in the UK and USA. ITA was established in the year 2000 in response 
to the educational challenges in Pakistan. According to the official website of ITA: 
Unfortunately education has consistently failed to be a priority for 
Pakistani leaders. In 61 years of Pakistan’s existence, Universal Primary 
Education (UPE) has remained an elusive goal… Chronic lack of 
resources, shortage of facilities beyond primary level, lack of competent 
teachers/managers, terrorism and emergencies are severely jeopardizing 
possibilities for human development and participation (ITA 2012a). 
ITA emerged with the ideology that it is the social responsibility of citizens to work 
jointly with the government to address these challenges. The mission of ITA is stated 
as: 
To actively pursue universal access and standard setting in education as a 
comprehensive learning experience for human evolution and 
consciousness by creating contemporary education systems for all 
children without discrimination due to gender, class, age, religion, color 
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and ethnicity and, endeavoring to address educational bottlenecks 
through timely resource mobilization and influencing of public policy 
(ITA 2012a).  
Although very broad, there are three main objectives evident in this mission: 1) 
universal access and standard setting in education, 2) resource mobilisation, and 3) 
influencing public policy. 
ITA’s leader and founder, Dr. Baela Raza Jamil, is a well-known educationist and a 
public policy specialist. Baela’s biography helps to explain how her experiences 
resulted in establishing ITA. Baela is a daughter of a well-known lawyer of Pakistan 
and belongs to the upper income class of the country. She started working in the field 
of education at UNICEF where she worked as a programme officer for the education 
of women and children in vulnerable circumstances. Baela always wanted to be in a 
position where she could influence policy decisions. In an interview with a local 
journalist she explains: 
UNICEF was a good place but I wanted to have more say in policy 
making because that is the real thing… What is the point of researching 
and working and reaching a conclusion about flaws in a system but not 
having the power to see they are mended? (Jalil 2011) 
Later in 1995 she joined the Punjab education task force
5
 which provided her with an 
opportunity to input into policy work. Two years later Baela joined the Sindh 
Education Foundation (SEF). At that time SEF was led by Anita Ghulam Ali who 
first presented the idea of the ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme in Sindh province. All 
these experiences encouraged Baela to set up her own not-for-profit organisation. 
ITA was established with a project based on the Adopt-a-School programme, the 
idea that Baela learned while working at SEF. 
Keeping in view the vision and mission of ITA, it is not surprising to find that ITA is 
working to mobilise diverse stakeholders in the education sector. This includes the 
government, community, corporate sector, philanthropists, NGOs (local, national and 
                                                 
5
 The Pakistan Education Task Force is a national initiative to support the implementation of the 
National Education Policy in Pakistan with support of DFID. ‘The initial work of the Task Force was 
to set key priorities that will establish national standards for schools, improve monitoring of these 
standards, and harness government, private and charitable resources to increase enrolment and 
achievement’ (DFID, 2011). 




international), educationists, expatriates and different types of donor organisations. 
ITA works with these diverse partners and is involved in many initiatives which are 
described below. 
Inspired by the idea of the ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme, ITA has developed the 
Whole School Improvement Programme (WSIP). This is the flagship programme of 
ITA and it focuses on uplifting under-performing state schools by entering into 
partnership with district governments. WSIP occupies a central position in ITA’s 
working. It is the main focus of this study and is discussed in detail in Section 6.3. 
In another initiative, ITA worked in collaboration with a multi-national company, 
Unilever Pakistan, for the promotion of Early Childhood Education (ECE) and 
developed a National Curriculum for Early Childhood Education 2007. ITA 
developed learning materials to facilitate the implementation of this National 
Curriculum. It conducted teachers’ training workshops for 200 teachers from 160 
schools (120 state and 40 private) in the district Lahore. 
ITA is also involved in professional development programmes for teachers both in 
Pakistan and abroad. Since 2004 ITA has coordinated a professional training 
programme for in-service teachers under Pakistani Education Leadership Institute 
(PELI) project. The project is sponsored by the US Department of State and the 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Selected public sector teachers and 
education managers from all over Pakistan are given an opportunity to visit 
Plymouth State University in the USA for a four to five-week training programme 
aimed at cross-cultural and educational exchange. ITA’s partnership with Punjab 
Education Foundation (PEF)
6
 is also an important part of capacity building. 
Since 2006, ITA has been working in partnership with PEF on their Continuous 
Professional Development Program (CPDP) and it conducts training workshops for 
teachers and head teachers at PEF partner schools all over Punjab. 
                                                 
6
 PEF is an autonomous public sector organisation that is involved in partnerships with several private 
sector organisations. “The Punjab Education Foundation was established under the Punjab Education 
Foundation Act of 1991 as an autonomous statutory body for the promotion of education, specially 
encouraging and supporting the efforts of the private sector in providing education to the poor, 
through public private partnership” (PEF 2012) 
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In addition to formal education, ITA is also working in the area of non-formal 
education and literacy programmes. According to an ITA’s brochure there are six 
different programmes that ITA has been involved in since 2002 under this heading 
(ITA 2010). These programmes were targeted at specified districts of Punjab for a 
specific period of time and were supported by Save the Children, the US Department 
of Labor, International Labour Organization, UNICEF and Government of Pakistan. 
The main aims under almost all these programmes were to provide education to 
marginalised working children in order to get them into mainstream formal 
education. 
ITA, since its inception, has actively pursued developing linkages and alliances with 
organisations working in the same field not only in Pakistan but globally. One of the 
most prominent ITA’s alliances is with South Asian Forum for Education 
Development (SAFED). This is an education forum for nine South Asian countries: 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and 
Burma. ITA has played an important role in the establishment of SAFED, and ITA 
has been assigned as SAFED's first secretariat to take SAFED forward in its first 
phase. It is ITA’s responsibility to coordinate among the SAFED members and other 
partners and affiliates. Under this and other alliances, ITA takes the initiative to host 
seminars and conferences whereby several leading NGOs, mainly from South Asia, 
and public sector officials are invited to share their ideas and initiatives. 
Under the umbrella of SAFED, ITA takes a leading role in conducting the Annual 
Status of Education Report (ASER), which is a survey of the quality of education in 
Pakistan. ITA conducts this survey in all rural districts of Pakistan and is working in 
partnership with several national and international organisations such as DFID, the 
British Council, the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), Sindh 
Education Foundation and OXFAM. The survey data is compiled in report form and 
shared with the government, media, partner organisations and other stakeholders 
working in the education sector, including NGOs. 
The list of programmes does not end here. ITA keeps exploring new ideas and 
actively pursues opportunities for mobilising resources from diverse sources. An 
existing study comments on ITA’s objectives as ‘to attack as a platform to synergise 
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the energies of these diverse actors… its vision involves engaging with all kind of 
education methods and techniques to optimise the resources to provide education to 
all rather than choosing a specific path over the other’ (Bano 2008a: 14). ITA’s 
programmes, with myriad projects funded by diverse sources, endorses this point of 
view. 
6.3 ITA and WSIP 
As demonstrated in section 6.2, ITA is involved in many diverse programmes but 
this case study report is primarily concerned with the partnership between ITA and 
the LDG through Whole School Improvement Programme (WSIP), generally known 
as ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme. Despite being involved in a number of initiatives 
related to education, WSIP is still the main focus of ITA and all other initiatives are 
linked to WSIP in some way. The following excerpt from the interview of the Lahore 
District Manager of ITA reflects the centrality of WSIP, she remarked: 
All different programmes of ITA could be seen as streams falling into a 
big ocean of WSIP and all activities are linked to WSIP (ITA-District 
Manager). 
The birth of ITA and WSIP are closely related to each other. Under the banner of 
‘Adopt-a-School’ programme, ITA started adopting state schools by means of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ITA and LDG. Baela adapted the 
‘Adopt-a-School’ programme from SEF and gave it the name Whole School 
Improvement Programme (WSIP), with the slogan of ‘Regenerating Schools - 
Regenerating Communities’. This adaption process is evident from Baela’s paper 
presented at a national symposium on ‘International experiences with 
decentralization and education’: 
This is yet another home grown programme devised in 1990 by the 
eminent educator and leader of professional teacher association Professor 
Anita Ghulam Ali… The programme with origins in Sindh was adapted 
in Punjab in 1998. In one of its more recent versions it is called 
“regenerating schools: regenerating communities” through the adopt a 
school approach (Jamil 2001). 
Since the inception in 2000, WSIP has been expanded across the country. By 2012, 
ITA had worked in 280 state schools and reached 350,000 children across all four 
provinces of Pakistan (ITA 2012a). Although Baela established ITA as an 
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organisation to support government in the provision of quality education under 
WSIP, she no longer likes WSIP to be labelled as ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme. She 
argued in her interview: 
No, the thing is that from the year 2000 we have consciously said that we 
do not want to call it adopt-a-school, we find adopt-a-school a 
dependency model and it's a lower ordered model (stressing). The 
adopt-a-school programme should be totally changed... we are not 
making claims that we are adopting a state school forever, we are saying 
that this is a partnership for school improvement… adopt-a-school is not 
the right term and although the notion has stuck on as a most popular 
notion, but I think it's not a sensible term and I think that the more 
sensible term is school improvement through partnerships (ITA-Founder 
and Director Programmes). 
It is quite evident from the above quote that Baela’s views about the ‘Adopt-a-
School’ programme have changed over time. 
Given the focus of research, it is important to understand the partnership process in 
WSIP because it helps to understand the developmental stages of ITA-LDG PPP, the 
dynamics of the IORs and the factors shaping them. WSIP is developed as a four 
phased process as shown in Figure 6.1 and explained in sections 6.4 and 6.5. 
Figure 6.1: WSIP: process and sources of funding 
 
Source: ITA official website (ITA 2012a) 
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As evident from Figure 6.1, ITA actively seeks different sources of funding for 
WSIP. In fact it would not be wrong to say that through WSIP, ITA is acting as a 
focal point to synergise resources from many diverse sources. ITA was among the 
pioneers of the idea of public-private partnership in education through corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Under this banner, ITA works with the corporate sector 
to implement various WSIP programmes. Consequently, the sources of funding for 
WSIP include almost every type of stakeholder, including the corporate sector, NGO 
alliances, and the support provided by different donor agencies. Some prominent 
names include Oxfam, Dubai Cares, Unilever Pakistan Limited, Nestle, ICI, Telenor, 
CIDA and UNICEF (ITA 2010). 
6.4 PPP set-up 
During phase I of WSIP, ITA obtains a list of potential schools in need of partnership 
and support from the education department. ITA gets in direct contact with the 
district education officers: the EDO education and his team (see Figure 5.1 in 
Chapter 5 for more details on LDG organisational structure for education service 
delivery). ITA officials reported that they introduced district education officers to 
WSIP by giving them an orientation to the programme and they also arranged a joint 
visit to the potential schools. The purpose of the joint visit is to introduce WSIP to 
school staff and observe the site. However, in her interview, the head teacher of the 
first school adopted by ITA in Lahore said that she didn’t know about partnership 
until the MoU was signed at the district level. 
In the second phase, a decision is made to enter into a partnership by signing the 
MoU at the district level. In the case of ITA-LDG PPP, the MoU was negotiated and 
agreed between the DCO and ITA’s leader. The district education officials including 
the EDO Education, who is the person in charge of education service delivery at the 
district level, was not involved in the development and agreement process of the 




Box 6.1: Main features of the ITA-LDG MoU 
The EDO (Education) under the current MOU in principle agrees to consider initiatives of 
special programmes by NGO, such as Community Mobilization, Teachers Training, Health, 
Early Childhood Education, IT literacy, literacy for mothers and siblings, Homework Study 
Centers, Summer School (Project Based Learning) etc. However, the NGO shall consult with 
CDG [City District Government] prior to initiating such programmes to ensure that liabilities 
and responsibilities are clearly established and there is no financial liability for the CDG (Clause 
3, ITA-LDG MoU). 
 
That City District Government shall not be liable to any financial liability except payments of 
emoluments of the CDG staff posted in the adopted school as permissible under the law (Clause 
8, ITA-LDG MoU). 
 
That if “NGO” of its own accord engages any additional staff, it shall be at the risk and cost of 
“NGO”. In this connection, “NGO” shall not be entitled to claim any compensation from the 
CDG (Clause 11, ITA-LDG MoU). 
 
That the management and other affairs of the school shall be supervised by the School Council 
consisting of members, from each of the following organizations: 
a)School-Head Teachers / Teacher, b)Parents, c)Community, d)Adopter (NGO), e)EDO 
(Education)/ on behalf of CDG, f) Nazim or his / her nominees from the Education Committee. 
The head teacher would act as the Chairperson of the Management (Clause 10, ITA-LDG MoU). 
 
The provision and maintenance of fully equipped science laboratory and library shall be the 
responsibility of CDG if money is available, otherwise of the NGO and the school community 
(parent, teachers and students) (Clause 19, ITA-LDG MoU). 
 
That the annual repairs and white wash of the adopted schools shall be undertaken jointly be 
CDG and NGO (Clause 20, ITA-LDG MoU). 
 
Training opportunities provided by NGO to teachers and School Council will be supported by 
CDG. It will be incumbent on the CDG paid teachers to participate in these during the summer 
break and otherwise at a mutually agreed time and will practice them in school (Clause 25, ITA-
LDG MoU). 
 
NGO will submit quarterly / monthly reports to CDG on its performance and also attendance 
and quality of teaching / assessment methods with positive recommendations for improvement 
and corrective measures. This will be in the best interest of the school and its students (Clause 
26, ITA-LDG MoU). 
 
The staff hired by NGO will be professionally sound. They will be under the joined management 
of head teacher and NGO. All permissions for leave and or other movement for NGO hired staff 
will be obtained through the NGO management. A join review of NGO hired school staff will be 
conducted by head teacher and NGO representatives (Clause 27, ITA-LDG MoU). 
 
Management of the entire affairs of the above referred school(s) shall mutually vest in CDG and 
the NGO (through the School Council constituted under clause 10 above) subject to overall 
supervision and control of CDG within the formalities of the agreement (Clause 28, ITA-LDG 
MoU). 
 
In case of any dispute between CDG and NGO the matter will be resolved amicably in the spirit 
of the collaboration and resolution to promote quality education in Lahore through public private 
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partnership. On behalf of the CDG the EDO (Education) of the Education Department will be 
the representative. Both parties will expedite resolution of the matter within stipulated time 
formally agreed at the time of conflict by the CDG / EDO Education and NGO. In extreme cases 
the provision under article I above will be invoked for exit by the NGO and CDG from the 
agreement (Clause 31, ITA-LDG MoU). 
 
ITA considers WSIP as a ‘tripartite arrangement’ consisting of the government, 
NGO and community working together as three partners through a formal MoU for 
school improvement (ITA 2012a). The initial MoU is for five years during which 
time ITA supports the adopted schools by addressing their infrastructure needs, 
providing teachers where there is shortage of teachers and improving teaching by 
training teachers in adopted schools. 
The MoU was developed by ITA and was considered very important to ITA’s work 
in adopted schools because it is essential to get the formal permission of the 
government to work in state schools. Realising that the government officials are not 
very comfortable with contributing financial resources, there are several clauses in 
the MoU that ensure no financial liability on the LDG for any initiatives introduced 
by ITA (see Box 6.1). At the same time, the MoU provides enough space to ITA to 
envision the goals of partnership and take up the roles and responsibilities they wish 
to pursue to achieve these goals. For example, clause 3 of the MoU demands support 
of the EDO education to implement ITA designed initiatives such as community 
mobilization, Early Childhood Education and training of teachers in adopted state 
schools. 
The MoU emphasises the importance of jointly determined processes in adopted 
schools in several ways and makes it necessary for both parties to consult each other 
before undertaking any important action (such as infrastructural changes, transfer of 
staff, etc.) in the adopted schools. This makes ongoing interaction between the public 
and private sector parties a permanent feature of this PPP. Furthermore, the terms of 
MoU are kept flexible and ‘can be extended or reduced with mutual consent of the 
parties’ (Clause 1, ITA-LDG MoU). 
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6.5 PPP implementation and management 
While the interactions during PPP set-up are mainly between the LDG education 
officials, the implementation and management of the WSIP is mainly done at school 
level and occasionally at the district level with the EDO Education and his team. The 
non-involvement of the adopted schools’ staff in PPP set-up phase and the lack of 
any serious effort on the part of those involved in the MoU agreement process to 
clarify the scope and objectives of the programme resulted in confusions and 
reservations about WSIP in the minds of head teachers and other staff in the adopted 
schools. The head teacher of the first school adopted in the Lahore district talked 
about her fears as: 
Actually when we heard about this partnership we didn't want ITA to 
come to our school, we tried to seek a lot of references to stop them from 
coming to our school (smiling). We also asked community to come and 
react against taking over the school, we called parents and asked them to 
give in writing that this is a government school and this interference 
should not be there. When ITA’s district manager came here we 
misbehaved with her out of anger and felt sorry afterwards (smiling) but 
we thought that they would interfere a lot, would launch the complaints 
about us in our office, would transfer us to some other school, this and 
that... we were afraid that it would create a lot of problems for us, so 
that’s why I sought many references and was able to keep it pending for 
six months but when there was a lot of pressure from higher level we had 
to agree (ITA-HT-01). 
The above excerpt is an example of school staff insecurities about WSIP. They even 
thought that ITA had a hidden purpose of taking over the school which could result 
in their transfers or even the termination of their jobs. Therefore, the head teacher 
looked for all possible means to stop ITA from entering the school. 
ITA was well aware of the non-involvement of school staff in the process of 
negotiating and agreeing the MoU. Realising the lack of trust and confusion about 
WSIP in the minds of head teachers and other school staff, ITA conducted a session 
entitled ‘Hopes, Fears, Expectations and Desires about the partnership’ with students 
and staff of every adopted school. These sessions helped ITA to make everyone at 
school level familiar with the WSIP and they were taken as an opportunity to address 
any concerns or doubts about the programme. In order to develop mutual 
understanding about the partnership, the orientation sessions included ITA officials 
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reading the MoU to school staff. These sessions were a critical step towards 
developing working IORs in an environment of mistrust and suspicions about ITA 
and WSIP. The head teacher of the first adopted school appreciated ITA’s approach 
to make it easier for her and others at the school to overcome their doubts about the 
presence of ITA in school. She explained: 
When ITA came to our school they called all staff and read the MoU 
before us. This clarified their purpose for being in the school, I still have 
a copy of the MoU in record, they told us that we are here to do such and 
such things and if we do something that is not mentioned in the MoU 
then you can make us accountable for that (ITA-HT-01). 
As mentioned earlier, ITA envisions WSIP as a ‘tripartite arrangement’ consisting of 
the government, NGO and the community working together as partners for school 
improvement (ITA 2012a). Therefore, ITA makes efforts to build relationships not 
only with the school staff but also with the community. An important initiative in this 
respect is the formation of a School Management Committee (SMC). For this 
purpose, a general meeting of all parents and teachers is called to identify school 
problems and to select the most appropriate parent and teacher representatives for the 
SMC. In addition, one nominee from the district education department is required to 
be co-opted to the SMC and this person is required to attend monthly meetings of the 
SMC. 
ITA takes pride in its ability to establish strong links and relationships with the 
community. The Programme Coordinator for Punjab explained: 
Our strength is that we work together with the government and the 
community. Whatever we do we plan it and share it with stakeholders 
and after that we implement it. With this approach we develop links with 
the community and so we can even reach the parents and we are really 
working well on it (ITA-Programme Coordinator). 
The SMCs help ITA to address two main objectives. First and more obvious, SMCs 
help to foster relationships with the community thereby pursuing the vision of 
‘Regenerating Schools - Regenerating Communities’, which lies at the heart of the 
WSIP. Secondly, through the involvement of teachers, parents and district officials 
on the SMC, it serves as a transparent instrument to mobilise the funds that are 
allocated to the schools by government.  This enables ITA to bring improvements in 
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the adopted schools through state school budgets thereby reducing the financial 
burden on ITA. 
In Punjab, SMCs were already in existence under a formal 1994 directive for the 
formation/reconstitution of SMCs (Zafar and Khan 2001). However, ITA played a 
significant role in the formation and activation of community representatives in the 
SMCs of adopted schools. The second phase of WSIP comes to an end with the 
opening of a SMC bank account with a scheduled bank. 
During the third phase of WSIP a ‘Needs Assessment Form’ is completed in 
consultation with the head teacher and other staff of the adopted school. During this 
phase, a School Development Plan is also produced in consultation with the SMC 
and the school staff and resources are mobilised to implement the plan. 
The next sub-section looks at ITA’s PPP model and highlights the points and 
frequency of interactions between ITA and LDG education officials. The model is 
summarised in Figure 6.2. The response of head teachers to ITA’s PPP model and 
the IORs in day-to-day routines and in critical incidents are described in subsections 
6.5.2 and 6.5.3 respectively. 
 ITA’s PPP model and points of interaction 6.5.1
The ITA-LDG MoU gives ITA the responsibility to uplift and strengthen the adopted 
state schools under WSIP. Nevertheless the school head teacher, who is a 
government employee, is the one who remains primarily responsible for managing 
school affairs. In order to address the shortage of teachers in adopted schools, ITA 
provides additional teachers for the schools. The number of ITA teachers in each 
school varies with the requirements of the school. ITA teachers are accountable to 
the ITA’s chain of command but work under the supervision of the school head 
teacher. The head teacher is in direct contact with the LDG education department 
through District Education Officers (DEOs) and their team (see Figure 5.1 in Chapter 
5). 
An Education Promoter (EP) is appointed by ITA who is required to work with the 
head teacher, other staff of the school and the SMC to ‘facilitate school-based 
planning, enhance the [student] enrolment and reduce drop outs, engage in TOTs 
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[Training of Trainers] and support as trainers’(ITA 2012c). Each EP works in 6-20 
schools (depending on the number of adopted schools in a cluster) and each has a key 
responsibility to report to the district manager on weekly basis. Under this model a 
district manager is appointed who is ‘responsible to plan, implement, monitor, and 
report all project activities at district level to meet project targets…[and] Provide 
guidance and supervision to the team members’ (ITA 2012b). A district manager is 
given the responsibility for developing contacts with the relevant district government 
education officials and is responsible for coordinating with them on a regular basis. 
The district manager is required to work in close coordination with the provincial 
programme coordinator of ITA to achieve overall project targets. On top of the 
organisational hierarchy is ITA’s founder, Baela, working under the designation of 
Director Programmes and leading the organisation. 
Figure 6.2: ITA’s chain of command for managing WSIP in Lahore 
district 
 
ITA commits to provide technical support to the adopted schools in the areas 
mentioned in the MoU (see clause 3 in Box 6.1). In this regard, the main initiatives 


























 capacity building of the staff by providing training opportunities; 
 community mobilisation; 
 creating awareness and sensitivity about health and hygiene, and environment 
issues; 
 encouraging and involving children to take part in project based learning and 
co-curricular activities through ‘summer schools’;  
 providing technical support on Child Friendly Schools (CFS) and Early 
Childhood Education (ECE); 
 designing and providing supplements to improve pedagogy; 
 provision of ECE kit, health kit with first aid box, sports kits, reading kit; and 
 promoting literacy for mothers and siblings. 
In addition to this technical support, ITA emphasises creating a ‘safe learning 
environment through school rehabilitation’ (ITA 2012a) and provides missing 
facilities in the adopted schools, including undertaking construction works, 
establishing ECE rooms, libraries and science labs, providing furniture, and 
undertaking maintenance work. These initiatives are implemented by mobilising 
resources from diverse sources.  
 The response of head teachers towards ITA’s WSIP 6.5.2
Given the lack of resources at many state schools at the time of the partnership 
initiation, ITA’s ability to provide missing facilities and additional teachers seems to 
be a key factor in winning the support of head teachers. They were generally happy 
about the provision of inputs as indicated in the following excerpts: 
At that time there were very scarce resources necessary for the progress 
of the school… There used to be a lack of furniture and teachers which 
was addressed by ITA. ITA also constructed this portion of the building. 
There were no window panes and children shivered due to cold and ITA 
fixed that, they gave fans too and they cooperated with us a lot (ITA-HT-
07). 
A similar type of response was given by another head teacher, she explained: 
There was a need of partnership because there was no furniture in our 
school, the building was in bad condition, there was nothing to sit on, and 
only a few chairs were there for teachers. For these 10 years they (ITA) 
have fulfilled a lot of our requirements; they provided furniture, repaired 
the ceilings, constructed this office, got the school painted. At that time 
we didn't have any funding, it is only now that we are getting funds from 
the government, at that time we had no money, ITA spent Rs.70,000/ to 
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get the ceilings repaired, I have all record, they repaired many parts of 
the school and worked hard for it (ITA-HT-01). 
From the above quotes it could be inferred that ITA was successful in winning 
support of the head teachers due to its ability to provide infrastructural inputs for 
education service delivery. There are also some instances where head teachers 
acknowledge the technical support provided by ITA in the form of training 
opportunities. One of the head teachers appreciated ITA’s support for capacity 
building and said: 
They guided us a lot and taught us lesson planning and conducted many 
workshops and we learnt a lot. Before that we had our traditional way of 
teaching to ask children to open books and gave them lesson but they 
taught us different ways of teaching and conducted subject specific 
trainings in English, Maths, Urdu and all other subjects (ITA-HT-06). 
Contrary to the above mentioned cases, the field research also encountered situations 
in which the head teachers were of the view that there is not much need of the 
partnership and that ITA has a limited role in the improvement of the schools. A 
head teacher with this point of view argued: 
There was no need of this partnership, I was managing my school in a 
first class way… there was not much need but if they come I welcome 
them. Thanks God there is a teacher in every class and all teachers are 
doing their work but if they (ITA) are coming we don't have any loss in it 
(ITA-HT-03). 
This sense of difference is usually found in schools in which there are not many 
missing facilities and they have enough teachers too. The head teacher added:  
I personally think that they should go to such schools where there is quite 
lack of facilities, there is no staff and work is not carried out properly, 
they should go there and should also place their one teacher permanently 
in such schools (ITA-HT-03). 
Another head teacher reflected the same viewpoint, she argued: 
I would say that initially when there were problems in state schools, there 
was shortage of staff and lack of funds, NGOs supported and played their 
role then but now our infrastructure needs are fulfilled and now we get 
funds from the government so at the moment the role of NGOs is 
minimal… There was no funding at that time and that is why we used to 
look upon others, but now our own sources are sufficient and we are 
working better than them. But if they (ITA) keep supporting us in the 
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same spirit like if we tell them that we need something and they fulfil our 
demands then it’s okay (ITA-HT-04). 
It is clear from the above excerpt that the head teacher felt that ITA is not playing 
much role in her school and she is able to work even better than ITA. However, she, 
like many other head teachers and district officials, considered ITA a donor and felt 
that the partnership could go on if ITA keeps providing the material resources. ITA’s 
ability to approach diverse organisations for the provision of funding and thus 
providing the required resources in adopted schools acts as a significant factor in 
building favourable IORs and winning the trust of the majority of the head teachers 
in adopted schools. 
 The IORs in practice: in day-to-day routines and in critical 6.5.3
incidents 
It is clear from the interviews conducted with the LDG education officers and head 
teachers of the adopted schools that they consider the main responsibility of NGOs to 
pump in material inputs and not to intervene much in actual education service 
delivery. Most of the head teachers in ITA adopted schools appreciated that ITA 
doesn’t interfere much while it provides resources for the improvement of the school.  
The facilitative approach of ITA is reflected in the programme management and 
implementation of WSIP by ITA. The person having the most interaction at school 
level is the Education Promoter (EP) who is required to work with the head teacher, 
other school staff and the SMC. The EP has key responsibility to report to the ITA 
district manager on weekly basis. The fact that each EP works in quite a number of 
schools, ranging from 6 to 20, is in line with the enabling role taken by ITA. The 
weekly or in some cases monthly visits of EP are aimed at solving any problems at 
schools and implementing the donor-led projects. The Programme Coordinator for 
Punjab explained that EP visits are to solve any problems that could not be handled 
by the head teachers. He argued: 
The ratio over here is that in South Punjab one EP has 20 schools, in 
Lahore it is less because there are only 12 schools here but on average an 
EP has 20 schools and they visit a school monthly. Basically the purpose 
is not that they go and sit there to see each and everything. Rather our 
EPs visit schools to see the follow up of the major issues of the schools 
that were observed in their last visit, what is the result of that and what 
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are the current problems of the schools. Basically we say that it is the 
government's responsibility to run the school and we support them in 
problem areas. For example, if there is some problem with the funds of 
the school council, that funds are not being transferred in the bank 
account, then our EP is there to provide support and all other issues of 
this type where government people feel helpless, we are there to provide 
support (ITA-Provincial Programme Coordinator). 
As is clear from the above excerpt, the Provincial Programme Coordinator was 
convinced that it is state’s responsibility to manage the adopted schools and ITA 
helps in areas where there is a need for support. The EP while explaining her 
approach reflected: 
Our attitude is not that of a monitoring officer rather we guide teachers 
not by telling them that you have done this wrongly but in a way that let's 
try to do it in a different way and if you think it is better then do it this 
way. We discuss it with teachers after sharing it with the head teacher 
(ITA-EP). 
The above quotation indicates that ITA has a participative and facilitative attitude 
towards addressing the weaknesses of government teachers, which is a sensitive area 
of work. Even the most cooperative head teachers don’t like NGOs to point out the 
weaknesses of their teachers. One of the head teachers mentioned: 
I let them visit any class they want but I told them that you shouldn’t say 
(stressing) anything to my teachers in the class, you can sit back and 
watch their lesson and note everything and then we can discuss these 
weaknesses together with the teachers in my office and they (ITA) did 
accordingly (ITA-HT-01). 
ITA’s approach becomes quite clear by an example narrated by the same head 
teacher, she said: 
For example, let’s assume that she (EP) goes to a classroom where a 
teacher is taking a maths lesson and is doing a question in a wrong way, 
she (EP) would note that and would report that in ITA’s office that in that 
particular school the teacher was doing it wrongly. We used to have 
monthly meetings and in those meetings someone from ITA would 
explain the right way of doing that question, then we would get to know 
the right way of doing it and would also come to know our mistakes. 
They also conduct subject based trainings for teachers (ITA-HT-01). 
The above example suggests that ITA takes an indirect approach to address the 
weaknesses of the government teachers in adopted school. This could be considered 
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as an attempt to foster trust and favourable relations between ITA and the staff 
working at adopted schools. Although most head teachers are generally appreciative 
of the enabling and facilitative approach of ITA to manage WSIP, a head teacher 
raised concerns about flaws in ITA’s management of WSIP. She explained that in 
order to assess the performance of schools the EP collects some data from the head 
teachers about the number of teachers and students in the school. In her experience it 
is easy to deceive ITA because EPs collect the required information from the head 
teachers rather than collecting it themselves. She reported that when she was 
transferred as a head teacher to the school she found that there were 250 fake entries 
in the enrolment register. She blamed ITA for having a weak monitoring system 
which makes it easy for the head teachers to keep working in their own way while 
capitalising the financial and technical resources of ITA. She argued: 
There should be a middle way not like someone is upon you all the time 
but if someone is coming then she should observe vigilantly. If 
partnership is there for many years and children are not physically 
present but still it isn't in the knowledge of ITA, then at least this should 
be avoided. Someone should not be that ignorant about the ground 
realities, so this is the extreme (ITA-HT-04). 
Although ITA involves SMCs in developing and implementing the School 
Development Plans, most of the initiatives undertaken by ITA are donor funded and 
ITA is required to work in close consultation with respective donors to decide upon 
the nature of initiatives in a given project. When it comes to implementing donor-led 
projects, such as Healthy Pakistan Mission (HPM) or Global Hand Washing Day 
(GHWD), they are pre-decided with the donors; district officials and school staff 
have almost no role in designing these initiatives. Nevertheless, ITA keeps district 
education officials informed about these projects and seeks their formal permission 
before implementing them in adopted schools. This happens at school level too 
whereby ITA plans and designs the initiatives with the donors and seeks the 
permission of head teachers to execute them in schools. This creates a sort of one-
way relationship in adopted schools whereby the school heads seem to implement 
whatever the EP or anyone else from ITA asks them to do. The following example 
was given by the Education Promoter:  
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In most of our partner schools whatever we ask them (head teachers) to 
implement is implemented properly and there are some head teachers that 
I tell them once that ma'am I think this should be done, like for example 
there must be soap bars and soap dishes in classrooms so that children 
develop habit of washing hands, and when I visit next time it is actually 
done (ITA-Education Promoter). 
It is interesting to note that head teachers value the fact that before implementing any 
project ITA discusses what is going to be implemented and asks for their approval. 
This is evident in the following excerpt from a head teacher’s interview: 
Whenever ITA wants to implement some project in my school, they 
formally ask for my permission and give me all the required details, it is 
not like they can implement anything they like but they give a lot of 
respect and ask for my approval. In most cases it is for the betterment of 
children and the school and there is no harm in doing that so I give them 
the permission (ITA-HT-06). 
In most cases, ITA faces no resistance from the head teachers or other school staff in 
implementing their initiatives. ITA’s strategy to build relationships with all 
stakeholders is a main factor in gaining such support and it has proved beneficial in 
overcoming resistance and gaining credibility in adopted schools. As a result, the 
initial resistance to WSIP changed into greater acceptance of the programme. 
In conflicting situations, ITA officials go by the policy of no confrontation which is 
integral to ITA’s working. It would not be wrong to say that this is the most 
significant factor in building cooperative IORs in the case of ITA. All head teachers 
interviewed during this research, including those who were quite sceptical about 
ITA’s contribution, generally reflected positively on ITA’s conduct. Collectively, 
these include statements such as: 
ITA deals with us in a very good way. I used to hate them too much and 
wanted to throw them out of our school but they dealt us in such a way 
that we forgot all that and were happy that they were here… I think when 
someone joins ITA the first policy that they teach is good behaviour 
(ITA-HT-01)  
they do it in a very good and friendly way and give a lot of respect (ITA-
HT-06) 
whenever I discuss something with the EP or the district manager, they 
are so polite that I don't like to create any conflict with them and they 
deal in such a nice way and talk in a very good manner (ITA-HT-07) 
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ITA mainly interacts with the staff of the adopted schools with respect. Such an 
approach is a factor to explain cooperative IORs. This view was reiterated by the EP 
as she explained: 
Whenever ITA recruits a teacher (to overcome the shortage of teachers in 
adopted schools) she is told that ITA is your appointing authority but you 
have to work according to the management of the school (ITA-EP). 
Moreover, ITA’s  job descriptions explicitly mention that to be eligible to work for 
ITA a person should be humble, hardworking and committed and ‘able to develop 
cordial working relationships’ with relevant government officials (ITA 2012b; ITA 
2012c). The policy of no confrontation was visible in many cases during the 
fieldwork. ITA is quite flexible in changing or even dropping its initiatives when 
head teachers do not agree. Such an approach is evident in the following example 
narrated by a school head teacher: 
If we don't like something we tell them and they listen to us and agree 
with us and also drop it. In the case of ACCESS (English language 
classes) there was some discussion between me and the district manager 
which I don't want to disclose but she dropped the idea of conducting 
ACCESS classes in my school when I asked her. Whenever I tell her my 
problem she listens to it with cool mind and open heart… this is trust, I 
trust her that she won’t cheat me and would listen to me (ITA-HT-04). 
As indicated in the above quote, by adopting the policy of no confrontation, and 
being open to discussion, ITA is successful in building trust among the head teachers 
which strengthens the IORs in practice. Compromise acts as an effective mechanism 
in establishing a sense of equality and cultivating cooperative IORs, as evident in the 
following excerpt from a head teacher’s interview: 
No one dominates in this partnership, sometimes we compromise and 
sometimes they do. They (ITA staff) do it in a very good and friendly 
way, the district manager talks in such a sweet way (smiling), she gives a 
lot of respect and we also give her respect (ITA-HT-06). 
So there is a sense of reciprocity between head teachers and ITA. Most of the head 
teachers shared the same views about Baela too. ITA’s policy of no confrontation, 
engaging the head teachers with respect, and solving minor problems through open-
minded discussion helps building trust and cooperative IORs. The district manager of 
Lahore shared her experience in following words: 
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I think giving them respect plays an important role in building trust. We 
try to work in consultation. Whenever there is any problem we try to 
discuss with them and we never challenge them. We discuss and that is 
why it doesn't go to the level of conflict and up till now there has never 
been any such issue which was not resolved (ITA-District Manager). 
It is clear from these examples that ITA usually opts to solve any problems locally 
rather than making it a dispute and taking it to higher levels. This is in line with the 
MoU for WSIP which also envisages conflict resolution through discussion. If a 
conflict remains unresolved the partnership agreement is terminated and ITA exits 
from the school (see clause 31 of ITA-LDG MoU). The fieldwork observed no case 
of major confrontations of this nature between ITA and the head teachers or district 
education officers. 
6.6 PPP outcomes 
WSIP has been a good opportunity for the LDG education department to capitalise 
on ITA’s technical and financial resources, especially as the LDG is not required to 
contribute financial resources towards the improvement of the adopted schools under 
the MoU. The fieldwork finds that ITA has contributed towards the provision of 
missing facilities and capacity building of staff at the adopted schools. With respect 
to the former, ITA has contributed libraries, science labs, additional classrooms, 
furniture and toilets. From a capacity building perspective, ITA has provided several 
training opportunities which introduce teachers to new styles of teaching. For 
example, ITA emphasises the importance of Early Childhood Education (ECE) and 
claims to be the first to introduce ECE into state schools. ITA promoted ECE in 
government schools and there seems to be enough evidence to support ITA's claims 
in this regard. Even one of the head teachers, who explicitly reported no major role 
of ITA in her school, acknowledged that ITA has emphasised and supported ECE. 
Many head teachers said it was ITA who gave them the idea of ECE and then 
facilitated them to implement this idea in their schools.  
ITA conducts training workshops, teachers get new ideas from those 
workshops and then implement them in schools. Certainly we want ITA 
to be here in our school, they gave us furniture and computers and taught 
us how to do art work, taught us class arrangement and provided 




Another head teacher echoed the same views: 
After partnership there was improvement both in the building and in the 
students. The reason was that they (ITA) spent money, they gave us their 
teachers and they established ECE rooms, it is only now that kids rooms 
are being established in the government schools but we had these for ten 
years especially in my school (ITA-HT-01). 
Through WSIP, or ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme in general, LDG is seeking 
partnerships with the private sector, especially NGOs, to pursue the overarching aim 
of meeting Education for All (EFA) goals. Therefore, it is generally expected that 
with the support of the private sector enrolment rates in the state schools would 
increase.  
Although there is no reliable data showing outcomes of the partnership in relation to 
quantitative indicators - such as exam results, enrolment and dropout rates - most of 
the head teachers reported improvements. Many head teachers were appreciative of 
ITA in helping to improve both the facilities and quality of education at their schools. 
They reported an increase in enrolment as a result of these improvements. There are 
some head teachers who consider infrastructural improvements and community 
events responsible for increase in enrolment.  
There was much increase in enrolment as the name of the school 
improved, enough teachers were there, furniture was there and a lot of 
events were held on all special days in which people saw the school and 
most of the events were organised by ITA (ITA-HT-07). 
Some interviewees thought that the training opportunities provided by ITA enabled 
them to teach in a better way, which they perceived similar to private schools. One of 
them remarked: 
After partnership the enrolment increased a lot because children 
experienced new style and new ways of teaching… when children get 
something similar to private schools then people are happy to send their 
children. The enrolment at the time of partnership was 96 and now it is 
nearly 300 (ITA-HT-05). 
However, it is important to keep in mind that after 1998 a lot of government 
initiatives were taken to improve education service delivery in the country. PPPs in 
education should be viewed as a part of these initiatives.  It is hard to say that the 
improved enrolment rates in ITA adopted schools are only due to the partnership 
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itself. It is, therefore, important neither to consider all improvements merely the 
contribution of ITA nor to overstate the role of government behind any 
improvements. Indeed, all the head teachers interviewed commented on the 
improved role of the state as an important factor behind increases in enrolment rates. 
For example, one of the head teachers said:  
And now the government has made education free for people and since 
education is free, it is much better much better (emphasising). When I 
came to this school there were 65 children and now by the grace of God 
it is almost 500, so the government has taken interest in education which 
it didn't use to (ITA-HT-02). 
Mobilising resources from different channels is another added value of ITA-LDG 
PPPs. Entering into a partnership with ITA enabled the government education 
department to capitalise on diverse sources of technical and financial resources. The 
partnership with LDG is of benefit to ITA too. Many international donors have 
changed their funding patterns. They now provide funding to NGOs through the state 
which obliges NGOs to get in some kind of relationship with the state: 
Main donors are now providing funding to NGOs through the 
government. So, government now has large amounts of development 
funding available to it. So, the only way is to work with the government 
in some relationship (ITA-Chair). 
Working with the LDG education department also increases the credibility of ITA 
and enables it to draw on resources from multiple channels including the community, 
corporate sector, philanthropists, expatriates, and many multilateral and bilateral 
donor organisations. Baela highlighted that the corporate sector of Pakistan is 
increasingly aware of their social responsibility and they are more willing to 
contribute money if is spent on state schools. Hence, working in partnership with the 
LDG makes more funding options available to ITA, which is one of the three 
objectives reflected in ITA’s mission. 
One of the direct results of cooperative IORs between ITA and the head teachers in 
adopted schools is the expansion of WSIP. ITA’s strategy of building relationships 
with all stakeholders, together with their facilitative approach proved beneficial in 
overcoming resistance and gaining credibility in adopted schools. The head teacher 
of the first adopted school, who was initially quite apprehensive about WSIP, 
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subsequently helped ITA expand its WSIP programme by encouraging other head 
teachers in nearby state schools to get into partnership with ITA. This expansion is 
an indicator of ITA’s success in meeting its own organisational  goals. 
ITA has always strived to influence public policy, which is part of its stated mission. 
WSIP gives ITA knowledge about grassroots education issues which increases its 
credibility in influencing public policy: 
See if you want to do advocacy at macro level you can't do it until you 
have the knowledge of grassroots level and what people actually do at 
grassroots level to know their local issues and problems… secondly if we 
want the government to improve the quality of education in government 
schools then we need to show government the best practices there and 
suggest the government to replicate it, so that’s the advocacy (ITA-
Provincial Programme Coordinator). 
For ITA, WSIP has served as a vehicle to travel the distance between service 
delivery at grassroots level to policy advocacy at the provincial and federal 
government levels. Baela provided an example where she was able to persuade the 
state to change the finance structure at schools due to her experience in one of the 
adopted schools. She argued: 
When we started working (in the state schools) we saw an issue in one 
school and we said that it is rubbish that in every school there are seven 
accounts and no account is fundable. So every time when you have to 
spend money you could only spend a specific account like for example if 
you want money for exams you could only take it from exam fund. So 
that was simply taking money from children and not spending it for their 
betterment. There was a lot of money in bank accounts but they were not 
spending it, so we sent letters to government several times and there was 
no response. At last I prepared a draft for the government that this exists 
and this should be done and sent it to finance department and everyone. 
So it happened, all accounts were merged and we did it (ITA-Chair). 
Baela’s sense of achievement was evident in her interview. She took pride in 
influencing policy decisions such as this one due to the technical expertise gained via 
WSIP. Traditionally these funds were left unutilised for many years and head 




Missing facilities in state schools and lack of technical expertise within the public 
sector are the main factors leading to the ITA-LDG PPP under the banner of WSIP. 
Despite the initial mistrust and huge suspicions about WSIP among the district and 
school staff, ITA is successful in building cooperative IORs with government 
officials. This shows that development of IORs in the adopted schools was a 
dynamic process and IORs changed from one stage of the partnership to another. 
Besides some diversity in the response of head teachers towards WSIP, the IORs 
generally remain cooperative mainly due to ITA’s facilitative programme 
management and willingness to adjust according to the needs of the partners. 
Compromise acts as an effective mechanism in establishing a sense of equality and 
cultivating cooperative IORs. 
Although ITA-LDG PPP represents the relationship where ITA normally implements 
donor-led initiatives in adopted schools and does not engage the government officials 
in the design of these initiatives, ITA emphasises taking approval from both district 
officials and school staff before implementing these programmes in adopted schools. 
This typically creates a sense of ownership among government officials which makes 
it easier for ITA to implement the initiatives in most cases. 
ITA-LDG PPPs are reported to achieve value added such as increases in the 
enrolment rates and improvement in exam results. There is evidence of both partners, 
ITA and LDG, achieving their own organisational objectives through partnership 
arrangement. Whilst LDG is able to capitalise on diverse sources of technical and 
financial resources through ITA’s platform, the partnership arrangement increases 
ITA’s credibility and enables it to draw on resources from multiple channels. 
Moreover, ITA-LDG PPPs give ITA knowledge about the grassroots educational 





Chapter 7 PEF PPPs 
7.1 Introduction 
This case study report explains the nature of IORs in a PPP arrangement between the 
Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) and its private sector partners. The chapter 
begins by describing the organisational profile of PEF. Then it discusses the diversity 
of PEF’s private sector partners and provides an overview of the main characteristics 
of these partners. This is followed by a discussion of the process through which this 
PPP is set-up, implemented and managed (in sections 7.4 and 7.5). The main focus 
throughout these two sections is to explain the IORs between PEF and its private 
sector partners, and to highlight the factors shaping these IORs. Section 7.6 
documents the outcomes of PEF PPPs to review the benefits achieved by this 
partnership model. 
7.2 An introduction to PEF 
PEF was established under the Punjab Education Foundation Act of 1991 ‘to 
promote and finance the development of education in the Province of the Punjab’ 
(Government of Punjab 1991). Under this Act, the main functions of PEF included 
provision of grants and loans to private entrepreneurs to construct school buildings 
and to purchase furniture, fixtures and equipment for schools. In 2004 a new bill was 
passed by the Punjab Assembly and PEF was restructured under the Punjab 
Education Foundation Act of 2004. While PEF’s main mandate, to support private 
sector initiatives in the education sector, remained broadly the same there were some 
major changes with respect to the governance structure of PEF. According to the first 
Managing Director after the restructuring of PEF: 
While the PEF Act of 1991 gave the government control over PEF affairs 
- with the chief minister of the province serving as PEF chair and a senior 
provincial official as PEF managing director - the PEF Act of 2004 gave 
the entire control and management of the foundation to its own Board of 
Directors. Under the PEF Act of 2004, the Board appoints the managing 
director and other employees of the foundation and determines the terms 
and conditions of their employment. The restructured PEF was thus an 
autonomous body, with the executive and financial authority vested in its 
Board of Directors (Malik 2010: 2). 
169 
 
It is clear from the above quote that the restructuring of PEF resulted in giving 
greater administrative and financial autonomy to PEF through its Board of Directors 
(BOD).  Section 5 of PEF Act 2004 sets the criteria for selecting the BOD; fifteen 
directors, including chair, are appointed by the government. Eight directors should be 
selected from the private sector including NGOs, academicians and philanthropists; 
five directors are secretaries of government departments; and vice chancellor of the 
University of Education. The managing director of PEF would also act as the 
secretary of the Board (PEF 2006). 
Another prominent feature of the 2004 Act was the anticipation of closer working 
between PEF and the private sector. While the 1991 Act mainly involved helping 
private entrepreneurs by giving loans and grants, section 4 of the PEF Act 2004 
promoted a new relationship under the banner of a ‘public-private partnership’ 
initiative (PEF 2006: 13). This enhanced PEF’s scope from a passive funding body to 
an active partner working with the private sector to tackle the educational challenges 
in the country. The idea of ‘public-private partnership’ lies at the heart of PEF’s 
working and functions, and is explicitly stated as a part of PEF’s vision:  
The promotion of quality education through Public Private Partnership, 
encouraging and supporting the efforts of [the] private sector through 
technical and financial assistance, innovating and developing new 
instruments to champion wider educational opportunities at [an] 
affordable cost to the poor (PEF 2012). 
The restructuring of PEF can be argued to be a result of a broader push towards the 
idea of PPPs (as discussed in Chapter 1). In the case of PEF, PPPs were sought as a 
‘combination of private sector efficiency and public sector funding’ to meet the 
‘urgent need of educational system that provides an affordable quality education to 
all’ (Malik 2010: 1). PEF especially targets the creation of affordable quality 
education opportunities for the under-privileged sectors of society. For this purpose it 
enters into partnerships with private sector bodies that are already targeting low-
income segments of society in the field of education (either in the form of schools or 
capacity building organisations). PPPs offer PEF the prospect of rapidly scaling up 
the delivery of education, which is the potential added value of partnership. 
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 PEF programmes 7.2.1




Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS) 
Under the FAS programme the private schools in partnership with PEF get financial 
assistance in exchange for making their education free and more accessible for poor 
children. Given that the mission of PEF is to create opportunities of affordable 
quality education through PPPs, the target schools for FAS are those with a low fee 
structure and these are usually located in the poor urban and rural areas of Punjab. 
There are criteria for selecting schools set out by the BOD. Schools are evaluated on 
criteria which include performance in the Quality Assurance Test (QAT) conducted 
by PEF to assess the quality of education delivered. The partnership between PEF 
and private schools is formally agreed through a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU). Once in partnership with PEF, the schools are not allowed to charge students 
fees (including fines, study tours expenses and exam fee). 
PEF provides funding to partner schools on a per child enrolled basis. However, the 
financial assistance provided to participating schools is dependent on the test 
performance of children. Funding is discontinued if the school fails the QAT twice in 
a row.  The quality standards for passing QAT are set by PEF and are amended from 
time to time by the BOD. In addition to the QAT, schools are regularly monitored by 
PEF staff to ensure basic standards and to verify the enrolment figures provided by 
schools. In the case of any misrepresentation of facts or non-compliance with the 
terms and conditions agreed in the MoU, PEF reserves the right to impose penalties 
or even cancel the partnership. 
Continuous Professional Development Programme (CPDP) 
CPDP was launched in 2005 for training school teachers from low cost private sector 
schools with particular emphasis on PEF partner schools. Currently there are three 
main CPDP programmes. The Continuous Teachers Development Programme 
(CTDP) conducts training for primary, elementary and secondary level teachers.  The 
                                                 
7
 From time to time there have been some changes in the programmes offered by PEF but the basic 
rationale behind the programmes remained broadly the same. 
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major focus is on the content knowledge of different subjects - especially English, 
Mathematics and Science - along with classroom management, pedagogical skills 
and child psychology. However, over time PEF noticed that teachers who 
participated in CTDP found it difficult to apply and incorporate innovative teaching 
practices due to lack of support from school administrators. To address this problem, 
PEF launched the School Leadership Development Programme (SLDP) which is 
targeted towards school heads to make them aware about the latest teaching methods. 
Both CTDP and SLDP are conducted through a PPP agreement with several private 
sector organisations. Organisations with experience in the field of professional 
development and capacity building are selected through open competition and the 
MoU is signed. Partner organisations are paid by PEF in return for their contribution 
to the training programmes provided for PEF partner schools. The quality of training 
workshops is evaluated by PEF on the basis of performance evaluation criteria 
developed by PEF and approved by the BOD. The partner organisations are subject 
to penalties if their training does not meet the standards and instructions given by 
PEF. 
In all, CPDP contributes to the overall mission of PEF by supporting quality 
improvement in low-cost private sector schools through providing technical 
assistance. 
Education Voucher Scheme (EVS) 
The Education Voucher Scheme is directly targeted at providing education 
opportunities to children who otherwise could not get education due to financial and 
social constraints. The project starts with the identification of under-privileged areas 
or urban slums and household surveys are carried out to identify the number of 
deserving children in a particular area. The eligibility of children is then determined 
and they are registered on the EVS according to the criteria approved by the BOD. 
The registered children are given education vouchers which are redeemable against 
tuition fees in a private school which is in partnership with PEF under an EVS MoU. 
PEF’s approach to selecting partner schools and manage partnership is different in 
EVS when compared with the FAS programme. The criteria for selecting partner 
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schools are prescribed by the BOD but are not as stringent as in the case of FAS. 
Another feature that differentiates EVS from FAS programme is that in FAS school 
owners/ heads are free to decide whether to admit a child or not. In EVS the decision 
makers are the parents as they are the ones who have the vouchers and are free to 
register their child with any EVS partner school. Whilst FAS partner schools cannot 
charge fees from any child registered in the school, EVS schools continue to charge 
fees to non-EVS students but cannot charge EVS children for any aspect of their 
education. Partner schools get fixed funding from PEF based on the number of EVS 
children enrolled.  
EVS partner schools are regularly monitored by PEF staff to ensure basic standards 
as well as to verify the enrolment figures provided by schools. As with FAS, the 
continuity of EVS partnerships is also reliant on performance in the QAT and it is 
terminated in the case of two consecutive failures in the QAT. PEF also reserves the 
right to impose penalties for breaches of the terms and conditions mentioned in the 
MoU. 
New School Programme (NSP) 
The general lack of interest amongst private sector entrepreneurs to set up schools in 
the rural and remote areas, coupled with a lack of government schools, results in 
limited access to education in these areas. The New School Programme (NSP) was 
initiated as pilot project in March 2008 to attract private sector entrepreneurs to set 
up schools in such areas of Punjab. Private sector entrepreneurs who want to set up a 
school in an area where there is no public or private school within a 2 Km radius are 
selected for partnership under NSP. However, there is a relaxation in this criterion to 
set up a school for girls if there is only a boys’ school within the identified radius. 
Similarly an elementary or high school may also be established if only a primary 
school exits within a 2 Km radius. 
As in the case of FAS and EVS, the NSP schools are subject to monitoring and the 
QAT and continuity of partnership is dependent on passing the QAT. However, a 
grace period of six months is given to build the infrastructure of school. During this 
period PEF supports private sector partners by giving them Rs.350 per child for 50 
students even if there is no student enrolled. 
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All four programmes sit within the statutory requirements of the PEF Act of 2004 
and they are in line with the overall mission of the organisation. All the programmes 
are striving to ‘promote quality education through public-private partnerships… at 
[an] affordable cost to the poor’ (PEF 2012). This case study reports the research 
carried out on all four PPP programmes (for more details see Table 7.1).  
 Organisational structure of PEF 7.2.2
As mentioned earlier, after the restructuring of PEF in 2004 it now works as an 
autonomous body with financial and executive authority vested in its BOD. The 
executive body of PEF is led by its Managing Director with three Deputy Managing 
Directors in the areas of operations, human resource management and finance. The 
list of PEF departments, along with some details, is as follows: 
1. FAS department: manages the FAS programme under the director FAS. 
2. CPDP department: manages the CPDP programmes under the director CPDP 
3. EVS department: manages the EVS under the director EVS 
4. NSP department: manages the NSP under the deputy director NSP 
5. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E): an independent department created by the 
BOD to monitor all four programmes of PEF. The head of M&E reports to 
the Board rather than the management and gives suggestions for decision-
making.   
6. Academic Development Unit (ADU): mainly responsible for quality 
assurance in PEF programmes. ADU comprises subject specialists who are 
responsible for formulating a test bank, designing and conducting QATs, 
which is the main determinant for continuation of a partnership in the FAS, 
EVS and NSP programmes. 
7. Finance department 
8. Law department 
9. Communication department 
10. IT department 
11. HR department 
All PEF programmes were introduced during the tenure of PEF’s first Managing 
Director (2004-2008). In 2008, PEF’s Managing Director was transferred to another 
government department and a new Managing Director was appointed by PEF’s 
BOD. For the purpose of this research, interviews were conducted with both the first 
and the current Managing Director, Deputy Managing Director for operations, all 
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four programme directors (deputy director in the case of NSP) and some programme 
coordinators and officers. A complete list of interviewees is provided in Appendix B. 
7.3 Diversity of PEF’s partners 
PEF private sector partners vary according to the different PEF programmes. Each 
partner enters into a partnership agreement with a distinct perspective and set of 
circumstances, and they then assess the success of the partnership arrangement 
against those circumstances and their prior expectations. In other words the identity 
of the partners affects their perspectives about the partnership. These perspectives 
shape their expectations which have an impact on the nature of IORs. It is, therefore, 
important to discuss the diverse identities of PEF’s partners before discussing the 
dynamics of IORs in PEF partnerships. 
Interviews with the PEF partners uncovered a range of views about their partnership 
with PEF. Three distinguishing characteristics of PEF’s partners emerged as 
explanation for their diverse views. First, perspectives about the partnership varied 
according to their reasons for entering the partnership. Partners have different 
reasons for entering into a partnership with PEF such as financial benefits, to be in a 
better position to pursue their mission and capacity building. Second, the type of 
focal persons managing the partnership relationship varied. Sometimes the focal 
person is the owner/entrepreneur whereas in other cases they are employees who are 
representing the schools (in FAS, EVS and NSP) or training organisations (in the 
case of CPDP). Third, the scale of work of partner organisations also differed. Some 
private sector partners relied completely on PEF for the provision of monetary 
resources while the scale of work of others provides them with alternate sources of 
income and hence they are less reliant on PEF to meet their expenditures. 
Looking at private sector partners’ reasons for entering into a partnership, it is useful 
to distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit partners. Amongst the 23 PEF 
partners interviewed for this research, 11 were not-for-profits and 12 were for-profit 
entities (as shown in Table 7.1). The analysis suggests that partners’ reasons for 
entering into a partnership with PEF can be grouped under two headings: gaining 
access to financial resources and being in a better position to pursue their own 
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mission. These two reasons are not mutually exclusive but it was possible to draw 
out the dominant reason in each case (see Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Main characteristics of PEF’s private sector partners 
Partner 
code 
Programme Background Main reason for 
entering partnership 







PEF-Partner 01 FAS Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Employee Yes 
PEF-Partner 02 FAS For profit Financial Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 03 FAS For profit Financial Entrepreneur No  
PEF-Partner 04 FAS Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Employee Yes 
PEF-Partner 05 FAS Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Employee Yes 
PEF-Partner 06 FAS For profit Financial Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 07 FAS Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Employee Yes 
PEF-Partner 20 FAS For profit Financial Entrepreneur  No 
PEF-Partner 21 FAS For profit Financial Entrepreneur Yes 
PEF-Partner 08 EVS For profit Financial (mission) Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 15 EVS Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 16 EVS Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 17 EVS For profit Financial Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 18 EVS For profit Financial Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 19 EVS Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 22 NSP For profit Financial Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 23 NSP For profit Financial Entrepreneur No 
PEF-Partner 09 CPDP Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Employee Yes 
PEF-Partner 10 CPDP For profit Financial Entrepreneur Yes 
PEF-Partner 11 CPDP Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Employee Yes 
PEF-Partner 12 CPDP For profit Financial (mission) Entrepreneur Yes 
PEF-Partner 13 CPDP Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Employee Yes 
PEF-Partner 14 CPDP Not-for-profit Mission (financial) Entrepreneur Yes 
 
It is clear from the table above that the most prominent reason for entering the 
partnership with PEF in the case of for-profits is to gain financial resources. Private 
for-profit schools used to charge school fees before partnering with PEF. Since they 
were generally targeting children from low-income families, they faced problems in 
collecting those fees. This is the reason they were attracted to PEF PPPs as they 
thought it would enable them to get rid of this tiring process of fee collection. 
Moreover, many of them took this as an opportunity to engage in ‘a noble cause of 
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educating the poor’ while getting paid by PEF. For these reasons, comments such as 
following are typical: 
We came into partnership due to two reasons. First, we would not have to 
put our efforts in fees collection and secondly we would be able to 
concentrate on our real mission which is to deliver quality education and 
would be able to educate children in a better way (PEF-Partner02). 
Secondly, the types of focal persons managing partnership are essentially different in 
two important ways. Firstly, employees have a fixed salary and have no personal 
interest in the financial assistance provided by PEF. Occasionally they did raise 
concerns about the amount of funding provided by PEF but it did not become a point 
of contention or serious conflict affecting IORs. However, the attitude of 
entrepreneurs was rather aggressive about the level of funding provided by PEF 
primarily because they are the ones directly responsible for meeting the expenditures 
of school. 
Another difference between entrepreneurs and employees lies in their general 
attitude towards partnership. As discussed later in this chapter, PEF PPPs resemble a 
contractual form of PPP in which the public sector partner defines the problem and 
specifies the solution to that problem in a unilateral manner. The dominance of PEF 
was generally accepted more readily by those focal persons who were employees 
than by those who owned the schools/organisations, possibly because the former 
were more used to compliance behaviour.  The owners experienced more difficulty 
with this relationship because they had previously been used to making their own 
decisions and felt somewhat constrained by PEF’s terms and conditions. 
The entrepreneurs tended to look at PEF as a dominating partner and sometimes they 
even considered the word ‘partnership’ as inappropriate for this relationship. That is 
why comments such as the following are not untypical in the case of entrepreneurs: 
See the building is ours, teachers are ours and by giving Rs.350/ only 
they rule on the building, on us and on money too… Partnership means 
to share something, if you come and try to command me that why are you 
doing this or that? then this is an order, would that be a partnership? It 
would be superior-subordinate relationship. Basically the way they talk 
and behave with us is not the way you should adopt in a partnership. So I 
would say that this is not a partnership, this is like superior-subordinate 
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relationship. When we go to their office, we know it very well that we 
are going to see our boss (PEF-Partner03). 
On the other hand the focal persons who are in the employee category have quite a 
different perspective towards partnership. They feel comfortable with the formal 
rules and regulations and try to comply with these. There are some cases of 
resistance too but broadly speaking compliance for them is far easier as compared to 
the entrepreneurs. 
All focal persons in the category of employees were not directly responsible for 
meeting school’s/organisation’s expenditures, and in all cases the employees had the 
opportunity to cover the budget deficits by some alternative sources, which becomes 
another factor to explain their perspective towards partnership. The majority of not-
for-profit partners were usually members of larger third sector organisations, which 
provided them with access to additional sources of income. The fact that most not-
for-profit partners were not totally reliant on PEF funds influenced their perspective 
and they were more likely to view their relationship positively with PEF. For-profit 
partners’ complaints about PEF funding levels were stronger in. It became a point of 
contention and conflict in several instances, which restricted the development of 
collaborative IORs. 
These three dimensions – reasons for entering the partnership, the focal person 
responsible for managing the partnership, and the additional sources of income – 
interplay with one another. It is difficult to draw neat lines between them but together 
they contribute to shaping partner perspectives about the partnership. The diversity 
of PEF’s partners is an important factor that explains the diverse IORs in PEF’s PPP 
and is reflected in different stages of the partnership that are discussed in the 
following sections of this case study report. 
7.4 PPP set-up 
The partnership process starts when PEF advertises in national and local newspapers 
and invites expressions of interest from the private sector. In the advertisements PEF 
sets out its mission statement and the selection criteria/ basic requirements that 
private sector parties have to fulfil in order to be eligible for partnership with PEF. 
The selection criteria are set by the BOD and they are somewhat different for each 
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programme depending on the programme aims and objectives. For example, the 
requirements for existing infrastructure are higher in the case of FAS as compared to 
EVS because the latter is targeted on schools in the urban slums which generally lack 
appropriate infrastructure. Since PEF spells out its mission in the advertisements, 
PEF officials at all levels assume that those showing interest in partnership agree to 
the goals determined by PEF and are ready to pursue them, as reflected in the excerpt 
below: 
See when we advertised we clearly mentioned our goal, they gave 
expression of interest which means that they want to come and their goal 
is somehow the same as ours. If not then why would they respond to our 
advertisement (PEF-Director-02). 
Similarly, 
In this partnership we give funding on the basis of some terms and 
conditions and they come into partnership only if they agree to that, if 
they don't agree they don't come into partnership (PEF-Prog.Officer-04). 
Another noticeable point from these quotes is a strong assumed belief in the 
alignment of partner goals with those of PEF. This, however, is not that simple and 
straightforward in practice. Different private sector actors enter a partnership with 
PEF for different objectives (as discussed in section 7.3). The diversity of individual 
agendas makes the alignment of goals a difficult process. 
The selected partners are required to sign a MoU, the contents of which are 
unilaterally determined by PEF beforehand. The main features of the MoUs are 
outlined in Box 7.1. The clauses of the MoUs are approved by the BOD and only the 
BOD has the discretion to make changes in those clauses when required. The content 
of the MoUs are broadly the same across the FAS, EVS and NSP programmes with 
some differences in the MoU for CPDP. This is because the private sector partners in 
the case of all programmes except CPDP are private sector school owners who 
commit to provide free education under the partnership with PEF. However, in the 
case of CPDP the partners are mostly NGOs who have experience in the field of 
professional development and capacity building. Nevertheless the MoUs for all four 
programmes commit PEF to provide financial assistance in exchange for the services 
delivered by its private sector partners.  
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Box 7.1: Main features of the PEF’s PPP MoUs 
This agreement of partnership is made at Lahore between Punjab Education Foundation 19-
Ahmed block Garden Town, Lahore (hereinafter called the first party) and 
____________(hereinafter called the second party). 
 
That under the Punjab Education Foundation Act 2004 the executive and managing authority 
of the Punjab Education Foundation (hereinafter called the Foundation) vests with Board of 
Directors (BOD) so the BOD shall have the sole authority to take all decisions to run 
FAS/NSP/EVS program effectively (Clause1-PEF-FAS,NSP,EVS-MoU). 
 
The partnership agreement shall continue and would deem to have been extended from year 
to year basis till terminated by the first party. The partnership agreement may also be 
terminated by the first party anytime on violation by the second party of any terms and 
conditions of the agreement (Clause2-PEF-FAS,NSP,EVS-MoU). 
 
That the amount as financial assistance to be provided to the second party shall be 
determined/fixed by the BOD on the basis of per child enrolled per month… At the sole 
discretion of the BOD of the First Party this amount may be increased or decreased due to 
any consideration (Clause8-PEF-FAS,EVS-MoU) and (Clause9-PEF-NSP-MoU). 
 
That the second party must abide by the rules and regulations, timings and schedules, 
formats and methods prescribed by the first party for maintaining the overall school building, 
educational environment, campus hygiene and passing of bi-annual QATs. The second party 
will observe all rules and regulations regarding school timings and holidays, failing which 
the first party may charge the penalties or what so ever. Provision of infrastructure, furniture, 
light system ventilation etc. will be the responsibility of the second party, failing of which 
give right to the first party to impose penalties as per its judgment (Clause11-PEF-FAS-
MoU) and (Clause12-PEF-NSP-MoU). 
 
In case of any deviation noticed by PEF during the monitoring… penalties shall be imposed 
and deduction shall be made accordingly (Clause5-PEF-CPDP-MoU). 
 
That the first party will administer bi-annual Quality Assurance Tests (QATs) of the students 
of the second party to assess eligibility for continued financial assistance under this 
partnership agreement. In addition to biannual QAT the first party reserves the right to 
conduct surprise/planned QAT with any partner school… In case of two consecutive failures 
of the second party in passing of these QATs, the first party reserves the right to immediately 
terminate any financial assistance or even terminate the partnership agreement without 
serving any prior notice to the second party (Clause10-PEF-FAS-MoU), (Clause11-PEF-
NSP-MoU) and (Clause11&12-PEF-EVS-MoU). 
 
Performance of the second party shall be evaluated periodically, however the second party 
shall ensure improvements in infrastructure, faculty, academic and co‐curricular activities, as 
per guidelines provided by first party. The second party shall be evaluated on the basis of 
enrolment‐attendance gap, retention of EVS students, promotion to senior classes, and 
improvements in students’ learning outcomes. If annual performance results are below 
standards defined by first party, the first party reserves the right to immediately terminate 
any financial assistance or even the partnership agreement without serving any prior notice 
to the second party (Clause13-PEF-EVS-MoU). 
 
That the first party may carry out class-wise random inspections to check/verify the veracity 
of earlier reported enrolment, improvements made in the infrastructure and standard of 
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cleanliness and hygiene at any time without serving the prior notice during the working 
hours of the school run by the second party. Students, teachers and other school staff may 
also be interviewed and must be directly accessible to the representatives of the first party 
even in the absence of the second party or its representatives (Clause17-PEF-FAS-MoU), 
(Clause18-PEF-NSP-MoU) and (Clause16-PEF-EVS-MoU). 
 
That by the 5th day of every month, the second party shall communicate accurate figures of 
the enrolment of the students, on forms supplied by first party, providing class-wise break-up 
and gender-wise information of enrolment shall be submitted (Clause18-PEF-FAS-MoU) 
and (Clause19-PEF-NSP-MoU). 
 
The contents of the MoUs are determined in a unilateral manner by PEF but there is 
evidence of PEF trying to create a better understanding of the MoU by orienting 
private sector partners to the nuts and bolts of the partnership arrangement. To 
achieve this, there is an orientation process where prospective partners are introduced 
to the MOU and their questions are answered. A programme officer at PEF explained 
the process through which joint agreement on the contents of MoUs is reached: 
Before signing the agreement we conduct a seminar to tell all prospective 
partners that these are your responsibilities. We have already defined 
their main responsibilities and have also developed FAQs. We always 
conduct such session and address their questions and after that we ask 
them to sign the agreement. Moreover, we make our agreement and each 
and every related material available online so that prior to coming for 
signing the agreement they should study it and should write down their 
questions so that they may ask them for their clarity (PEF-Prog.Officer-
05). 
PEF assumes that partners agree to the partnership goals and programmes are 
designed and approved by the BOD in such a way as to strengthen PEF’s formal 
authority over partners (reflected in the MoUs). For example, the MoUs refer to PEF 
as the first party and the private sector partners as second party which creates an 
impression of superiority in relation to partners. One of the school owners captured a 
sentiment shared by some partners: 
In the agreement first party was PEF and we're second party although we 
are the owners (stressing), we are first party and they should be second 
party, so I don't agree to this thing in the agreement because it is totally 
wrong. See first party is the school owner who already has an established 




So even before entering a partnership some PEF partners are worried about their 
status and identity within partnership. Such concerns and doubts inhibit the building 
of collaborative IORs at the outset. However, not all PEF partners were worried 
about this and some felt comfortable with being the ‘second party’. The diversity of 
private sector partners discussed in the previous section helps to explain this. 
7.5 PPP implementation and management 
PEF’s partnership model is designed around the notion of performance and 
outcomes. Right from the beginning with the advertisements, selection of partners, 
and the MoU, to the execution and management of partnership, the PPPs revolve 
around performance and outcomes. This focus on performance rather than the 
management of the school is highlighted by the following comments from PEF 
officials: 
We won't intervene in their management domain, in what ways they want 
to run the school, hiring and firing of the staff etc. is all with them...what 
we are concerned with is that what are the outcomes and what are the 
results in PEC (Punjab Examination Commission) and Board exam plus 
the QAT, if they fail two consecutive QATs then our agreement is 
withdrawn (PEF-Prog.Officer-05). 
PEF chairman also expressed this clearly and explicitly: 
My task is to ensure high quality education for children from them 
[PEF’s partners] in any way. Partnership is not permanent unless they 
show their performance…PEF can be described in only one word 
(stressing) and that is 'performance', chairman is with performance, MD 
is with performance, DMDs, Directors and even the person entering data 
are with performance, schools with performance, children with 
performance, teachers with performance, our slogan is performance. 
Technically there are many definitions but practically it is performance 
from both sides (PEF-Chairman). 
The central idea of these quotes is meeting performance indicators in order to sustain 
the partnership relationship. PEF officials reflected during the interviews that 
accountability towards achieving the targets is very important for PEF. This occurs 
partly because of their institutional requirements characterised by high accountability 
and transparency to various bodies. The Deputy Managing Director (DMD) of 
operations put this point as: 
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We have to face both public and private sector. Public sector gives 
money in its own way (on meeting certain conditions) and we're 
accountable to private sector to provide funding… and not only we're 
accountable to them; we're accountable to the donors too (PEF-DMD). 
This comment indicates that PEF is a sort of middle man between several parties; 
government, donors and private sector partners, and has to satisfy all sides. Many 
public sector organisations in Pakistan are accused of corruption in their processes. 
Being a public sector organisation, PEF is very careful to maintain its integrity and 
strives hard for this. Furthermore, there are three statutory bodies which audit PEF’s 
accounts to ensure transparency (Malik 2010). All this suggests that oversight is a 
part of PEF’s organisational culture and is crucial to them.  
Consistent with their organisational culture, continuous monitoring of partners takes 
a central position in the PEF partnership model. The financial assistance of PEF is 
subject to the performance of private sector partners on the pre-defined indicators 
outlined in the respective MoUs. In order to ensure the desired outcomes of the 
partnership, PEF monitors and evaluates student learning outcomes through the 
QATs. Surprise or informed visits are carried out by PEF monitors who are assigned 
to evaluate schools (in the case of FAS, EVS and NSP partners) and training 
workshops (in the case of CPDP partners). The details related to the monitoring of 
partners are outlined in the respective MoUs too (see Box 7.1). 
In addition to on-site monitoring by PEF there are some reporting requirements 
which make partners liable to share information about some indicators. This 
information (such as enrolment figures, number of teachers, etc.) is verified by PEF 
during the regular monitoring visits and in cases of any misrepresentation of facts or 
non-compliance with the terms and conditions laid down under the MoU, PEF 
reserves the right to impose penalties or even cancel the partnership. 
The MoU is designed to strengthen PEF’s formal authority over partners. PEF has 
rights that are not available to partners, such as decision-making about the 
partnership. When PEF officials are asked about the participation of partners in 
decision-making it sounds very strange to them as they consider it somewhat 
irrelevant. PEF’s chairman explained: 
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It is written in our Act that no partner can be a member of the Board of 
Directors where decision-making is done… people who have their vested 
interests in this institution they can never be the member. So they can't 
get involved in decision-making (PEF-Chairman). 
This excerpt clearly links PEF model to agency theory whereby preventing 
opportunistic behaviour of the agents lies at the core of partnership relationships. 
However, partners are not excluded entirely from decision-making. A senior official 
of PEF outlined three types of decisions involved in the FAS PPPs. First, there are 
decisions that fall completely within the ambit of the BOD, such as PEF’s 
determination of the MoU and changes in the policies, goals and targets of PEF. 
Second, there are decisions that fall entirely within the domain of partner schools, 
such as hiring of school staff, and day-to-day management. Finally, there are some 
decisions such as training requirements of teachers that involve both partners 
working together. 
There are defined roles and responsibilities for partner schools and each school is 
held accountable for these. One of the programme directors at PEF considers it ‘a 
success model due to non-interference in each other’s domain’. All of this reinforces 
the impression that the PEF PPP model resembles a contractual arrangement in 
which the public sector partner defines the problem and specifies the solution to that 
problem in a unilateral manner, and many PEF officials consider these arrangements 
to be the key to success in PEF’s PPPs. 
 The response of PEF partners towards partnership 7.5.1
Although the dominant position of PEF is perceived by all PEF partners, the data 
analysis suggests a sort of continuum with respect to acceptance of or resistance to 
PEF’s PPP model. At one extreme there are partners who envision joint 
determination of activities at the heart of partnership. A CPDP partner considered 
this a major weakness of the PEF PPP model as it obstructs taking full advantage of 
the learning and experiences of private sector partners. He argued: 
There are some things which lack in this public-private partnership. This 
is a very good model, while working in the private sector we've learned 
something and the public sector has its own learning, now our and their 
learning should come together in this partnership which is not happening, 
there are some points where it is not happening at all (stressing) like 
184 
 
things are imposed on us, 'you just do it, we're saying you just do it, we 
know everything you just do it', no the thing is that we've our own 
learning and when you get together you agree to others too and take a 
middle way, but this doesn't happen here, PEF is very (stressing) rigid 
and sometimes just stick to one point and say that we won't do it (PEF-
Partner12). 
Such partners are against the dominating position of PEF and some even consider the 
word ‘partnership’ inappropriate for this relationship. 
At the same time there are partners who easily accept the dominance of PEF, 
sometimes explicitly and sometimes in a subtle manner. Such partners are not at all 
worried about equality in the relationship and consider it their responsibility to 
comply with the PEF’s conditions. When asked about equality in partnership they 
simply consider the term ‘irrelevant in specific contexts’. Such partners use the term 
‘sub-ordinates’ for themselves and consider the label ‘partnership’ a goodwill gesture 
of PEF for a relationship that is ‘out-sourcing’ according to their viewpoint. Some 
typical comments from this side of the continuum are: 
Actually the concept of equality is very vague in some cases, of course 
someone is providing budget so if I talk in general terms there could 
never be equality. It's a natural phenomenon that if someone is financing, 
they have their objectives, they have their goals then of course there can 
never be equality. But as far as our dealings are concerned then even if 
there is no equality there is mutual understanding for sure. So sometimes 
it becomes difficult to use some terminologies in specific contexts 
(smiling) (PEF-Partner10). 
And similarly, 
Obviously PEF is a dominating partner because they provide financial 
assistance and we've to work on their parameters, so they are dominating 
partner.... we don't feel any need to challenge their dominance, like we 
can't provide finances to them, there is a procedure so we have to adopt 
that, their dominance would remain and it should remain (stressing) 
(PEF-Partner09) 
The diversity of PEF’s partners discussed in section 7.3 can be compared to a prism 
through which the PEF model passes as a beam of light as shown in Figure 7.1. After 
passing through this prism the PEF PPP model can be viewed as an array of different 
responses, just as a light beam which passes through a prism is segregated into its 
constituent colours. These different responses to PEF’s PPP model reflect the diverse 
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IORs which result due to the involvement of different partners who vary across many 
dimensions. 
While the PEF PPP model is the same for every partner, it is perceived differently by 
different partners. Not all partners are looking for collaborative IORs in PEF 
partnerships. There are some partners (usually not-for-profits with employees acting 
as focal persons) who are less concerned about their organisation autonomy and are 
willing to adapt according to partnership needs. They are of the view that they should 
comply with PEF’s terms and condition because PEF is giving them the money to 
deliver services. But in doing so they didn’t feel that they are compromising their 
organisation autonomy because they were free to make decisions specific to their 
own organisational operations (such as hiring of staff, day-to-day management, etc.). 
Furthermore, they believed that there are enough channels to participate in the 
partnership activities, their feedback and suggestions are communicated to the BOD 
to take into account before taking any decision and there is trust in their relationship 
with PEF. These are the partners who can be categorised as having cooperative IORs. 
On the other hand, there is evidence of conflictual IORs in the case of partners who 
aspire to a more active role in the partnership activities, want to establish equality in 
IORs and are looking for higher level of collaboration.  
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 The IORs in practice: in day-to-day routines and in critical 7.5.2
incidents 
PEF’s use of monitoring as a day-to-day management tool could be seen as an 
example of a principal-agent relationship that is essentially premised on mistrust and 
fear of opportunistic behaviour by agents (Eisenhardt 1989a). Such lack of trust and 
fear of opportunistic behaviour is evident in the following comment by PEF’s FAS 
programme coordinator: 
Well ahm yes we do trust (hesitant) but it’s not trust in blindness… We 
ensure trust (laughing) let me put it in this way. We visit them, we 
monitor them and it’s done three times a year and sometimes it is more 
than five times and we do ensure that yes (stressing) we should not be 
deceived. We reward good outcomes and we punish sluggish behaviour 
or deviations (PEF-Prog.Coordinator-01). 
This is a typical response offered by PEF officials when asked about trust. The lack 
of trust becomes even more explicit when it comes to monetary matters in 
partnership. This is the point when almost all PEF officials become sceptical about 
the intentions and motivations of private sector partners. 
There are some people who are there just to get money, they make stories 
and I tell you if I'm not strong and if I'm not vigilant then anybody could 
easily trap me...so you need to be very vigilant (stressing) (PEF-
Director-02). 
Primarily their main motive is making profit, it’s not the case of one or 
two school owners it’s the case of almost every school owner 
(stressing). They are basically entrepreneurs in actual… let me tell you 
they are just trying to catch on the potential that a government 
department has (PEF-Chairman). 
Collectively, comments such as above, suggest that a great deal of doubt remains in 
the minds of PEF officials when interacting with private sector partners. PEF’s 
responses towards the partners’ concerns about the level of funding are based on 
their lack of trust and their stereotyping about private sector being led by profit 
motives. 
From PEF’s partners’ perspective the PPP starts with a minimum level of trust (or 
maybe confidence) on the part of both parties. Partners are confident that being a 
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public sector body PEF would do what it commits to, as reflected in the following 
comment: 
We trust PEF because if they've said that they would give funding in 
time, they send it in time and there is no problem in it at all (PEF-
Partner07). 
Moreover, all partners consider PEF trustworthy even if they are not completely 
satisfied with the IORs between them and PEF. For example: 
Yes there is trust between us and would stay in our relationship. Though 
their behaviour is quite hard and bossy with us but if we say that PEF is 
not working or they are involved is some corruption then it would be 
wrong, they are working 100%, the only thing required from their side is 
to accept and treat us as partners. The trust we have on them is due to 
their work (PEF-Partner03). 
As mentioned earlier, being a public sector organisation accountable to various 
bodies, PEF works hard to maintain its integrity and reputation. PEF has positioned 
itself as a public sector body which has its own organisational culture that is distinct 
from many public sector bodies. There are two main characteristics that make PEF 
standout from the other public sector organisations: it is performance oriented and 
corruption free. These two features are referred to both by PEF and its partners. PEF 
strives hard to ensure transparency and objectivity in its processes. One example of 
this is reflected in PEF’s policy whereby PEF’s monitors are not allowed to take any 
personal benefit, as small as even a glass of water, from their private sector partners. 
One of the PEF officials commented: 
We never take a single glass of water (stressing) from school and when 
you are not even taking a single glass of water then neither would I be 
blackmailed by a school nor would I report wrong, wrong reporting is 
only possible when I take side of the school owners and give them 
favours (PEF-Prog.Officer-05). 
This comment suggests that by maintaining a high degree of objectivity and 
formality in IORs, PEF aims to promote unbiased and objective decision-making. A 
programme coordinator when probed about the rationale for this policy explained: 
It's really important. Our former MD used to say this and when we asked 
him why not a glass of water? He used to say very politely that when you 
go somewhere and eat or drink there then at the time of decision that 
stops you from taking the right decision, we are human beings and when 
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you get attached to someone then even if you take decision on merit it is 
usually thought that they used to eat with them, and this is what is said 
about government bodies that you've to give them something or feed 
them and only then your work would be done (PEF-Prog.Coordinator-
02). 
Although this policy may promote objective decision-making, it also restricts PEF 
officials getting involved in informal interactions and building collaborative IORs 
based on a spirit of equality (generally promulgated in the PPP literature). However, 
most PEF officials consider it crucial to seek partners’ suggestions and feedback 
about programme activities.  A programme coordinator stated:  
This is a very important aspect, in order to achieve our goals effectively 
our coordination and collaboration is very essential… if you want to 
bring some innovation or creativity in your work that is not at all possible 
without coordination (PEF-Prog.Coordinator-02). 
Although direct and equal participation by schools in decision-making is not possible 
in the PEF’s PPP model, there is indirect involvement of partners through different 
channels. One of these mechanisms is the District Coordination Meetings (DCMs) 
that are held to seek the viewpoints and concerns of private sector partners. Most 
PEF officials believe that school partners are indirectly involved in decision-making 
via this route since their feedback and suggestions are brought to the BOD and taken 
into account in their deliberations. The PEF Deputy Managing Director expressed his 
perspective: 
The whole structure of the programme is that we sit together, for example 
we have our District Coordination Meetings (DCMs) where we invite all 
the stakeholders, we ask for their opinion, we take their opinions and we 
give our feedback, then we bring them back to the Board and with their 
suggestions we try to improve our programmes. We've taken a number of 
decisions based on that, for example how the QAT should be conducted? 
What should be the format of the QAT? There was a demand from the 
schools that they need loans for improving infrastructure and to establish 
computer labs, so we have developed other arrangements to help our 
schools to provide them loans from banks. As per their requirement 
we've started teacher training programmes for our schools (PEF-DMD).  
Some PEF partners expressed their satisfaction with this process because they think 




Whenever any decision or change is going to take place, it definitely 
involves sitting together and sharing ideas, whenever there is any change 
there are discussions. It is very rare that they take some decision and then 
share it with us by calling us and tell us that it is going to be in this way 
from next time (PEF-Partner06). 
As mentioned earlier the MoU empowers PEF to monitor its partners and impose 
penalties in the case of non-compliance with the terms and conditions. In such 
incidents PEF calls the partners for a meeting with the director of the relevant 
programme to discuss the matter and listen to their point of view on that issue. Many 
partners expressed concerns about this process and sometimes used the term ‘court 
trial’ to explain the process. Following are the typical comments in this respect:  
I agree that check and balance should be there and we should not be left 
on our own but they have to listen to our problems, all penalties are for 
us only, they deduct a lot of money from our funding and the penalties 
are imposed (stressing) without any discussion and then they ask us to 
sign the statement that we agree to this penalty. We have to sign that, if 
we don't sign that they would stop the funding and if there is no funding 
then how can we run the whole set up of the school… If they simply call 
us only to impose penalties then it is like a court trial that has to be 
settled (PEF-Partner06). 
Some partners considered this process as mere formality as they believed that PEF 
officials come ‘with their own agenda’ and the decision to impose penalty is ‘set in 
stone’ and could not be reverted. One school owner argued: 
Whatever the monitor writes it is set in stone by PEF which is a cause of 
conflict, see when we are partners it should be discussed with us but they 
are very active in imposing penalties. We request quite a lot in such cases 
that you don't know the problems we face but there is no use. I can't 
understand what their problem is as they get funding from the 
government but there is some reason for that, maybe they show their 
performance by doing this; I don't know (PEF-Partner03). 
Contrary to this there are some partners who believe that their suggestions are being 
heard and implemented by PEF and give examples as:  
I had some problems regarding the data of my school. I met director FAS 
in this regard and explained that these problems are due to the non-
availability of internet and change of school administrator. He said that 
we will go by rules. Later, he gave us access to the internet and we 
updated all our data. I mean he supported us and didn’t refuse to sort the 




We had a meeting and people asked to change the month to conduct the 
QAT and they have changed it, all this shows that they listen to us and 
try to solve our problems. They have changed the QAT dates in response 
to school administrators who asked to change the dates during meetings. 
If funding has increased, it's again in response to the demand of all 
schools (PEF-Partner04). 
One point that could be established from this discussion is that the viewpoints of PEF 
partners tend to diverge across almost all themes. This is somehow not surprising 
given the diversity of PEF’s partners which has already been discussed in section 7.3. 
7.6 PPP outcomes 
PEF’s partnership approach is described as a ‘combination of private-sector 
efficiency and public-sector funding’ (Malik 2010: 1). Efficiency lies at the heart of 
PEF’s PPP model and all PEF interviewees considered it as the major benefit offered 
by all four programmes undertaken by PEF. PEF officials compared PEF partner 
schools to state schools and took pride in the superior performance and efficiency of 
PEF partner schools. For instance, the Director of the FAS programme commented 
that: 
The cost of education in public sector [schools] is approximately 
Rs.2000/ per student per month whereas PEF is delivering quality and the 
cost is Rs.350/ plus Rs.50/ administrative cost… So the cost is much 
lower and the quality is better… 30 of the top performing students [in 
provincial exams] were PEF students… public sector schools have 
secured no [top] position in [these] exams (PEF-Director-01). 
Similar types of responses are offered by private sector partners too and most of 
them are aware that PEF is able to pursue its mission more efficiently by getting 
engaged in partnerships. The focal person from one CPDP partner organisation 
expressed it as: 
If PEF arranges these trainings in partnership then their per head cost is 
approximately Rs.2,600/ and if PEF arranges these trainings on its own 
then it would be at least Rs.5,000/ per teacher. I am an accountant by 
background and I look at everything from financial perspective and I 
know that this is the main reason to promote public-private partnerships. 
The main purpose of these across the world is to save money… So it is 
cost effective as if PEF would do it on its own it would be a huge burden 
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for them as they would have to increase their human resources manifolds 
(PEF-Partner09). 
There are many examples of how PEF partner schools deliver education at low cost 
and improve the performance of pupils. Some of the partner schools interviewed 
commented on improved infrastructure, better teachers, and getting rid of the fee 
collection process as value-added benefits. Almost all of them reported 
improvements in pupils’ performance results. None of the partner schools 
interviewed thought that the partnership had added no value to their school. 
The dropout rate of students in PEF partner schools is estimated to be close to zero 
(Malik 2010), whereas overall in Pakistan half of the children enrolled in grade 1 
drop out of school before completing their primary education (Academy for 
Educational Planning and Management 2006).  The main reason for this sharp 
difference is the action taken by staff in PEF partner schools to ensure the presence 
of children. They do this to meet the QAT requirements and also to guard against 
surprise visits by PEF monitors to verify enrolment figures. Though occasionally 
sceptical of these monitoring visits, PEF schools recognise the benefits:  
The relationship with parents has strengthened as children used to be 
absent from school before and now we push them to be regular and it 
creates pressure on parents too (PEF-Partner07). 
Many interviewees expressed that in Pakistan most people would see this as a major 
benefit because irregular school attendance and high drop-out rates are real concerns. 
There are other examples of the synergistic benefits of PEF’s PPPs. For example, one 
PEF programme officer reflected on the potential of school partners to provide them 
with access to areas where it is difficult to reach children due to social and cultural 
constraints. He narrated a story about a rural area in Punjab where people did not 
want to educate their girls. He explained: 
If we would have gone there on our own and have asked parents to send 
their girls to school, it won't have been possible. It was possible to bring 
them to school only because the school owner belonged to that 
community and had a good repute in the area and since parents knew him 
that is why they sent their girls to school (PEF-Prog.Officer-05). 
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There are examples of both PEF and their partner schools going beyond the formal 
MoU agreement. Schools work hard to obtain better results in the QAT and other 
exams. One school administrator commented: 
We are doing very hard work and are here today even on Saturday that is 
usually off in our school. But we are preparing our children for PEF 
exam… These days we have zero period for class 9 and 10 that starts at 6 
in the morning, teachers come at 6 and teach them (PEF-Partner05). 
One of the PEF programme officers reflected that without interfering in their internal 
management ‘we have developed such system and such mechanism that they (partner 
schools) are fully engaged’. He mentioned that schools set up summer camps and 
extra classes to improve the learning outcomes of students. Another PEF official 
added, ‘there is no clause in the agreement which binds them to conduct afternoon 
classes but they are going one step ahead of our expectations… this is the main 
synergistic effect’ (PEF-Prog.Coordinator-01). 
There are instances of PEF going beyond the formal agreement too. Giving free text 
books to partner schools is one such example. In order to encourage good 
performance amongst partner schools, PEF also gives cash rewards to students and 
teachers who go beyond the formally agreed MoU. In addition, PEF has made 
arrangements for partners to access interest free loans from banks to improve the 
facilities at their schools. Another example comes from 2010 when some areas of 
Punjab were submerged by heavy floods. Many PEF partner schools in these areas 
were badly affected. The students in these schools migrated to other nearby schools 
and the enrolment level of the flood-affected schools fell sharply. Although it was 
contrary to the MoU, PEF continued to fund these schools at higher enrolment levels 
and offered them soft loans to restore their facilities. 
Overall, the added value of PEF’s PPPs goes beyond simply achieving cost savings; 
there is evidence of substantive improvements in education service delivery. 
Moreover, there are examples where PEF’s partners acknowledge that partnership 
with PEF has also enabled them to achieve their own organisational goals to an 
extent which was not possible without partnership, and this is another synergistic 
benefit of the partnership. One CPDP partner, for example, was interested in the 
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partnership to increase her access to far-off districts of Punjab but was not able to do 
so without partnership. She explained: 
I wasn't able to reach out to so many people, through PEF now I've 
reached many schools and so many people. On my own I wasn't able to 
reach so many people, the best we could've done was to adopt a few 
schools but now I'm able to go out to so many schools…PEF is providing 
us the funds and even if they're less we do have funds now. PEF has 
provided us the forum so that we can go to the schools and with PEF's 
name we don't have any problems introducing ourselves. So they 
provided us access, they provided us funds and they've provided us a 
platform to work with other people in the same field (PEF-Partner14). 
There are, however, instances where the experience of the partnership has not come 
up to the expectations of some partners. For example, the owner of one partner 
school expressed his views as: 
When I went in partnership with PEF the main problem was that of 
funding. This programme was started in the year 2000, after some time 
they raised funding from Rs.300/ to Rs.350/, with every year the rate of 
inflation has increased, believe me they have not increased the level of 
funding accordingly which was our main problem and due to which we 
entered this partnership (PEF-Partner03). 
Similarly one CPDP partner thought that his objective to expand out-reach is not met 
at all as he was limited to certain districts only by PEF. He commented: 
After coming (in partnership) with them we came to know that there is a 
limited role like for example for the last two years we've been working 
only in few districts, so our objective to expand out-reach was not met 
(PEF-Partner10). 
Such diverse responses reiterate the argument above that each partner enters into 
partnership with a distinct perspective and assesses the partnership arrangement on 
the basis of that pre-conceived notion. 
7.7 Conclusion 
PEF’s PPPs were launched after the restructuring of PEF under the Punjab Education 
Foundation Act of 2004. Although PEF’s PPPs represent interdependence and 
resource scarcity on part of both public and private sector partners to achieve their 
goals, the balance of IORs is asymmetrical in favour of PEF. Dominance of PEF is 
obvious right from the inception of the partnership relationship as the programmes 
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are designed a priori by the PEF’s BOD with no involvement of partners. The MoUs 
clearly state the terms and conditions that partners have to fulfil in order to continue 
with the partnership relationship. Because the contents of the MoUs are designed a 
priori, the MoUs bestow PEF with formal authority and dominant position in the 
partnership. There is evidence that PEF takes steps to create a better understanding 
and conducts an orientation seminar with private sector partners to explain the 
fundamentals of partnership arrangement and to seek joint agreement on the 
respective MoU. 
The diversity of PEF’s partners results in as an array of different responses and 
reactions to PEF’s PPP model. Consequently, perceptions of the IORs vary 
significantly across partners. On one hand, there are perceived to be cooperative 
IORs when private sector partners are willing to adapt according to partnership needs 
and believe that there are enough channels to participate in the partnership activities. 
On the other hand, there are partners who seek more collaboration in partnership and 
complain about the dominance of PEF. These partners talk about conflictual IORs 
and want to establish equality in the partnership. 
Finally, PEF’s PPPs have delivered substantive improvements in school education – 
including improvements in school facilities, and pupil access, attendance and 
performance – that could not have been delivered by either partner working alone. 
There was no partner interviewed for this study who thought that the partnership 
relationship has produced no added value for them. 
 
To reiterate, the main focus of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 was to describe and understand 
the nature of IORs during different stages of the partnership along with a discussion 
of the PPP outcomes in each case study. The description of the nature of IORs and 
factors shaping these in the individual case study chapters is carried forward in the 
next chapter, where a cross-case analysis is undertaken to characterise the nature of 
IORs and to understand the influence of different factors on IORs in PPPs. 
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Chapter 8 Cross-case analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous three chapters the case studies have been presented separately, with a 
particular focus on describing the IORs during different stages of the partnership and 
the outcomes of PPPs in each case study. In this chapter, the cases are analysed and 
compared in the light of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3. This 
discussion provides the basis for a theoretical analysis of the findings in the next 
chapter. In line with the conceptual framework, this chapter is divided into five main 
sections: characterisation of the nature of IORs; developmental stages of PPPs; 
contextual factors; motives to enter PPPs; and organisational factors. The discussion 
presented in each section is summarised in appending tables to offer a bird’s eye 
view of the comparative analysis. 
8.2 Characterisation of the nature of IORs 
Given that PPPs by their very nature are diverse, it is not surprising to find diverse 
IORs across the three case studies. Moreover, each case study programme comprises 
a number of individual PPPs which themselves also vary and this adds to the 
diversity of the PPPs and IORs. This diversity offers an opportunity to compare the 
dynamics of different PPPs so as to provide a more rounded view of the nature of 
these and the factors influencing the IORs. 
As illustrated in Chapter 7, PEF’s PPPs typically manifest contractual IORs 
characterised by lack of participative decision-making, dominance of PEF, 
hierarchical accountability and lack of trust. The balance of IORs is asymmetrical in 
favour of PEF who control the PPP set-up and management in several ways. PEF’s 
partners’ views of these contractual IORs vary as conflictual or cooperative; this 
difference in response shaped by the factors described in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
As mentioned in the CARE-LDG case study, the IORs in these PPPs vary 
significantly from one adopted school to the other. For some schools, there is 
evidence of collaborative IORs characterised by intensive interactions, brainstorming 
sessions to find solutions and participation of both public and private sector parties in 
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planning and review meetings. Nevertheless, there are instances when the IORs 
became conflictual and working through differences was difficult due to CARE’s 
lack of willingness to adjust and compromise. CARE has a policy of no 
confrontation in these situations but stands firm on its viewpoint. When there are 
conflicts at school level, CARE seeks the support of district education officials to 
force compliance from the school staff. This approach is sometimes seen as a barrier 
to building trust with the staff at school level which in turn results in conflictual 
IORs. However, there are schools where differences of opinion are easily handled 
and the IORs remain more collaborative. 
The IORs in the case of ITA-LDG PPPs embody cooperation and they manifest joint 
agreement on decisions, willingness to adapt, lack of concerns about organisation 
autonomy and mutual trust. Unlike CARE-LDG PPPs, the IORs in the case of ITA 
are broadly similar across all adopted schools. Two main reasons can be given for 
this. First, ITA adopts a facilitative and enabling role which contrasts with CARE’s 
authoritative approach. Second, ITA’s policy of no confrontation is coupled with a 
willingness to adapt. It is due to these two reasons that none of the partners in ITA-
LDG PPPs consider that their intentions or actions are challenged by the other 
partner. 




Table 8.1: Nature of IORs: a comparative analysis of the case studies 
 CARE-LDG ITA-LDG PEF’s PPPs 
Nature 
of IORs 
The IORs in CARE-
LDG PPPs vary 
significantly from one 
adopted school to 
another.  In some 
adopted schools the 
IORs are collaborative 
while in some other 




The IORs in ITA-LDG 
PPPs typically embody 
cooperation and they 
include joint agreement 
on decisions, 
willingness to adapt, 
lack of concerns about 
organisation autonomy 
and mutual trust. 
 
 
PEF’s PPPs typically 
manifest contractual 
IORs characterised by 
lack of participative 
decision-making, 
dominance of PEF, 
hierarchical 
accountability and lack of 
trust. 
 
From PEF’s partners’ 
perspective the IORs vary 




The balance of IORs 
remains symmetrical 
(principal-principal 
relationship) as there is 
no evidence where one 
partner is able to 
dominate consistently 
over the other partner. 
 
The balance of IORs is 
symmetrical (principal-
principal relationship) 
and no one party to the 
partnership is dominant. 
The balance of IORs is 
asymmetrical (principal-
agent relationship) in 
favour of PEF who 
control the PPP set-up 
and management in 
several ways 
8.3 Developmental stages of PPPs 
This section of cross-case analysis compares and contrasts the ways in which PPPs 
are set-up, implemented and managed with particular attention to the changing nature 
of IORs during these phases.  
 PPP set-up 8.3.1
PPP set-up in the CARE and ITA case studies is quite similar. Both CARE and ITA 
were amongst the pioneer organisations that entered the ‘Adopt-a-School’ (AAS) 
programme with the LDG. At that time, PPPs were a new concept for the Punjab 
School Education Department (SED) and district education officials were not 
familiar with such arrangements. They relied on their partners, CARE and ITA, to 
come up with a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU was then 
negotiated by the respective NGO and the LDG officials to reach agreement. 
The goals of the partnership in both AAS case studies are ‘to uplift the standard of 
education’ in the adopted schools. The partnership goals are broad and in principle 
provide scope to accommodate the specific objectives of both public and private 
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sector partners. Having said this, since the private sector partners in AAS model take 
the lead in developing the MoUs, it provides a greater space for them to envision the 
goals of partnership as well as the roles and responsibilities they wish to pursue to 
achieve these goals. For example, at CARE it is a strongly held belief that it is not a 
shortage of resources but their mismanagement which is the main problem to be 
addressed at state schools. Accordingly CARE takes on a management responsibility 
for adopted schools. In contrast, ITA officials are of the view that it is the state’s 
responsibility to manage the schools and that the role of ITA is to provide technical 
support to government staff when they are faced with problems. So, although 
management is considered as a joint responsibility in the MoU, in practice most of 
the management responsibilities in ITA adopted schools rest with the government’s 
head teachers; ITA staff are only there to solve any problems that cannot be handled 
by the head teachers. 
In the case of PEF, the PPP set-up is quite different from the AAS model. The PEF 
MoUs are not negotiated and their contents are decided a priori by PEF’s Board of 
Directors (BOD) before selecting private sector partners. However, the BOD has 
private sector representation and hence there is some indirect involvement of the 
private sector in determining the contents of the partnership agreements. Through the 
MoUs, PEF defines the problem(s) to be addressed and the solution(s). It specifies 
the quality and satisfaction parameters that have to be met by the private sector 
partners and states the mechanism to address shortfalls and incompatibilities. With 
respect to project content and scope, the partnership model is characterised by ex-
ante goal setting and the subdivision of a partnership into parts where each partner is 
liable for the responsibilities allocated to them. In short, PEF MoUs are characterised 
by a priori goal setting and a clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of 
each party, which are the typical features of contractual arrangements. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that PEF is sensitive to ensuring that private sector 
partners understand the terms and conditions stated in the MoUs and the mission of 
the PPP arrangement.  To achieve this, there is an orientation process where 
prospective partners are introduced to PEF, its mission and goals, the MoU and the 
respective responsibilities of each party in the PPP arrangement. The questions and 
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concerns of prospective partners are also addressed by PEF officials during this 
process. 
 PPP implementation and management 8.3.2
In the PEF’s PPP model, as mentioned above, there is quite a strong emphasis from 
the start on clear specification of terms and conditions of the partnership model. The 
MoUs play a significant role in setting out the ways in which programme will be 
managed. The management principles in PEF’s PPPs are mainly led by the principles 
of project management whereby the focus is on the ex-ante frameworks identified by 
the initiating actor (Mantel 2005). 
It becomes evident both from the MoUs and the interviews with PEF officials that 
the mode of accountability is mainly hierarchical as private sector partners are held 
accountable for the terms agreed in the MoU and monitored by PEF to meet these 
terms. Thus, continuous and extensive monitoring is adopted by PEF as a mechanism 
for goal alignment and to avoid the opportunistic behaviour of the partners. These 
findings could be described as an example of a principal-agent relationship that is 
essentially premised on mistrust and fear of opportunistic behaviour of agents 
(Eisenhardt 1989a). Similar to the doctrine of agency theory, PEF employs ‘a mix of 
incentives, sanctions, information systems (such as reporting procedures), and 
monitoring mechanisms’ (Van Slyke 2007: 162) in order to align the actions of the 
private sector partners with the goals of PEF. The PEF Act of 2004 and the MoUs 
give PEF some fundamental rights that are not available to PEF partners, such as 
participation in decision-making. 
In managing each PPP, there are clearly defined roles and responsibilities of each 
partner and PEF holds each partner accountable for that. The Director FAS considers 
PEF ‘a success model due to non-interference in each other’s domain’. As a result 
the idea of ‘collaboration’ which lies at the heart of much of the discourse around 
partnerships is limited in PEF’s model of PPPs. Participation in decision-making, for 
example, is limited to PEF seeking the suggestions from partners and then 
implementing them in a centralised way. 
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Nevertheless, a closer look at PEF’s PPP implementation and management reveals 
that there are channels of feedback available to private sector partners through which 
PEF officials can be held to account ultimately by the BOD. There are District 
Coordination Meetings (DCMs) which seek the viewpoints and concerns of private 
sector partners. Most PEF officials believe that private sector partners are indirectly 
involved in decision-making via this route since their feedback and suggestions are 
brought to the BOD and taken into account in decision-making process. The 
evidence of both ex ante and post ante management arrangements means that some 
level of co-production is maintained throughout the process of partnership. The 
earlier phases of exploration and planning do not involve private partners directly but 
there are mechanisms for more intensive interaction in the implementation and 
management phases. 
While the project set-up for both CARE and ITA shares many similarities, the 
management of their PPPs is more different than similar. The seeds of these 
differences are sowed at the outset during project set-up, and are contained in the 
respective MoUs. The fact that CARE takes on the management responsibilities of 
the adopted schools and ITA considers it as a joint responsibility is one reason for the 
differences in PPP management. The ways in which PPP implementation and 
management varies across CARE and ITA PPPs is a factor that shapes the IORs as 
discussed in section 8.2. 
The initial disposition of CARE towards staff in adopted schools is to distrust them, 
but in most cases trust seems to evolve over time. ITA, on the other hand, has an 
initial trust disposition and places greater value on cooperation to achieve goal 
alignment. Not surprisingly, given CARE’s initial distrust, it uses monitoring as a 
tool for goal alignment. An Internal Coordinator (IC) is appointed by CARE for each 
adopted school and is given both teaching and management responsibilities at school 
level. Conversely, an enabling and facilitative approach is quite visible in day-to-day 
programme management and implementation by ITA; an Education Promoter (EP) is 
appointed by ITA and is allocated 6-20 adopted schools. The EP is given the 
responsibility of helping the head teachers and other staff to improve the school. This 
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is achieved through occasional visits to adopted schools (usually once a week as 
observed during the fieldwork). 
Although both CARE and ITA are subject to the same government reporting 
requirements, the way in which both NGOs conform to these requirements is 
different. CARE collects the required information through its IC who is given 
responsibilities such as monitoring, record keeping and data management (including 
teachers’ attendance records, movement register and evaluation). The IC shares this 
information with the senior management of CARE who visits the adopted schools on 
regular basis. The senior management interacts with the relevant district officials, 
shares information reports and suggests further action if necessary. The ITA’s EP 
collects the required data from head teachers of the adopted schools. This 
information is then compiled in the form of a report which is shared with district 
officials. 
Despite the fact that both CARE and ITA introduced initiatives in the adopted 
schools that were designed a priori by the NGOs, they involved government officials 
in discussions (both at school and district levels) before implementing their 
initiatives. The CARE case study provides some examples of joint decision-making 
and joint determination of programme activities in CARE adopted schools, but 
beneath the surface of these examples there is quite a lot of manipulation as CARE’s 
staff seek to get their own agenda implemented. There are instances when head 
teachers are not convinced and such conflicts turn into major disputes. In these 
situations, CARE officials take matters to the district education officials to get them 
resolved. Hence, although CARE officials interact with the government staff at both 
adopted schools and district levels, mostly they seek acquiescence from public sector 
officials. 
ITA involves government officials, both at school and district level, at a point when 
their initiatives are in the final form to be implemented in adopted schools. The main 
purpose of involving district education officials is to get their approval to implement 
the initiatives and to keep them informed about what ITA is doing in adopted 
schools. The projects and initiatives are then discussed with the government staff at 
school level to ensure their support. Unlike CARE, ITA officials were found to be 
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quite flexible to change or even drop their initiatives when there was no agreement 
on them from the school side. In cases of conflict at school level, ITA opts to solve 
problems by taking a discussion route rather than making it into a dispute and taking 
it to district education officials. 
 PPP outcomes 8.3.3
There is evidence of added value being created by all three PPPs that could not be 
achieved by each partner working alone. With respect to quantitative indicators of 
the value added by partnerships, there were improvements in exam results, 
enrolments and dropout rates. As detailed earlier in the case study chapters, PEF’s 
PPPs have delivered substantive improvements in school education including 
improvements in school facilities, developing technical expertise through training 
opportunities as well as increases in pupil access, attendance and performance. 
The ‘Adopt-a-School’ (AAS) PPP model has also resulted in positive changes in 
similar indicators. Both CARE and ITA contributed to the provision of missing 
facilities in schools including teachers. They also provided training opportunities to 
government staff which helped to bring improvements in the quality of education. 
These improvements helped to increase the enrolment rates at adopted schools. In 
some of the CARE adopted schools it became difficult to accommodate the increased 
number of children in the existing buildings and some schools started 
accommodating children in double-shifts. The CARE adopted schools that ran 
double shifts were those where the IORs were collaborative which supports the view 
that there is a positive relationship between collaborative IORs and the added value 
of PPPs. Although many head teachers in ITA adopted schools reported increases in 
enrolment rates after entering into a partnership with ITA, none of the ITA adopted 
schools were running in double-shifts. As mentioned in the CARE-LDG case study, 
the government staff at adopted schools were conscious of being monitored by 
CARE through the IC. This is seen as interference at times but the continuous 
presence of CARE’s IC in each adopted school creates a sense of competition 
between CARE’s teachers and government teachers and this may encourage the latter 
to improve their performance. 
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Examples of more qualitative value added by PPPs can be found in all three case 
studies. There are instances when PEF and its partners go beyond the formal 
agreement to achieve the goals of the partnership. From PEF’s partners’ side, there is 
evidence that they go beyond the formal agreement with PEF in order to achieve 
better results in the QAT and other exams. PEF has made arrangements for its 
partners to access interest free loans from banks to improve their facilities and has 
supported them when floods submerged several partner schools. Furthermore, 
partnership with PEF increases the private sector partners’ visibility and repute in the 
community which is a qualitative benefit. 
PPPs with LDG enhance the legitimacy of CARE and ITA which makes more 
funding options available to them. From the government’s perspective, partnership 
with CARE and ITA brings improvements in the adopted state schools which makes 
these schools popular in the community. Furthermore, improvement in enrolment 
rates and exam results has a potential multiplier effect: these adopted schools become 
more visible to the LDG education officials, which in turn results in further 
improvements in these adopted schools. Both CARE and ITA staff were found to 
build contacts with the LDG education officials and in doing so they shared the 
problems of the adopted schools, which accelerated new developmental work in 
these schools. 
Another indicator of synergistic benefits, as discussed in Chapter 3, is the extent to 
which partner organisations perceive that they are able to meet their own 
organisational objectives through PPP arrangement. All PEF officials interviewed for 
this research unanimously agreed that they were able to meet their objectives of 
efficient education delivery through PPPs. They were of the view that PPPs allow 
them and their partners to benefit from the comparative advantages of one another. 
Many of PEF’s private sector partners also mentioned that they are in a better 
position to pursue their organisational objectives through a PPP. However, there are 
some instances where PEF’s partners perceive that the PPP has not come up to their 
expectations and they are not able to meet their objectives. 
There is recognition on the part of ITA that entering into PPPs with LDG enables 
them to better pursue their mission. ITA-LDG PPPs help ITA to pursue three main 
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objectives included in ITA’s mission statement. First, PPPs allow ITA to improve the 
quality of education at state schools. Second, working in state schools helps ITA to 
gain grassroots experience in order to influence public policy decisions. Third, 
working with the state education department increases the credibility of ITA and 
enables ITA to capitalise on funding from multiple channels. Similarly, CARE-LDG 
PPPs help CARE to achieve its mission of empowering under-privileged children 
with a marketable education. It is well-recognised by CARE that no NGO could ever 
have resources to do this alone and partnership with the LDG supports them to 
pursue their organisational mission and objectives. 
The main points from the discussion of developmental stages of PPPs in this section 
are summarised in Table 8.2.  
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Table 8.2: Developmental stages of PPPs: a comparative analysis of the case studies 
 CARE-LDG ITA-LDG PEF’s PPPs 
PPP set-up CARE takes the lead in developing the 
MoU which broadly defines the 
problem, roles and responsibilities of 
each partner; the MoU is then 
negotiated by both parties 
ITA takes lead in developing the 
MoU which defines the problem, 
roles and responsibilities of each 
partner; the MoU is then negotiated 
by both parties 
PEF defines the terms of the MoU 
including the responsibilities of each 
partner, quality and satisfaction 
parameters, and outcomes; the MoU is 




Based on the principles of process 
management (managing ongoing 
interaction among different actors); 
yet CARE’s style of management is 
direct and authoritative 
Based on the principles of process 
management (managing ongoing 
interaction among different actors); 
ITA’s style of management is 
enabling and facilitative 
Primarily based on ex ante frameworks 
and principles of project management 
along with some ex post measures (such 
as seeking partners’ feedback and 
suggestions through meetings and feeding 
these through to the BOD to take into 
account before taking any decision) 
PPP outcomes CARE’s provision of missing facilities 
including teachers in the adopted 
schools; improvements in the quality 
of education; increase in enrolment 
rates; some schools started 
accommodating children in double-
shifts; increased oversight improved 
schools’ performance; greater 
visibility of the schools within LDG 
education department and community; 
both CARE and LDG are able to meet 
their objectives 
ITA’s provision of missing 
facilities including teachers in the 
adopted schools; improvements in 
the quality of education; increase 
the enrolment rates; greater 
visibility of the schools within LDG 
education department and 
community; both ITA and LDG are 
able to meet their objectives 
Substantive improvements in school 
education – including improvements in 
school facilities, developing technical 
expertise through training opportunities 
and increase in pupil access, attendance 
and performance; evidence of going 
beyond the formal agreement to achieve 
the goals of the partnership; PEF’s 
partners’ enhanced visibility and repute in 
the community; both PEF and its partners 
are able to meet their objectives 
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8.4 Contextual factors 
These are the factors that operate at a macro-level and are beyond a particular case, 
though they may play out differently in each case. To recap from Chapter 3, among 
the more important contextual factors are interdependence, institutional pressures, 
reputation and sectoral differences. In line with the conceptual framework, this 
section engages with the cross-case analysis of the contextual factors in two ways: 1) 
the ways in which they stimulate the formation of PPPs, and 2) the ways in which 
they influence the IORs. 
 Interdependence 8.4.1
Interdependence is an important contextual factor that facilitated the formation of 
PPPs across all three case studies. All case study organisations were unable to 
generate enough resources by themselves to pursue their mission and goals. Virtually 
all parties including PEF, its private sector partners, district education officials, 
CARE and ITA had a broad consensus that there is a need to improve the access to 
quality education in the country, and most parties were involved in contributing 
towards this need even before entering the PPP arrangements. Nevertheless, 
individual parties were constrained by resources and were faced with a situation 
where each party had some resources that were required by others. For example, the 
state possesses a large infrastructure of schools consisting of more than 57,000 state 
schools in Punjab (School Education Department 2012) but had failed to provide 
adequate and comprehensive education services under its role as a direct provider. 
Private sector schools are generally known for a more efficient provision of 
education (Andrabi et al. 2008) and they have played a prominent role in filling the 
gaps in the provision of education services (PSLM 2011). Yet private sector schools 
lack all the necessary resources to address the educational challenges without the 
state’s support. Recognition of this interdependence supported the formation of PPPs 
across all three case studies. 
With respect to the ways in which interdependence affects the IORs in each case, the 
impact of interdependence is mediated through partners’ motives for entering a PPP. 
PEF and its private sector partners, for example, are dependent on one another to 
deliver education services. PEF’s primary focus is to enter into PPPs so as to take 
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advantage of the resources of private sector parties whilst exercising their control 
over the rules of partnership. PEF’s partners have varying motives to enter into a 
partnership with PEF. These contrasting motives play a significant role in shaping 
the IORs in PEF’s PPPs. In the case of AAS PPPs, both public and private sector 
parties are interdependent and enter into PPPs with diverse motives which affect the 
resulting IORs. The ways in which these motives shape IORs are discussed in detail 
in section 8.5. 
 Institutional pressures 8.4.2
It can be argued that all the PPPs studied in the context of this research faced 
institutional pressures of different types with varying intensity. Taking PEF first, 
PPPs lie at the core of its existence under the Punjab Education Foundation Act 
2004. PEF receives funding from many different donors such as DFID and the World 
Bank, who emphasise working in partnerships to meet educational needs. Hence, 
working in PPPs increases PEF’s access to funding. PEF partners experience 
somewhat different institutional pressures. Knowing that they would be able to offer 
free education to children and get paid by PEF for their services was an incentive to 
work in partnership with PEF. In many cases partners also mentioned that working 
with PEF, an autonomous public sector organisation, enhanced their visibility, 
reputation and image in the community. 
ITA aims ‘to address educational bottlenecks through timely resource mobilization’ 
(ITA 2012a) and it acts as a platform to mobilise the resources from various sources. 
Working with the LDG education department increases the credibility of ITA and 
enables ITA to capitalise on resources from multiple channels including 
communities, the corporate sector, philanthropists, expatriates and many multilateral 
and bilateral donor organisations. It was mentioned by ITA’s leadership that donor 
organisations and the corporate sector are more willing to contribute money if it is 
spent on state schools. This becomes an institutional pressure for ITA to work in 
partnership with government education departments. Although none of the 
institutional pressures to enter PPPs were directly mentioned by either the LDG 
education officials or head teachers of the adopted schools, it could be argued that 
LDG entered PPPs to demonstrate the norms of cooperation in view of the donor 
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push towards involving all sectors of the society to deal with Pakistan’s educational 
challenges. 
Before getting into partnership with the LDG, CARE had established three of its own 
schools providing education to more than 3000 children (CARE 2012b). CARE 
didn’t face institutional pressures with respect to funding agency requirements, 
because their funding base largely consists of donations by local and expatriate 
individuals. In the case of corporate donors, CARE’s leadership reported being very 
selective and choosing donors without strings in order to stay independent. 
Nevertheless, getting into a PPP with the LDG expanded CARE’s network 
significantly, and enhanced CARE’s image, visibility and profile in the community 
and education sector. 
 Reputation 8.4.3
The reputation of partners seems to play a significant role in the case of CARE’s 
partnerships with the LDG. CARE was one of the pioneers adopting state schools in 
1998. CARE’s reputation and experience in providing access to education for many 
under-privileged children acted as an enabling factor when initiating the CARE and 
LDG partnership. Due to its good reputation, CARE takes pride in its work and 
considers it as their main strength. This level of confidence was useful in forming the 
CARE-LDG PPPs but it is sometimes seen as interference by head teachers in 
adopted schools. Some of these head teachers complained that CARE officials 
consider that they are superior and more knowledgeable and do not take into account 
their own vast experience. Though the LDG education department and state schools 
are known for their inefficiencies and inabilities to provide quality education, getting 
into a partnership relationship with a government institution enhances the reputation 
and visibility of private sector partners, and hence was seen as a favourable factor to 
establish partnerships. 
In 2005 when PEF launched its PPP programmes not many private sector school 
owners were willing to enter into a PPP relationship with PEF. This was mainly due 
to a fear that partnerships were a tactic by the government to take hold of their 
schools, as happened in 1972 when a democratic government nationalised a large 
number of education institutions run by the private sector (Bano 2007). The 
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leadership of PEF at the time of restructuring made concerted efforts to develop a 
trusting relationship with its private sector partners to restore the reputation of public 
sector. Although the PEF model focuses on pre-defined terms of partnership and 
formal mechanisms ensuring hierarchical accountability, some of the early private 
sector partners reported more interactive processes where they were involved in 
various programme activities which helped in building trust between PEF and its 
partners. Once PEF gained a good reputation in the education sector, many more 
private parties were willing to enter into partnership with PEF. The greater 
availability of willing partners and a change in PEF’s management altered the PEF 
officials’ perspective towards private sector partners with less emphasis on 
collaborative IORs. 
With respect to PEF’s partners, reputation doesn’t seem to play any significant role 
either in the PPP formation or on the nature of IORs. PEF selects partners on the 
basis of pre-defined criteria given by its BOD. The criteria give no weighting to 
reputation of private parties. The PEF partnership model and its requirements on 
partners are applied to all partners regardless of their reputation. For example, all 
partners are subject to the same reporting requirements and same monitoring process 
irrespective of their reputation. 
The inception of ITA was based on the ‘Adopt-a-School programme’. Under the 
banner of Whole School Improvement Programme (WSIP), ITA started adopting 
state schools. Hence it was not the reputation of ITA but the reputation of its leader 
and founder that played an enabling role in the formation of the ITA-LDG PPPs. 
This is discussed further under organisational factors in section 8.6. 
 Sector differences 8.4.4
As expected public and private sector differences lie at the heart of the PPPs in all 
the case studies. PEF officials generally feel that being a public sector organisation 
they cannot delegate their power to control the PPPs. There is division of 
responsibilities at the outset and the PPPs are regulated through continuous 
monitoring, which fits with the value patterns of hierarchy. PEF officials consider it 
their duty to make sure that the funding provided to the private sector partners is used 
to fulfil the goals of the PPPs to safeguard the primacy of the public interest. For this 
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reason, they do not hesitate to spend money on the monitoring of partners. PEF’s 
controlling stance results in contractual IORs from PEF’s side. Although public 
interest seems to be important for PEF’s partners too (at least in the case of not-for-
profit partners), they seem to be interested in seizing this opportunity to gain 
financial benefits too. Keeping in view that the target market for most of the PEF’s 
private sector partners was the lower income groups; they generally viewed PPPs 
with PEF as an opportunity to serve the underprivileged sectors of the society while 
getting paid for their services by the public sector. This allowed them to minimize 
the financial risks of getting involved in the education of children from lower income 
families. Control by PEF was perceived differently by different PEF partners 
(discussed in section 7.5.1 of Chapter 7) resulting in diverse IORs. 
Sector differences were one of the main causes of conflict in the CARE-LDG PPPs. 
CARE’s leadership seemed quite upset with the centralized and hierarchical nature of 
the education department. They were wary of political risks, such as changes in the 
government and its policies, and argued that the state system restricts innovative 
solutions. At school level, the role of head teachers is an important determinant of 
IORs. Due to the hierarchical nature of the public sector education department, the 
MoU of the CARE-LDG PPP was negotiated between the top management of the 
district and the leadership of CARE. The staff in adopted schools, who lie at the heart 
of PPP implementation and management, were not included in this interaction. This 
is particularly problematic given that PPPs involve various actors at different levels. 
LDG education officials and head teachers of the adopted schools also had some 
concerns that could be linked to sector differences. These officials had a strong 
orientation towards continuity and when CARE tried to introduce changes, such as 
change in the medium of instruction, it did not fit in with their ways of working. 
Being public sector officials, they were not willing to relinquish their control, which 
generally resulted in conflictual IORs especially during the first year of partnership. 
Sector differences do not appear to be an issue in the ITA-LDG PPPs due to ITA’s 
policy of no confrontation and willingness to adapt. This leads to cooperative IORs 
in almost all schools adopted by ITA. 
212 
 
The ways in which contextual factors influence the formation of PPPs and IORs 
across all three case studies is summarised in Table 8.3. 
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Table 8.3: Contextual factors: a comparative analysis of the case studies 
 CARE-LDG ITA-LDG PEF’s PPPs 
Interdependence CARE is unable to pursue its mission without 
interacting with government education department 
 
Government education department is unable to 
provide access to quality education to every child 
without the help of the private sector 
ITA is unable to pursue its mission without 
interacting with government education 
department 
 
Government education department is unable to 
provide access to quality education to every 
child without the help of the private sector 
PEF is unable to provide education on 
its own 
 
PEF’s partners generally face lack of 




CARE not required to enter into PPP with LDG but 
partnership with government enhances CARE’s 
image, visibility and profile in the community and 
education sector 
 
LDG entered into partnership with CARE to 
demonstrate norms of cooperation in view of 
broader push towards PPPs 
ITA is required to enter into PPP with LDG 
(and other district governments) to meet 
funding bodies’ expectations 
 
LDG entered into partnership with ITA to 
demonstrate norms of cooperation in view of 
broader push towards PPPs 
 
 
PEF’s access to funding is based on 
working in PPPs 
 
Partnership with PEF enhances 
partners’ visibility, reputation and 
image in the community  
 
Reputation CARE’s good reputation is an enabling factor to 
form CARE-LDG PPP. The good reputation of 
CARE cultivates a sense of internal pride which is 
sometimes seen as interference by head teachers of 
adopted schools 
 
Despite public sector failure in addressing the need 
for quality education, getting into partnership with 
government education department enhances the 
reputation and visibility of private sector partners, 
and hence was seen as a favourable factor to 
establish partnerships 
It was not the reputation of ITA but that of its 
leader that acted an enabling factor for ITA-
LDG PPP 
 
Despite public sector failure in addressing the 
need for quality education, getting into 
partnership with government education 
department enhances the reputation and 
visibility of private sector partners, and hence 
was seen as a favourable factor to establish 
partnerships 
Dubious initial reputation of PEF 
obstructed PPP formation but resulted 
in early attempts to develop more 
collaborative IORs. The good 
reputation that PEF gained over time 
facilitated PPP formation but made 
IORs more contractual 
 
Reputation of PEF’s partners doesn’t 
seem to play any significant role either 
in PPP formation or in the nature of 
IORs 
Sector differences Differences between the public and private sector 
constrain collaborative IORs 
Differences between the public and private 
sector do not seem to constrain collaborative 
IORs 
Differences between the public and 




8.5 Motives to enter PPPs 
The data confirms that resource scarcity and interdependence may induce either 
cooperation or the desire for control driven by reciprocal and power acquisition 
motives respectively. With respect to the former, entering into a partnership 
relationship is led by the desire to exchange resources with one another (reciprocal 
motives). Whereas from a control point of view, interdependence prompts efforts to 
exert power, influence or control over the resources of others in order to generate 
required resources (power acquisition motives). 
Taking PEF’s PPPs first, PEF exerts control over its partners; holds partners 
accountable for the terms agreed in the MoU; can impose penalties on private sector 
partners in the case of non-compliance with the MoU terms and conditions; is 
resistant to relinquishing autonomy and control; and is reluctant to adapt according to 
the needs of the partners. There is enough evidence in the case study to suggest that 
PEF enters into PPPs with power acquisition motives which leads to contractual 
IORs. 
The diversity of PEF’s partners makes it quite complex to explain the motives with 
which PEF’s partners enter into PPPs. For example, there are some partners who 
enter into a partnership relationship with PEF with a clear understanding that PEF is 
a public sector body which gives them money and they have to perform according to 
the PEF’s requirements. They are not expecting a relationship based on equality and 
they enter into the partnership with the motive of enhancing their legitimacy or 
increasing their efficiency. On the other hand, there are some PEF’s partners who 
enter into a PPP with PEF with reciprocal motives and want to play an active role in 
planning and decision-making. They become upset due to the dominance of PEF. 
This difference in partner motives is an important factor that shapes the varying 
IORs. 
A cross-case comparison can extend this analysis of how interdependence as a 
contextual factor has different effects on the IORs.  The AAS model of PPPs, to 
which the other two case studies (CARE and ITA) belong, provides a contrast. In this 
model of partnership, reciprocal motives drive both public and private sector parties, 
resulting in more symmetrical balance of IORs. Although LDG experiences 
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interdependence similar to PEF, both public and private sector parties considered 
inter-organisational exchange of resources as crucial for achieving their individual as 
well as their partnership goals and there was mutual agreement on the rules 
governing partnership. However, the motives to enter a PPP interact with some 
organisational factors (discussed in section 8.6) when seeking to explain the IORs. 
This is the reason that although both CARE and ITA generally enter with reciprocal 
motives and operate under a similar model of PPP, their PPP set-up and management 
is different. 
It is found that although reciprocity may be seen as a sufficient reason for entering a 
relationship with LDG, the organisational factors introduce some other motives for 
CARE and ITA choosing to enter PPPs. To illustrate, CARE’s management 
understands that their mission, to empower under-privileged children with a 
marketable education, is impossible to achieve without working with the government 
education department. They are well aware that it is more efficient to adopt 
government schools to pursue their mission rather than building CARE’s own 
schools. This clearly links the motives of reciprocity with those of efficiency. 
Similarly, for ITA the incentive to pursue mutually beneficial relations interacts with 
a desire to enhance its organisational legitimacy and stability. ITA is involved in 
many initiatives to mobilise diverse stakeholders in the education sector as a part of 
its mission. Many donors are now providing funding to NGOs through the state 
which obliges NGOs to get into some kind of relationship with the state. Hence, 
working in partnership with the government education department enhances ITA’s 
legitimacy and stability by increasing its access to funding from various sources. 
Due to the non-involvement of school staff in the PPP set-up phase, the head teachers 
and other staff in both CARE and ITA adopted schools enter PPPs with the motives 
of necessity. This generally results in conflictual IORs in CARE adopted schools 
especially during the first year and there is evidence of strong resistance from the 
school staff against the PPPs. Realising the fact that the staff in adopted schools are 
not involved in the process of PPP set-up, ITA puts in efforts to clarify any concerns 
and builds trust at the very outset. As a first step, ITA tries to fill the gap left by the 
LDG education officials by conducting a sessions with students and staff of the 
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adopted school entitled ‘Hopes, Fears, Expectations and Desires about the 
partnership’. This helps ITA to make everyone at school familiar with the PPP 
scheme and it is taken as an opportunity by ITA to address any concerns or doubts in 
the minds of government staff at school. Conducting such a session is a critical step 
towards building cooperative IORs in an environment of mistrust and suspicions 
about ITA and the PPP. The head teacher of the first state school adopted by ITA 
appreciated ITA’s approach which made it easier for her and others at school to 
overcome their doubts about the presence of ITA in the school. 
The analysis of interaction among different motives to enter PPPs is especially 
enlightening when explaining the difference in the nature of partnership and IORs in 
the PPP models of CARE and ITA. Due to its motives to enhance legitimacy and 
stability, it is in the interest of ITA to build cooperative IORs with the government 
officials both at district and school level, which is reflected in the PPP set-up and 
management by ITA. 
The comparative analysis of motives to enter PPPs across the three case studies is 
encapsulated in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4: Comparative analysis of the motives to enter PPPs 
 CARE-LDG ITA-LDG PEF’s PPPs 
Motives to 
enter PPPs 
Both CARE and LDG 
education department 
enter PPPs with the 
motives of reciprocity; 
the motives of necessity 
on the part of head 
teachers in adopted 
schools resulted in 
conflictual IORs in the 
first year of these PPPs 
 
The reciprocal motives 
of CARE mainly interact 
with those of efficiency, 
and legitimacy motives 
appear to be secondary 
Both ITA and LDG 
enter PPPs with the 
motives of reciprocity; 
the IORs were 
cooperative despite the 
motives of necessity 
on the part of head 
teachers in adopted 
schools 
 
The reciprocal motives 
of ITA mainly interact 
with the requirement 
to enhance legitimacy 
and stability 
PEF enters with power 
acquisition motives; 




The motives to enter 
PPPs vary across 
different PEF partners 





8.6 Organisational factors 
The characteristics of the organisations entering into partnership arrangements have a 
significant impact on the IORs. Important organisational factors are its organisation 
identity, leadership, organisational culture and structure, and sources of funding. 
Together these shape the internal dynamics of the organisations entering a PPP 
relationship and these in turn have important implications for the IORs in PPPs. 
 Organisation identity 8.6.1
At a basic level the mission of all public and private sector parties involved in the 
PPPs tends to revolve around two major themes: increasing access and delivering 
quality education (see Box 8.1). Nevertheless, it is possible to tease out some 
important differences under these overarching themes. The data analysis shows that 
each party has its own operationalisation of the term ‘quality’ shaped by their 
respective vision and mission. In the case of CARE, for example, delivering quality 
education primarily means improving the management of adopted schools and 
enhancing the learning levels of children. This is the reason that CARE takes on the 
management responsibility of the adopted schools. Whereas for ITA, quality broadly 
refers to the provision of technical support to the adopted state schools and creating a 
‘safe learning environment through school rehabilitation’ (ITA 2012a).  
The interviews with the LDG education officials and some government documents 
suggest that the government education department doesn’t seem to have any 
distinctive vision and mission apart from a general view of the provision of quality 
education as a means of developing society and the Pakistani nation. This helps to 
explain why CARE and ITA are instrumental in shaping the MoUs of the 
partnerships. With respect to the goals of the partnerships and expected contribution 
of private sector partners, the operationalisation of the term ‘quality’ varies at 
different levels of the government. At the provincial level, it seems that private sector 
partners could contribute anything towards improving the quality of education in 
adopted schools. Whereas the interviews conducted with district officials and the 
head teachers of adopted schools suggest that for them improving the quality of 
education involves undertaking infrastructure improvements; providing furniture, 
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science labs and computer labs; addressing the shortage of teachers; and providing 
some training opportunities to teachers. 
Box 8.1: Stated missions of the different parties involved in PPPs 
State 
Our education system must provide quality education to our children and youth to enable 
them to realize their individual potential and contribute to development of society and 
nation, creating a sense of Pakistani nationhood, the concepts of tolerance, social justice, 
democracy, their regional and local culture and history based on the basic ideology 




To provide a quality marketable education to every child in Pakistan and to empower 
children with a solid education, with the hope to make them better, more productive 




To actively pursue universal access and standard setting in education as a comprehensive 
learning experience for human evolution and consciousness by creating contemporary 
education systems for all children without discrimination due to gender, class, age, religion, 
color and ethnicity and, endeavoring to address educational bottlenecks through timely 
resource mobilization and influencing of public policy (ITA 2012a). 
 
PEF 
The promotion of quality education through Public Private Partnership, encouraging and 
supporting the efforts of private sector through technical and financial assistance, innovating 
and developing new instruments to champion wider educational opportunities at affordable 
cost to the poor (PEF 2012). 
 
For CARE, providing ‘quality marketable education’ and achieving ‘remarkable 
results’ are the main features of its mission which seems to be the reason that 
CARE’s PPP model emphasises the learning levels and exam results of pupils. Due 
to its focus on learning outcomes, CARE takes a direct approach which is sometimes 
seen as interference by the district officials, especially the head teachers of the 
adopted schools. ITA’s model of partnership focuses primarily on implementing 
donor-funded initiatives in adopted schools, which are seen as an opportunity to gain 
grassroots level experience that could be used for policy advocacy at the federal and 
provincial level of the state. ITA has quite an enabling and facilitative approach and 
focuses on building cooperative IORs at all levels. Most of the head teachers in ITA 
adopted schools appreciated that ITA does not interfere much and provides resources 
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for the improvement of schools. While comparing CARE and ITA, a head teacher of 
ITA adopted school expressed her opinion as: 
I know CARE has adopted many government schools but comparatively 
ITA is far better than CARE, as whenever we heads meet with each other 
and have discussion, we get to know that ITA is far better than CARE. In 
CARE's model they have their IC who sticks to the school all the time 
and even observes teachers while they are taking classes (ITA-HT-04). 
The stated mission of PEF also has some implications for the nature of PPPs and 
IORs. ‘Quality education’ and ‘affordable cost’ are quite important for PEF, and 
PPPs are sought as a mechanism to achieve these. The effect of these is quite 
apparent in the way the partnership model is designed around the notion of quality 
and outcomes. There are many clauses in the MoU which require partner schools to 
improve the quality of education and PEF adopts monitoring as a management tool to 
ensure that the terms of the contract are met by private sector partners. 
As expected, in view of the diversity of PEF’s partners, the vision and mission varies 
considerably across different partners. Here, it is useful to go underneath the 
umbrella term ‘private sector’ because difference in organisational mission can be 
broadly separated on the basis of for-profit and not-for-profit partners. Generally 
speaking, the vision and mission of not-for-profits was found to be more compatible 
with that of PEF, but it didn’t have any significant effect on the resulting IORs from 
PEF’s side. PEF stresses a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach which undermines the effect 
of its partners’ vision on IORs and they remain contractual for all private sector 
partners. Nevertheless, the willingness of PEF’s partners to adapt and their need for 
collaboration in PEF’s PPPs is coloured by their respective organisation identities (as 
shown in Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7). This is why despite PEF’s universal approach the 
resulting IORs between PEF and its partners are different. 
 Leadership 8.6.2
Leadership is an important factor shaping the nature of PPPs and IORs in CARE and 
ITA case studies. The leaders of both CARE and ITA are founders of the respective 
NGOs. They have played a prominent role in shaping the mission of their 
organisations and their PPP models. Seema Aziz, Chairperson and founder of CARE, 
strongly believes that it is not the lack of resources but the mismanagement of 
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resources that is the main constraint in ensuring quality education for everyone. She 
seems to have faith in the strengths of the country and its people and is against 
approaching foreign donor agencies for any funding (referring to it as a ‘wicked 
foreign donor concept’ in her interview). Such an approach is reflected in CARE’s 
more locally-based funding sources and in the way it capitalises on indigenous 
human resources by engaging students from reputable colleges and universities to 
work with the CARE team in its schools. 
Baela Raza Jamil, leader and founder of ITA, believes that in order to address the 
educational challenges in the country it is important to mobilise resources from all 
possible sources. Therefore, ITA actively seeks different sources of funding. This 
seems to have a direct link with how ITA perceives its role in PPPs where less 
attention is paid to addressing educational needs in a manner that is sustainable over 
time. The difference in the approach of both leaders is one factor to explain the 
difference in the nature of PPPs and IORs in ‘Adopt-a-School’ model. 
From the LDG side, the leadership in adopted schools (i.e. the head teachers) plays 
an important role in shaping the IORs. Given CARE’s direct role in adopted schools, 
the IORs are dependent on the attitude of the head teachers towards the CARE-LDG 
partnership, and vary across adopted schools (explained in section 5.6.2 of Chapter 
5). 
Leadership is an important factor that influences the nature of the partnership and 
IORs in the case of PEF too, though not as strongly as in the case of CARE and ITA. 
One explanation of this is that CARE and ITA are NGOs and the founders are still 
the leaders. On the other hand, PEF is a public sector body. PEF’s executives are 
appointed for a fixed period of time and then are moved to another government 
department. Moreover, they have a limited impact on the ways in which the PPP 
programmes are managed. 
As mentioned earlier, not many private sector partners were initially willing to enter 
into partnerships with PEF due to the fears of nationalisation. A lot of PEF’s partners 
from the early days of PEF reported that at that time the leadership of PEF used to 
visit them frequently and engage with them in many ways to build collaborative 
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IORs. These PEF partners kept comparing the old and new leadership at PEF, and 
mentioned that the interactive part of IORs has been lost in this transition. The 
interviews conducted with the current occupants of the executive positions of PEF 
seemed to endorse these view. It was found that PEF officials have considerable 
fears about the opportunistic behaviour of private sector partners that breeds lack of 
trust. Most of them were of the view that the private sector partners’ main objective 
is to make profit and they want to take advantage of PEF’s resources to pursue their 
own objectives. Such views are very typical and could be referred to as shared 
attitudes about the private sector partners which significantly impede the process of 
building trust among PEF and its private sector partners. 
 Organisational culture and structure 8.6.3
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the organisational culture and structure of partner 
organisations were not a part of the initial framework for this thesis and this emerged 
as a factor that influences IORs in PPPs. Due to this, the nature of the comments 
around these factors might vary in terms of consistency as compared to some other 
factors. 
The organisational cultures at CARE and ITA were linked to the vision of their 
leaders. Nevertheless they varied in terms of how strongly the views were shared 
throughout the organisation. Taking CARE first, Seema Aziz has been successful in 
infusing her vision so deeply in her team that even the words, sentences and stories 
told in response to some questions were similar across the CARE team interviewed 
for this research. For example, the ICs frequently quoted Seema and her mission and 
this is indicative of a well-established organisational culture at CARE. Seema takes 
pride in CARE’s work and capabilities, and so does the rest of the team. Perhaps due 
to the experience of education provision at CARE’s own schools, Seema strongly 
believes that ‘we can fix everything’ and this belief was found to be shared by many 
CARE officials too. 
The intense pride in the organisation’s strengths and reputation cultivates a sense of 
superiority amongst CARE officials which results in lack of willingness to adjust and 
compromise on their approach towards partnership. This is particularly evident in 
cases of conflict where CARE officials report to have a policy of no confrontation 
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but nevertheless stick to their viewpoint during negotiations. As mentioned earlier, 
this attitude is sometimes seen as barrier to building trust and has direct implications 
for the nature of IORs. 
There are some values and beliefs that are strongly held at ITA too. ITA’s founder 
and Director Programmes, Baela, also has a firm belief in the policy of no 
confrontation but prefers solving problems through open-minded discussions. The 
policy of no confrontation is a significant factor in building cooperative IORs with 
government staff, especially at school level. ITA’s  job descriptions explicitly 
mention ability to develop ‘cordial working relationships’ with relevant government 
officials (ITA 2012b; ITA 2012c). There are examples where ITA has changed or 
even dropped an initiative when there was no agreement on it from the school side. 
As expected such an enabling and facilitative approach acts as an effective 
mechanism in establishing a sense of equality and nurturing trust. This helps ITA in 
gaining cooperation from the grassroots level. All head teachers interviewed during 
this research, including those who were quite sceptical about ITA’s contribution, 
generally reflected positively on ITA’s conduct. 
The impact of organisational culture of adopted schools is stronger in the case of 
CARE as compared to ITA. This is mainly due to the nature of CARE’s PPP 
management in adopted schools. Due to their day-to-day interaction with the adopted 
schools, CARE officials encountered experiences such as some government teachers 
bringing their children to schools and some of the school students being asked to take 
care of these children. CARE stopped such activities in adopted schools which was a 
cause of conflict at times. The IORs in the case of ITA-LDG PPP, on the other hand, 
were not much affected by the organisational culture of the government education 
department or the adopted schools due to its facilitative approach. 
In PEF’s PPPs, the organisational culture of private sector partners affects the IORs 
in some fundamental ways. Some of them tend to believe that PEF is a superior party 
in this partnership and they should comply with the terms and conditions laid by 
PEF. To them, ‘it is a great gesture of PEF to consider them partners when they are 
just delivering services on PEF’s behalf’. While some others consider themselves on 
a par with PEF and believed that it is necessary to maintain collaborative IORs in 
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order to call this relationship ‘a partnership’. These differences in organisational 
beliefs affect the private sector partners’ willingness to cooperate and relinquishing 
autonomy and hence influence IORs. 
Being a public sector organisation accountable to various bodies, PEF seeks to 
maintain its integrity and reputation. PEF has positioned itself as a public sector body 
which has its own organisational culture that is distinct from usual public sector 
bodies. There are two main characteristics that make PEF standout from the other 
public sector bodies: being performance oriented and corruption free. These two 
features are referred to both by PEF and its partners as distinct from usual public 
sector organisations. PEF strives hard to ensure transparency and objectivity in its 
processes. In order to reduce the chances of corruption, some of PEF’s activities are 
outsourced too, conducting QATs for example. Not surprisingly, such an 
organisational culture leads to more reliance on formal rules and detailed contracts to 
govern the relationship with partners. 
This type of organisational culture coupled with a relatively inflexible and 
bureaucratic organisational structure reinforces professional norms among PEF 
officials that restrict the development of informal understandings and interpersonal 
ties. One example of this is reflected in PEF’s policy whereby PEF monitors are not 
allowed to take any personal benefit as small as even a glass of water from their 
private sector partners. This restricts PEF officials from getting involved in informal 
interactions and building IORs based on a spirit of equality. Consequently, even after 
series of interactions over time ‘personal relationships’ do not ‘supplement formal 
role relationships’ and IORs remain formal. This creates a communication barrier 
between PEF and its partners which impedes the development of trust between both 
parties. 
By contrast, a relatively flexible NGO structure supports the development of 
informal interpersonal relationships between public and private sector actors in the 
AAS model of PPPs. Accordingly, over time NGO and government staff seem to get 
familiar with one another as people, and they appear to rely on ‘interpersonal 
relationships’, rather than ‘inter-role relationships’. This generally supports the 
building of trust which is directly associated with a lower perceived need for formal 
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contractual or legal safeguards. Likewise, in the majority of schools adopted by 
CARE and ITA head teachers did not feel the need to read the partnership MoU.  
 Sources of funding 8.6.4
Sources of funding affect organisational culture by shaping organisational autonomy 
and priorities, which in turn affect the way PPPs are set-up and managed. Funding 
from international development bodies mostly has some strings attached to it which 
set a framework for partnership working and patterns of interaction, which may or 
may not be consistent with an organisation’s own mission. This is evident in the case 
of ITA where reliance on diverse sources of funding becomes a main factor in 
determining the nature of the IORs in ITA-LDG PPPs. By contrast, the reliance of 
CARE on philanthropic donations as a main source of funding has enabled it steer its 
own cause as they are not accountable to or dependent on donor agencies. This has 
an impact on the working philosophy of CARE. Unlike the more short-term, project-
based approach adopted by ITA, CARE commits to a long-term relationship with 
adopted schools. 
Given that most of the initiatives undertaken by ITA are donor funded, it is necessary 
to work in close consultation with donors when deciding on the nature of 
interventions in a given project. This links with the type of IORs in ITA-LDG PPPs. 
ITA involves officials from the district government education department and 
schools at points where the project is already in a final form to be implemented, and 
hence there is not much input from the government side in project design and 
planning. The emphasis is on getting approval to implement the projects in state 
schools and keeping schools and LDG informed about what ITA is doing in adopted 
schools. The study of the MoU between ITA and LDG also corroborates this idea, 
although there are quite a few clauses in the MoU which make it essential for ITA to 
implement initiatives and take decisions in consultation with the state officials, there 
is no clause in the MoU that requires ITA to design its projects or interventions in 
consultation with state officials. Nevertheless, ITA maintains cooperative IORs due 
to its willingness to adapt according to the needs of district education officials and 
head teachers of the adopted schools. 
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PEF draws most of its funding from the provincial government and international 
donor agencies, and hence it is accountable to various bodies for meeting the 
performance targets. Most public sector organisations in Pakistan are blamed for 
corruption in their processes. Being a public sector organisation, PEF is very careful 
to maintain its integrity and strives hard for this. Accordingly, PEF maintains formal 
and contractual IORs with its private sector partners and PEF officials are restricted 
from taking any personal benefit from PEF’s partners. 
While PEF, CARE and ITA have multiple sources of funding, PEF’s private sector 
partners vary in terms of single or multiple sources of funding which becomes a 
factor influencing IORs. Complete reliance on PEF for funding became a point of 
contention and conflict in several instances, resulting in conflictual IORs. However, 
the IORs tended to be less conflictual in the case of partners with alternate sources of 
income who are hence less reliant on PEF to meet their expenditures.  
LDG education department gets its budget from the provincial government which is 
then allocated to all state schools in the district. Though the PPPs with the private 
sector make additional resources available to the adopted schools they do not include 
direct provision of funding by private sector partners. Hence, from the government 
side the sources of funding do not seem to play any significant role in shaping the 
IORs in schools. 
A comparative analysis of organisational factors shaping IORs in three cases studies 
is summarised in Table 8.5. 
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Table 8.5: Organisational factors influencing the IORs: a comparative analysis of the case studies 
 CARE-LDG ITA-LDG PEF’s PPPs 
Organisation vision 
and mission 
Differences in organisation vision and 
mission of partners make it difficult to 




Compatible vision and mission or 
partners facilitates cooperative IORs 
 
 
PEF’s vision and mission makes it difficult 
to develop collaborative IORs 
 
The vision and mission of PEF partners 
didn’t have any significant effect on the 
resulting IORs  
Leadership CARE’s leadership approach and lack 
of willingness to adapt is sometimes 
seen as a barrier to build collaborative 
IORs 
ITA’s leadership approach supports 
cooperative IORs 
Leadership is important factor in PEF’s 
PPPs but PEF’s executives they have a 
limited impact on the ways in which the 
PPP programmes are managed, they are 
appointed for a fixed period of time and 





Difference in organisational culture 
and structures makes it difficult to 
build collaborative IORs 
 
 
ITA’s organisational culture supports 
cooperative IORs 
 
Differences in organisational culture and 
structure do not affect IORs due to ITA 
policy of no confrontation and 
willingness to adapt 
The organisational culture and structure of 
PEF make IORs more contractual 
 
Organisational culture affects the private 
sector partners’ willingness to cooperate 
and relinquish autonomy which is a factor 
shaping IORs 
Sources of funding Lack of reliance on donor agencies for 
the provision of funding makes CARE 
autonomous and does not become a 
factor to influence the IORs 
 
From government side the sources of 
funding do not seem to play any 
significant role in shaping IORs 
Due to reliance on donor agencies for 
the provision of funding, the IORs are 
influenced by the requirements of the 
donors 
 
From government side the sources of 
funding do not seem to play any 
significant role in shaping IORs 
Due to reliance on donor agencies for the 
provision of funding, the IORs are 
influenced by the requirements of the 
donors 
 
Single or multiple sources of funding 





The dominance of PEF and contractual IORs, as in principal-agent relations, is 
supported by interviews, process observation and documentary evidence. The IORs 
in the two AAS PPPs are characterised by a more symmetrical balance of 
relationships. However, the nature of IORs is quite different in the two AAS 
schemes. The ITA-LDG PPPs closely resemble a principal-principal relationship and 
signify cooperative IORs due to the willingness of both sides (especially ITA) to 
make adjustments in response to the needs of partnership. The CARE-LDG PPPs can 
also be referred to as a principal-principal relationship because no one party is 
consistently dominant over the other and there are intense interactions amongst 
public and private sectors (both at district and school level) to jointly realise the 
goals of partnership. Nevertheless, there is evidence that at some critical points 
CARE tends to be reluctant to adjust according to the views of its public sector 
partners. 
The set of factors discussed in this chapter are interlinked and shape the IORs in an 
overlapping fashion. All case study organisations were unable to generate enough 
resources in order to pursue their mission and were faced with institutional pressures 
of different types with varying intensity. The impact of the contextual factors, 
however, is mediated through the motives to enter into a PPP arrangement. These 
motives are influenced by both contextual and organisational factors and it is the 
interplay between different sets of factors that help to explain the IORs in PPPs. For 
CARE reciprocal motives interact with those of efficiency more strongly than the 
need for its enhanced legitimacy (which appears to be secondary). For ITA, on the 
other hand, the reciprocal motives mainly interact with the desire to enhance its 
legitimacy and stability. This difference is influenced by organisational factors 
including organisation mission and sources of funding which are linked to the 
leadership of CARE and ITA. 
PEF and its private sector partners are also interdependent and are subject to 
institutional pressures to enter PPPs. The interdependence provokes power 
acquisition motives on the part of PEF whereas its private sector partners enter PPPs 
with diverse motives which are instrumental in shaping the IORs. The organisational 
228 
 
factors at PEF, such as a bureaucratic organisational structure and a widely shared 
belief about the need to control the opportunistic behaviour of private sector partners, 
prevent the development of informal interpersonal relationships between PEF and its 
private sector partners. This leads to contractual IORs in PEF’s PPPs. Due to the 
diverse motives and organisational factors of PEF’s partners, their views of these 
contractual IORs tend to vary as conflictual or cooperative. 
Despite the diversity apparent in the IORs, all PPPs have achieved some synergistic 
outcomes which could not be achieved by each partner working alone. This suggests 
a need to revisit the established link in the PPP literature between collaborative IORs 
and synergic outcomes of PPPs. This issue is discussed in the next chapter along with 
other comparisons and contrasts between the findings and the existing literature.  
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Chapter 9 Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, the conceptual framework developed for this research suggested the 
key characteristics of IORs in contractual and collaborative PPPs, and proposed that 
context, motives to enter and organisational factors are the important factors that 
shape the IORs. It was highlighted that there is a strong thread in the existing 
literature which argues that in order to achieve the synergistic benefits of PPPs it is 
important to maintain collaborative IORs. Such IORs are characterised by 
participative decision-making, shared power arrangements, reciprocal accountability, 
joint determination of partnership activities and trust. By promoting collaborative 
IORs it is assumed that the resulting balance of IORs will be symmetrical (a 
principal-principal relationship) and no one party to the partnership will be dominant. 
It was argued in Chapter 1 that the focus of the existing PPP literature is on the set-
up and performance of PPPs, to the detriment of their relational aspects (Weihe 
2010; Jones and Noble 2008). Due to a dearth of research into the relational side of 
PPPs, the conceptual framework for this research was developed in Chapter 3 by 
integrating ideas from the PPP, IOR and the mainstream organisation theory and 
behaviour literatures. Whilst there are other frameworks which take into account 
some of the factors included in the conceptual framework for this thesis, to date only 
limited efforts have been made to integrate these sets of factors in order to explain 
the nature of IORs in PPPs. 
This chapter discusses the characteristics of IORs in PPPs and how different factors 
interact and shape these. In doing so, it comments on the extent to which findings 
from the cross-case analysis support or extend the arguments found in the existing 
literature. The purpose of the discussion is to consider how and why IORs differ in 
these PPPs and what their implications are for achieving synergistic PPP outcomes. 
Section 9.2 discusses the nature of IORs in PPPs. The factors shaping the nature of 
IORs are discussed in the sections 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5. Based on the discussion in these 
sections, section 9.6 examines the dynamics of IORs in PPPs, with particular 
attention paid to how various factors interact in this dynamic process. The 
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penultimate section reviews the link between IORs and the synergistic outcomes of 
PPPs. It counters an apparent pro-collaboration emphasis in the existing PPP 
literature by documenting and explaining the benefits associated with cooperative 
IORs. 
9.2 The nature of IORs in PPPs 
The thesis has drawn on a rich variety of typologies of IORs (e.g. Brinkerhoff 2002b; 
Coston 1998; Najam 2000) and focused on four main types of relationships: 
collaborative, contractual, cooperative and conflictual. Despite this, characterising 
the IORs found in the case studies is not straightforward. This is due to the inherently 
diverse nature of PPPs. Each case study partnership (e.g. CARE-LDG) is made up of 
many individual, school-level partnerships. Hence, it is hard to precisely characterise 
the IORs of the overall partnership scheme. The IORs in case of the CARE-LDG 
PPP, for instance, are sometimes conflictual and sometimes collaborative due to the 
involvement of different partner schools. In a somewhat similar vein, Coston (1998) 
and Najam (2000) argue that both governments and NGOs are not monolithic, and on 
any issue ‘different agencies and actors within the same government can nurture 
different types of relationships with a given NGO and vice versa’ (Najam 2000: 
391). Thus they acknowledge the possibility of different IORs within an overall 
partnership scheme. 
As explained in Chapter 2, there are many partnership frameworks and typologies in 
the existing literature which suggest that some types of partnerships are better than 
others. In general, these frameworks advocate that the higher the level of 
collaboration the better. Collaboration in partnerships is usually conceptualised as 
intensive interaction between partners as they jointly determine the rules that govern 
their relationship. Joint determination involves setting up the content of partnership 
in a collaborative manner, making joint decisions and jointly realising the objectives 
of the partnership (Klijn and Teisman 2000). However, the findings from this 
research offer more support for a related concept of joint agreement, drawn from the 
broader IOR literature (Levine and White 1961). 
Joint agreement lies at the core of cooperative IORs. It may include joint decision-
making about project scope and content, but it mainly involves seeking acceptance of 
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a priori defined rules and regulations, division of responsibilities, formal 
relationships and mechanisms to address incompatibilities. Joint agreement relies 
mainly on what Levine and White (1961) refer to as a process of orientation rather 
than negotiation. As discussed in Chapter 3, Levine and White provide a useful 
framework for thinking about the different ways in which acceptance of each other’s 
goals (‘domain consensus’) is achieved. They argue that in cases where the functions 
of interacting organisations are not clearly defined negotiations are required to reach 
acceptance. However, when the functions are more clearly specified, ‘domain 
consensus’ may be attained by a process of orientation. Some organisations choose to 
avoid negotiation and prefer orientation as a mechanism to achieve domain 
consensus because it requires minimal participation and reduces opportunities to 
challenge, debate and quibble over the terms and conditions of a potential 
relationship (Levine and White 1961). The idea of achieving domain consensus 
through joint agreement shifts the focus from developing collaborative IORs, and 
thus equality in partnerships, towards attaining agreement on the pre-defined rules 
that will govern relationships. 
Levine and White’s arguments are supported by the empirical evidence reported in 
this thesis. The cross-case analysis in Chapter 8 shows how the interplay of 
contextual factors, motives to enter PPPs and organisational factors makes PEF 
hesitant to engage with its partners in the process of bargaining or negotiating the 
terms and procedures of partnership.  PEF’s MoUs are not jointly determined, 
instead, PEF pursues domain consensus through an orientation process where they 
try to ensure that their private sector partners understand and agree to the nuts and 
bolts of the partnership arrangement. Prospective partners are introduced to the MoU 
in meetings and their questions are answered. In operating the PPPs, PEF maintains a 
mix of both ex ante frameworks (such as clearly defined standard operating 
procedures, expected outcomes, and monitoring and performance-reporting 
requirements) and ex post measures (such as orienting partners, seeking their 
feedback and suggestions and feeding these through to PEF’s Board of Directors). 
These processes of orientation and joint agreement provide opportunities for the 
partners to complement and interact with each other. This provides the basis for 
PEF’s Board of Directors to revisit and adapt the scope of the partnership without too 
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much concern for the loss of autonomy, which is often discussed as a major risk 
while working in inter-organisational arrangements (Alter and Hage 1993; Oliver 
1990). 
Loss of autonomy is sometimes seen as inevitable ‘in the face of [a] growing web of 
interdependencies that emerge with time’ (Ring and Van de Ven 1994: 108). 
However, loss of autonomy is a particular concern for many public sector 
organisations. Interactive decision-making, which lies at the heart of collaborative 
IORs, is problematic in PPPs because public sector actors tend to choose the roles 
that fit with their ‘dominant views about democracy and the role of political primacy’ 
(Klijn and Koppenjan 2000: 375). Orientation and joint agreement processes can 
provide a means of coping with these concerns in PPP arrangements. 
The PPP literature tends to draw a distinction between collaborative and contractual 
partnership arrangements and IORs. However, the case study evidence presented in 
this thesis demonstrates that there is possibility of different types of IORs within a 
contractual approach, especially when IORs are analysed from both the principal’s 
and agent’s perspectives. Taking the example of PEF’s PPPs again, although the 
IORs from PEF’s perspective are contractual and quite similar across different 
private sector partners due to its one-size-fits-all approach, these IORs can be 
characterised as cooperative or conflictual when analysed from the perspectives of 
PEF’s partners. The data also highlights that the existence of cooperative IORs 
within an overall contractual approach can produce synergistic outcomes, something 
that is underplayed in the existing literature. 
While orientation processes lie at the centre of cooperative IORs, they can also 
involve negotiation. Orientation processes are particularly prominent in principal-
agent relationships. However, reaching agreement in principal-principal relationships 
may involve negotiation in the process of gaining acceptance of each other’s goals. 
This was evident in the ‘Adopt-a-School’ (AAS) PPPs, where negotiation is found 
during different stages of partnership as partners seek to jointly agree the terms and 
procedures of the partnership arrangement. Reaching joint agreement through either 
negotiation or orientation is said to reflect ‘a resolution well within the bounds of 
acceptability’ (Warren 1967: 413). Conflict or difference of opinion may still exist 
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on some matters even though an overall agreement has been reached (Thomson and 
Perry 2006).  
Once general domain consensus is achieved, it is maintained either through 
monitoring or building trust. The ongoing use of monitoring or trust has direct 
implications for the nature of IORs. For example, the heavy use of monitoring in 
PEF’s PPPs makes these IORs more contractual than those found in ITA-LDG PPPs 
where there is more reliance on trust and IORs are viewed as cooperative by both the 
public and private sector partners. 
Overall, this thesis has found that the concepts of collaborative, contractual, 
cooperative and conflictual IORs allow us to characterise the nature of IORs in PPPs, 
but these types of relationship are not mutually exclusive.  While PPP schemes may 
be characterised in general terms using one of these types, that can mask significant 
variations in the nature of IORs in particular location, occasions and time periods. 
Based on the empirical evidence presented in this thesis, there are hitherto largely 
unacknowledged benefits of cooperative IORs. These relationships can be found in 
situations where there is an asymmetrical balance of IORs and the dominance of one 
partner. Having said this, cooperative IORs should not be considered passive or inert 
relationships where one organisation calls all the shots and the partner merely 
acquiesces and loses their own independent identity. Brinkerhoff (2002b) and Lewis 
(2000) refer to this as ‘co-optation and gradual absorption’ and ‘dependent forms of 
partnership’ respectively. Cooperative IORs are best characterised as an active 
process, a careful balancing act between being willing to adapt to partnership needs 
while still retaining one’s own organisation identity, so as to contribute comparative 
advantages to the partnership. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is common in the existing literature to arrange different 
forms of IORs and partnerships along continuums and assume or imply that IORs get 
better as one moves from one end of the continuum to the other. Rather than 
suggesting a normative continuum or hierarchy of IORs and PPPs, this thesis 
proposes that one type of PPP or IOR should not be seen as consistently or 
fundamentally better than others. It is important to view them as different possible 
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forms and then to investigate whether and how synergistic outcomes are produced 
via different forms of IORs. In this respect, I am on the same wave length as Smith 
and Wohlstetter (2006), who challenge a hierarchical perspective towards PPPs on 
the grounds that: 
A partnership that is situated at the bottom of a continuum may not be as 
meaningful a relationship as one that involves ‘cultural integration’, but it 
may also require less sacrifice from the players involved. A new way to 
differentiate partnerships is needed - one that assesses the different types 
of cooperation neutrally, so that participants may shape their partnerships 
based on their specific needs rather than on a normative perception of the 
superiority of some partnerships over others (Smith and Wohlstetter 
2006: 252). 
A further discussion of the implications of different IORs for achieving synergistic 
partnership outcomes in provided in section 9.7. The next three sections discuss the 
factors shaping the nature of the IORs in relation to the existing literature. 
9.3 Contextual factors 
The set of factors identified as contextual factors in the conceptual framework play a 
key role in supporting or blocking collaborative IORs. The initial conditions of 
interdependence facilitate the formation of PPPs and also affect IORs. Although it is 
argued by some scholars that greater dependence on the partner’s contribution leads 
to better collaborative processes (Chen 2010), it was observed that tight dependency 
of some PEF’s private sector partners on PEF to provide funding obstructed 
collaborative IORs. However, in cases when both parties were roughly equally 
dependent on each other, there were greater chances of more collaborative IORs. 
This was the situation in the case of AAS PPPs. Both CARE-LDG and ITA-LDG 
were unable to pursue their own organisational missions without interacting with one 
another, which facilitated somewhat more collaboration in these PPPs. Whilst PEF 
was also dependent on its private sector partners to achieve its goals, two conditions 
made it possible for PEF to sustain its supremacy in partnership relationships: market 
competition and capacity. The existence of a competitive market where many private 
sector parties are willing to enter into a partnership relationship with PEF does not 
always exist when a public sector organisation wants to enter into a PPP (Skelcher 
2005). Secondly, PEF acts as what Kettl (1993) calls a ‘smart buyer’ and gets into 
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PPPs on the terms and conditions decided a priori by its BOD. This enables PEF to 
maintain its dominance during all stages of PEF’s PPPs. PEF’s partners also 
experienced interdependence which activates different motives to enter PPPs, and 
this shapes the resulting IORs (an issue discussed in the section on motives to enter 
PPPs). 
While institutional pressures reinforced the formation of PPPs, they did not always 
support collaborative IORs as suggested by the literature (e.g. Sharfman et al. 1991; 
Chen 2010). Both PEF and ITA faced institutional pressures in the form of funding 
agency requirements to work in partnership, however, the IORs in both case studies 
were different. Whilst these pressures initiated reciprocity and cooperation in ITA-
LDG PPPs, they were translated into contractual IORs in PEF’s PPPs. This finding 
doesn’t fit comfortably with the existing literature that links collaborative IORs to 
institutional pressures. The analysis shows that this difference is influenced by the 
requirements of the funding agencies. Funding that is tightly outcomes-based (as in 
the case of PEF) stimulates clearly defined roles, responsibilities, quality and 
satisfaction parameters; mechanisms to hold partners accountable for contract goals; 
and performance-reporting requirements. On the other hand, when funding is tied to 
the introduction of new ideas that require more of a supportive role (as in the case of 
ITA), there are more chances for IORs to be interactive. 
This research does not provide data which directly supports a relationship between 
the level of collaboration and institutional pressures, other than funding agencies 
requirements. Nevertheless, working with respectable partners enhances the image, 
visibility and reputation of organisations and this makes more funding options 
available to them. For example, CARE’s partnership with LDG increased the 
acceptance, visibility and prestige of CARE in the education sector and this, in turn, 
increased the funding options available to CARE. 
The existing literature proposes a positive relationship between good reputation and 
both the formation of PPPs and collaborative IORs due to its causal relationship with 
trust (Van Slyke 2007; Chen 2010; Bryson et al. 2006). Good reputation of potential 
partners is associated with the formation of PPPs in this study but this does not 
necessarily result in collaborative IORs. In most cases, the good reputation of the 
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partner organisations breeds self-pride and a sense of superiority, which limits 
compromise and adjustment. In the CARE-LDG PPPs, due to CARE’s good 
reputation in providing access to education to many under-privileged children, 
CARE officials sometimes considered themselves more knowledgeable and 
experienced in ways that were detrimental to collaborative IORs. A similar trend was 
observed in PEF’s PPPs whereby the management of PEF sought more interaction 
with private sector partners in initial phases of the PPP programme but as PEF 
gained reputation less attention was paid to interaction, resulting in less collaborative 
processes. 
A contextual factor that is perhaps more important and specific to PPPs (and other 
cross-sector arrangements) are the sectoral differences of public and private sector 
parties. Since PPPs bring together organisations with different backgrounds and 
identities, their sector difference are likely to make collaborative IORs more difficult 
(Klijn and Teisman 2003). The findings from this research support this idea and there 
are many examples in the case studies which reflect problems due to sector 
differences. For example, CARE officials were used to quick and easy 
communication at different levels in their organisation and they got frustrated with 
what they saw as the ‘overly bureaucratic and too centralised’ organisational 
structure of LDG education department. They bypassed different levels in the 
hierarchy and spent more time with the DCO and EDO Education who were more 
likely to quickly respond to them, and in some cases the DCO and EDO instructed 
district education officials and head teachers of adopted schools to respond 
favourably to CARE. This approach had some important implication for the IORs in 
each school. Top management, DCO and EDO Education, were not the ones who are 
involved in day-to-day routines. Those involved in the PPPs on daily basis - staff at 
the adopted schools - saw this as bypassing their authority resulting in conflictual 
IORs in some cases. PEF’s private sector partners also shared similar experiences 
and considered PEF as a ‘highly rigid and centralised’ organisation where all powers 
reside with the BOD. In more abstract terms, sector differences made it difficult for 
individual organisations to understand the organisational routines of their partners, 
which often obstructed collaborative IORs. As an exception, sector differences did 
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not seem to influence the IORs in ITA-LDG PPPs due to differences in 
organisational factors and motives which are discussed in the next two sections. 
9.4 Organisational factors 
The analysis of organisational factors at the individual organisation level (rather than 
at the collective partnership level) has enabled insight into why it is especially 
important for some organisations to maintain their autonomy and how open they are 
to adapting to the needs of their partners and the partnership. Given that a defining 
characteristic of PPPs (and any other inter-organisational arrangement) is the dual 
identity of partners: their own distinct organisation identity and the partnership 
identity (Wood and Gray 1991; Huxham and Vangen 2005; Thomson and Perry 
2006), these questions have direct relevance for understanding the nature of IORs in 
PPPs. 
The organisation identities of partners, especially reflected in their vision and 
mission, is an important factor shaping IORs in all the PPPs studied. Whilst the PPP 
literature argues that maintaining the organisational identities of partners serves to 
preserve one’s ‘own portfolio of assets and skills’ (Brinkerhoff 2002b: 24), the IOR 
literature pays more attention to the behavioural aspects of inter-organisational 
arrangements and points out that it is difficult to maintain unique identities due to 
increasing interdependencies that develop over time (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). 
This research found that partners confronted similar dilemmas and tensions with 
respect to maintaining their individual organisational identities. At times attempts to 
preserve organisational identities made it difficult to develop collaborative IORs. For 
instance, in order to safeguard their respective comparative advantages and thereby 
maintaining their organisational identities, the management of PPPs by CARE and 
ITA reflected their distinct organisational mission and goals. This affected the degree 
of collaboration in the partnership and much of the programme management was 
found to be determined a priori without much participation of the government 
officials. On the other side, head teachers of the adopted schools, in order to maintain 
their organisational identities, persisted on doing things in their own way. This was 
not a problem in ITA-LDG PPPs due to the leader’s policy of no confrontation with 
the government officials. CARE leadership also reported having the same policy but 
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while ITA operated the policy mainly from the spirit of collaboration, CARE 
officials were found to practice the policy of no confrontation contingently, 
combining the spirit of collaboration with collaborative thuggery at the same time 
(Vangen and Huxham 2003). 
The difference in the leadership approach of the leaders of CARE and ITA 
influenced the rest of the organisation and this shaped the nature of IORs. This 
supports Murray’s (1998) argument about the influential role of leaders in affecting 
the rest of the organisation. The difference in the leadership approach of both NGOs 
is especially prominent in critical incidents. In such situations, CARE officials 
interact with the government staff at both adopted schools and district levels; but 
mostly they seek acquiescence from public sector officials (collaborative thuggery). 
Whereas in cases of any conflict at school level, ITA opts to solve problems by 
taking a discussion route rather than making it into a dispute and taking it to higher 
levels (acting from a spirit of collaboration). 
A somewhat similar pattern is observed in PEF’s PPPs too. PEF is successful in 
retaining its organisation identity due to a priori goal setting and its design of PPPs 
but this inhibits the development of collaborative IORs. PEF’s partners’ concerns 
about organisation identity varied across different partners. Nevertheless due to 
PEF’s lack of interference in the ways partners managed their internal organisational 
matters, none of the partners interviewed for this research were worried about 
maintaining their mission, goals, core constituencies and underlying values.  
The comparison of data from all three case studies suggests that although 
maintaining organisation identity may facilitate contributing the comparative 
advantages that individual organisations bring to PPPs, it can be detrimental to the 
development of collaborative IORs. This is because it seems to provoke a safeguard 
mechanism in organisations which makes it difficult for them to adjust in 
partnerships. However, being willing to compromise and even forfeit organisation 
identity, as observed in one CARE adopted school due to the passive role of the head 
teacher (see Box 5.2 in Chapter 5), is not the answer either as it restricts the 
partnership’s ability to achieve synergistic benefits. In Brinkerhoff’s words: 
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If organization identity is lost, by definition comparative advantages are 
lost, the organization loses legitimacy in the eyes of its defined 
constituencies, and its effectiveness wanes… [This can] lead to a 
diminished capacity of a partner to maximize its contribution in the 
longer run. There is no longer a strong rationale to justify the extra effort 
required for a partnership (Brinkerhoff 2003: 108). 
The comparison of data from all three case studies suggests that both too high and 
too little concern about maintaining organisation identity is problematic and can 
make it difficult to develop collaborative IORs. Hence as opposed to an emphasis on 
preserving individual organisations’ identities, this research stresses the importance 
of fostering a balance between willingness to adapt and retaining one’s comparative 
advantage. 
Differences in organisation culture and structure came out as a consistent theme 
across all PPPs, whether it was in the form of PEF’s partners’ complaints about rigid 
and bureaucratic structure of PEF or PEF’s concerns about the profit-making culture 
ingrained in its partners, or CARE/ITA’s problems in dealing with slow processes at 
LDG. The problems associated with differences in organisation cultures and 
structures become pronounced when an organisation is concerned to safeguard its 
own identity (as in the case of PEF and in some of the CARE adopted schools). 
These problems have been recognised in the extant literature (Teisman and Klijn 
2002; Klijn and Teisman 2005) and are an essential component of PPPs. 
Last but not least, sources of revenue are important and these interact with other 
factors to influence IORs. For example, when donor organisations are the main 
sources of revenue this interacts with the institutional pressure of conformity. 
Dependency on a single source of funding affects an organisation’s strategic 
decisions including its willingness to form partnerships (Oliver 1990; Alter and Hage 
1993). The effects of such reliance on IORs are mediated through partners’ motives 
for entering a PPP which are the subject of discussion in the next section. 
9.5 Motives to enter PPPs 
The research findings with respect to the motives to enter PPPs support Oliver’s 
(1990) articulation of the interaction between different motives when an organisation 
decides to enter an inter-organisational arrangement. In addition to the interaction of 
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different motives, the findings suggest that the motives of legitimacy, stability, 
efficiency and necessity can be linked to either power-acquisition or reciprocal 
motives. These two motives, in turn, colour the nature of IORs more strongly than 
other motives to enter into PPPs. For example, both PEF and ITA had the desire to 
enhance their legitimacy by entering into PPPs. However, for PEF increasing 
legitimacy was linked to power-acquisition motives as opposed to ITA where 
legitimacy motives interacted with reciprocity. This shaped the varying IORs in both 
cases studies. So, although both PEF and ITA sought legitimacy, the IORs are 
generally contractual in the former and cooperative in latter. 
Although the IORs in PEF’s PPPs are characterised as contractual, some of PEF’s 
partners view them as conflictual while other partners describe them in more 
cooperative terms. The motives to enter into PPPs differ across partners and these 
affect the resulting IORs. The IORs tend to be generally cooperative when PEF 
partners entered into PPPs mainly with the motive of enhancing their legitimacy or 
increasing their efficiency. Conversely, conflictual IORs resulted in the cases where 
partners had reciprocity motives and envisioned themselves as playing an equal role 
in programme planning and decision-making. Thus both cooperative and conflictual 
IORs can be seen as possible outcomes of a contractual relationship in the case of 
PEF PPPs. 
Although the efficiency motives of some of PEF’s private sector partners resulted in 
cooperative IORs, the same motives didn’t have the same effect in CARE-LDG 
PPPs. CARE entered into PPPs with the LDG to achieve its goals more efficiently. 
However, CARE was reluctant to adapt according to the needs of others and wanted 
to maintain its organisation autonomy in all situations. This resulted in conflictual 
IORs in most of the schools during the first year of the partnerships due to equal 
concerns to maintain organisation autonomy by head teachers of the adopted schools. 
This shows the varying effects of similar motives in different situations that can be 
explained by the interaction of different factors influencing IORs (discussed in 
section 9.6). 
The data analysis supports the argument put forward by Oliver (1990) that contextual 
factors affect the motives for forming inter-organisational arrangements. However, 
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she assumes conscious decision-making and the findings reported in this thesis do 
not totally support this. The conceptual framework for this research also considers 
the ways in which organisational factors influence the nature of IORs and it is likely 
that some organisational factors, e.g. culture and structure, do not have a conscious 
influence on decisions; they are factors which are likely to operate and influence at a 
sub-conscious level. If we only look at factors that operate at a conscious level and 
only examine intentional decisions, then we miss the things that never get 
consciously considered. Some options may be sub-consciously ruled out. 
9.6 Explaining the dynamics of IORs in PPPs 
The diversity of IORs within each of the case study PPP programmes highlights that 
it is not the contextual factors but the organisational factors and motives to enter 
PPPs that have more explanatory power to interpret the IORs. If the contextual 
factors, such as interdependence or sectoral differences, had more explanatory power 
then the nature of IORs would not have been as diverse within the PPP programmes. 
For example, different private sector partners are found to have different IORs with 
PEF, despite PEF applying its PPP model consistently across all PEF’s partners. This 
holds true across the other two case studies too. Although both the CARE-LDG and 
ITA-LDG PPPs share the same policy context and, in theory, operate under the same 
model of partnership; the resulting IORs are different within and across both case 
studies. 
The interaction between context and different motives to enter a partnership is made 
clear in Oliver’s (1990) framework. She suggests that the underlying motives of 
power acquisition or reciprocity are crucial in shaping IORs. For example, given the 
contextual conditions of interdependence and resource scarcity, an organisation may 
choose to enter a partnership based on either reciprocal or power acquisition motives. 
However, there seems to be no explanation in the existing literature of whether 
power acquisition or reciprocal motives will dominate in a given situation. The 
findings from this thesis shed some light on this. They suggest that the interplay 
between contextual and organisational factors is an important part of the explanation. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, although the contextual conditions for both PEF and ITA 
were characterised by interdependence and institutional pressures, differences in 
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their organisational factors resulted in the dominance of power acquisition motives in 
the case of PEF as opposed to ITA’s reciprocal motives. 
To add to the complexity, the IORs in PPPs do not remain static and are subject to 
change with the passage of time, as suggested by Ring and Van de Ven (1994). In all 
three case studies, the IORs developed and changed over time. For example, since 
district and school level officials were not involved in any negotiations in the PPP 
set-up phases of ITA-LDG and CARE-LDG PPPs, they felt as if the partnership 
relationships were enforced on them by higher authorities. This restricted their 
understanding of the goals of partnership, the nature of each other’s roles and 
responsibilities, and the motives and trustworthiness of partners. As a result the 
initial IORs in the adopted schools were typically characterised by 
misunderstandings and conflicts. The IORs at school and district level started 
changing when the partners started working together and became more familiar with 
one another. The IORs changed quite quickly in ITA-LDG PPPs and became more 
cooperative within a short period of time. In the CARE-LDG PPPs it took more time 
to build favourable IORs. As explained in Chapter 8, this difference can be explained 
by comparing various organisational factors and partner motives for ITA and CARE. 
Whilst the relationship between contextual factors and motives is well-established in 
the IOR literature (Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the data analysis for this 
thesis suggests that the ways in which different motives interact is also driven by the 
organisational factors. As discussed in section 9.4, organisational factors such as 
leadership and organisational culture influence individual actors’ willingness to 
change and their concerns over organisational autonomy. So for example, in the case 
of ITA-LDG PPPs, the motives of stability and legitimacy interacted with reciprocal 
motives mainly due to the leader’s policy of no confrontation and this, in turn, 
reduced concerns about organisational autonomy and increased the readiness of the 
organisation to adapt according to the needs of partnership. This interplay between 
various factors shaped the IORs in ITA-LDG PPPs. 
In summary, this research proposes that motives to enter PPPs, shaped by contextual 
and organisational factors, play a significant role in influencing the ongoing nature of 
IORs. Contextual and organisational factors operate in the background and 
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continuously shape motives, but it is motives which play a more direct role in 
shaping the IORs. The achievement of synergistic outcomes also shapes the ongoing 
nature of IORs. Partners began to value the educational PPPs when they started 
realising the value-added outcomes of these, and this influenced their ongoing 
willingness to cooperate. The next section discusses the link between IORs and 
synergistic outcomes in PPPs. 
9.7 IORs and synergistic outcomes 
The departure point for this research was the argument that improving the level of 
collaboration in PPPs would enhance synergistic outcomes by taking advantage of 
the strengths of both the private and public sectors (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and 
Teisman 2005; Peters 1998). The concept of synergistic outcomes (also referred to as 
added value or collaborative advantage in the existing literature) has been measured 
across two dimensions: 1) the qualitative or quantitative added value created by a 
PPP that could not be achieved by each partner working alone and 2) the extent to 
which partner organisations perceive that they are able to meet their own 
organisational objectives through a PPP arrangement.  
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, several conceptual frameworks in the existing 
literature have contrasted PPPs with contractual arrangements (Klijn and Teisman 
2000; 2005; Koppenjan 2005). These frameworks tend to argue that symmetry and 
highly interactive processes are what PPPs should be striving for. Some PPP scholars 
go as far to claim that contractual PPPs are not really PPPs (Klijn and Teisman 
2005). 
Although this research confirms the importance of interactive processes in PPPs, 
given the hybrid nature of PPPs it seems too harsh a judgement to conclude that 
partnerships with an asymmetrical balance of IORs should not be labelled as PPPs. 
None of the educational PPPs investigated in this research exhibited collaborative 
IORs in the ways identified by the literature. Although the IORs were close to being 
collaborative in some CARE adopted schools, even in those schools the element of 
joint determination of partnership activities was absent. However, there was evidence 
of at least some synergistic outcomes in all three case studies. While PEF’s PPPs are 
typically characterised by PEF’s dominance and contractual IORs (from PEF’s 
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perspective), they have delivered substantive improvements in school education – 
including improvements in school facilities, and the access, attendance and 
performance of pupils – that could not have been delivered by either partner working 
alone. As mentioned earlier, some of PEF’s private sector partners were willing to 
accept PEF as the dominating partner because they still considered that there were 
enough opportunities within the PEF model for the public and private sector partners 
to interact and work with each other. The resulting IORs have been described as 
cooperative and productive, in that they resulted in synergistic outcomes that could 
not have been achieved by each partner working alone. Furthermore, PEF’s private 
sector partners who had cooperative IORs reflected very positively on the extent to 
which they were able to meet their own organisational objectives through the PPP 
arrangement. 
These findings are contrary to the proposition that only collaborative PPPs are able to 
achieve synergistic outcomes, which raises the question of how synergistic outcomes 
are achieved in PPPs? The concept of ‘cooperative IORs’ has been found to be 
particularly helpful in explaining how synergistic outcomes are achieved in the PPPs 
studied. 
The idea of establishing and managing PPPs through joint agreement and orientation 
is enlightening. For instance, by taking the route of orientation PEF was able to enter 
into PPPs with diverse partners in ways that allowed it to control decision-making 
and maintain its organisation identity, mission and goals. The resulting asymmetrical 
balance of relationships did not prevent PEF’s PPPs from achieving some synergistic 
outcomes. When the champions of collaborative IORs criticise principal-agent 
relationships in PPPs, they tend to focus more on the commissioning party (the 
public sector) and assume that contractual IORs will necessarily limit the ways in 
which partners can interact and complement each other (Edelenbos and Teisman 
2008; Koppenjan 2005). The research for this thesis has investigated the relational 
aspects of PPPs from the point of view of both public and private sector partners in 




The research has found that cooperative IORs involve the ability to achieve domain 
consensus while maintaining a balance between willingness to adapt and retaining 
own organisational identity. It is this careful balancing in situations of 
interdependence that makes it possible to achieve the synergistic rewards of PPPs. To 
continue with the PEF example, although PEF is dominant and demands compromise 
from its private sector partners in many situations, it doesn’t interfere in the internal 
matters of the private sector partners. This makes it possible for PEF’s partners to 
find a balance between complying with PEF’s demands while retaining their 
organisational identity and a measure of local autonomy. Whilst collaborative IORs 
assume the maintenance of symmetrical or principal-principal relationships, 
cooperative IORs are not constrained in this way. Furthermore, it is possible to 
develop cooperative IORs in principal-agent relationships (such as PEF’s PPPs) as 
well as in principal-principal relationships (as in the case of ITA-LDG PPPs). 
Finally, while emphasising the productive nature of cooperative IORs, this thesis is 
not arguing that cooperative IORs are the most effective form of relationship. More 
collaboration and symmetry in IORs might enhance the possibility of synergistic 
outcomes but this is an empirical question that cannot be answered with the available 
data. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that the relationship between symmetry and 
partnership performance is not simple and not necessarily linear. 
9.8 Conclusion 
The analysis of educational PPPs in Pakistan confirms previous suggestions that 
PPPs are not monolithic and the nature of IORs varies significantly even within one 
case study due to the involvement of diverse partners. Moreover, the IORs in PPPs 
are not static: they develop and change over time. These changes result from a 
dynamic interplay between contextual factors, organisational factors, partner motives 
and the perceived outcomes of the partnership. This chapter concludes that while 
each set of factors has limited explanatory power, together they help to understand 
and explain how and why IORs differ in PPPs.  
The analysis also reminds us that looking only at the structural aspects of PPPs may 
be misleading. If contracts are the archetype for asymmetrical relationships and 
partnerships the archetype for symmetrical relationships, this excludes asymmetrical 
246 
 
relationships from the category of PPPs. When we apply such a framework to the 
educational PPPs, mostly we end up not being able to label them as either a 
partnership or a contractual arrangement; they combine elements of both. 
The research has also explored the argument that improving the level of 
collaboration in PPPs is important because synergistic outcomes can only be 
achieved by improving the symmetry in relationships. The conclusion is that this 
argument needs to be reconsidered because in the educational PPPs studied the link 
between relationship symmetry and the realisation of synergistic outcomes was not 
necessarily linear (i.e. improving the level of symmetry does not appear to result in a 
similar increase in synergistic outcomes).  
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Chapter 10 Conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
The overarching research question for this research concerns how we can understand 
inter-organisational relationships in public-private partnerships. This overarching 
question was elaborated into three detailed research questions that aimed to develop 
an understanding of PPPs and IORs, the different factors that shape IORs in PPPs, 
and the implications of different IORs for the achievement of synergistic outcomes. 
These questions have been addressed with the aid of a conceptual framework that 
integrates relevant concepts and findings from the PPP, IOR and mainstream 
organisation theory and behaviour literatures. 
This chapter draws together the main findings and implications of the research 
reported in this thesis. The next section revisits the research questions, reaffirms their 
importance and briefly discusses the main findings of the research in relation to these 
questions. Section 10.3 critically reflects upon the research design, conceptual 
framework and methodology employed in the research. This is followed by a 
discussion of the theoretical and empirical contributions of the research and its 
implications for the policy and practice of PPPs in sections 10.4 and 10.5 
respectively. The penultimate section of the chapter suggests areas where future 
research could usefully focus. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks about 
the conceptualisation of PPPs and the study of IORs in the light of findings from the 
three cases studies.    
10.2 The research questions and key findings 
On the basis of the overarching aims of the research, the following three detailed 
research questions were framed for this study: 
1. What is a ‘Public-Private Partnership (PPP)’? 
2. How can inter-organisational relationships (IORs) in PPPs be examined and 
characterised? How do different factors influence IORs in PPPs? 




In analysing the first research question, it became clear that PPPs are diverse in 
nature and there is no consensus among scholars on what constitutes a PPP and how 
to differentiate between different partnership arrangements. Some researchers 
compare and contrast PPPs with traditional competitive arrangements (e.g. 
Koppenjan 2005; Klijn and Teisman 2005) while others arrange different types of 
PPP along continuums such as ‘low’ to ‘high’ involvement of the private sector 
(Pollitt 2003), or from an insubstantial or weak partnership arrangement to 
something more meaningful or strong (e.g. Austin 2000). These PPP typologies were 
found to be illuminating and confusing at the same time. It is difficult to read across 
them in order to understand nature of the PPPs due to a lack of consensus on their 
defining features. 
Generally speaking, the main arguments behind comparing partnerships with 
traditional competitive arrangements or arranging different PPP arrangements along 
a continuum can be boiled down to two main (often implicit) assumptions: 1) 
collaborative IORs are viewed as the relational goal of PPPs, and 2) collaborative 
IORs in PPPs are considered as a prerequisite for delivering synergistic outcomes. 
In a nutshell, on the basis of the existing literature there seems to be no definitive 
answer to the first research question about what a PPP is. Nevertheless, there is a 
need to set a boundary at least with respect to what a PPP is not. The working 
definition adopted in this thesis goes some way to setting this boundary by describing 
a PPP arrangement in a way that distinguishes it from other inter-organisational 
arrangements. It describes PPPs as a specific type of inter-organisational 
arrangement that 1) brings together a public sector organisation and any 
organisation(s) outside of the public sector (including for-profits and not-for-profits), 
2) combines the resources (including skills and knowledge) of these partners, and 3) 
delivers societal goals (Bovaird 2004; Skelcher 2005). In the light of this definition 
any public-private interaction which is not intended to achieve a societal goal is 
outside the PPP realm. Similarly the partnerships between a public sector 
organisation and government-owned or government-financed NGOs also fall outside 
this definition of a PPP (Budding et al. 2009). In view of the lack of a widely agreed 
definition of PPPs, such boundary setting is an essential first step in the process of 
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studying PPPs as it enables the researcher to identify case study examples of PPPs 
for further analysis and investigation. 
Although there is an inconclusive and ongoing debate in the literature about the 
detailed defining features of PPPs, there is a consensus among scholars that they are 
dynamic and diverse. This highlights the need to understand the diversity of inter-
organisation relationships in PPPs and how these change over time. This leads to the 
second research question about how we can characterise and analyse the IORs in 
PPPs. 
Due to the limited research on the relational aspects of PPPs, this thesis has reviewed 
the IOR literature vis-à-vis the PPP literature to help understand the IORs in PPPs. 
This led to IORs being examined and characterised as collaborative, contractual, 
cooperative and/or conflictual. These types of IOR are not mutually exclusive.  For 
example, IORs can be contractual and conflictual or contractual and cooperative. 
Similarly, IORs that may be characterised overall as collaborative may nevertheless 
show signs of being cooperative and/or conflictual at times. Furthermore, IORs 
change over time and may be viewed differently by different partners. 
In relation to understanding different factors influencing IORs, the existing IOR 
literature examines contextual factors mainly as antecedents to the formation of the 
inter-organisational arrangements (Bryson et al. 2006; Murray 1998; Doz 1996; Alter 
and Hage 1993) and suggests that contextual factors interact with an organisation’s 
motives for entering a partnership to shape IORs (Oliver 1990). The empirical 
evidence reported in this thesis supports this argument but nevertheless finds that it 
underplays the impact of organisational factors on IORs. The cross-case analysis 
identifies and explains how the interplay between contextual factors, organisational 
factors and motives shapes IORs. It suggests that while contextual and organisational 
factors mainly operate in the background, they influence not only partners’ motives 
for entering a partnership but also their ongoing actions in the management of the 
partnership. This in turn affects the resulting IORs in PPPs. 
While the PPP literature pays attention to contextual and organisational factors, it 
tends to overlook the effects of these factors on IORs. With respect to contextual 
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factors the main focus remains on the factors leading to the formation of partnerships 
and their effects on the outcomes. While this offers some important insights into the 
formation of partnerships and the factors affecting outcomes, it underplays the 
connection between the contextual factors and the nature of IORs. The analysis of 
organisational factors in the PPP literature focuses on the organisational 
characteristics of partnership arrangements. It underplays the importance of the 
organisational characteristics of participating partners and how these influence IORs.   
Turning to the third research question, the empirical evidence reported in this thesis 
questions the pro-collaboration bias found in the existing literature, which assumes 
that collaborative IORs are needed in order to achieve synergistic outcomes in PPPs. 
The authors of existing PPP frameworks (such as the composite one presented in 
Table 3.1) have argued that contractual PPPs usually only result in simple cost 
savings and that substantive improvements and innovative products and services only 
become possible with collaborative IORs. The evidence of synergistic outcomes in 
the educational PPPs investigated despite the absence of collaborative IORs
8
 in many 
instances was intriguing. It identified the need to have a richer characterisation of 
IORs than the current contractual or collaborative distinction in the PPP literature. 
This thesis argues for a classification of IORs in PPPs which moves beyond a binary 
characterisation (contractual or collaborative; asymmetrical or symmetrical). As a 
starting point it highlights the importance of ‘cooperative IORs’. Discussion of 
cooperative IORs in the public administration and management literature usually 
places these either on a continuum or at least relative to other types of IORs (e.g. 
Coston 1998; Najam 2000), implying the superiority of one type of IOR over 
another. This thesis finds that one type of IOR is not consistently or fundamentally 
better than the others, but rather provides insights into the different options available. 
Results from the case studies of educational PPPs in Pakistan suggest that symmetry 
and collaborative IORs are not essential in order to deliver synergistic outcomes. 
Instead if partner organisations are able to reach joint agreements during different 
stages of PPPs (involving interacting organisations accepting each other’s goal 
                                                 
8
 To remind the reader, collaborative IORs were operationalised with five indicators based on the 
literature: participative decision-making, shared power arrangements, reciprocal accountability, joint 
determination of partnership activities and trust. 
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through ongoing processes of orientation), there can be significant synergistic 
rewards alongside asymmetric IORs. This finding is especially relevant to PPPs 
which (unlike private-private partnerships) are usually characterised by public sector 
hegemony, where the government is reluctant to relinquish power and control in 
many (if not all) cases (Johnson and Osborne 2003; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). 
10.3 Research design, conceptual framework and methodology 
The choice of a case study research design has proved to be a suitable approach for 
this research because IORs in PPPs are an under-researched and complex 
phenomenon and case study design is generally accepted as a viable approach for 
studying complex issues (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 1994). It is not possible to isolate 
IORs from their context, and case studies are particularly pertinent when the 
phenomenon under study needs to be considered in its context (Yin 1994; 2014). The 
use of documentary sources and semi-structured interviews as the primary means of 
collecting data has also allowed a more holistic view than would have been gained 
from the use of a single method and has made is possible to minimise the pitfalls of 
each method (Patton 2002). 
Given the importance of context in case study research design, it is important to 
reflect on the relationship between the cases and context within this research. It may 
appear from the conceptual framework that the main focus of this thesis is to 
examine the ways in which contextual factors influence the IORs in PPPs in a 
unidirectional way. Nevertheless, the choice of case studies also made it possible to 
analyse the reciprocal effects of PPPs on the overall context of educational PPPs in 
Pakistan. Given that the case study organisations (particularly CARE and ITA) were 
amongst the pioneers in establishing educational PPPs in Pakistan, they were also 
creating and influencing the context in important ways. For instance, the availability 
of donor funding was not simply a ‘given’ feature of the external context but was as 
much created by the efforts of the case study organisations as they interacted with 
potential donor agencies. Hence, there was an interwoven relationship between the 




Another helpful decision was to use a conceptual framework to guide data collection 
and analysis and to incorporate the idea of progressive focusing as opposed to a 
deductive-inductive divide (Stake 1981). The conceptual framework helped to 
identify the most relevant types and appropriate sources of data. Without it there 
would have been a danger of trying to collect ‘everything’ (Yin 2014) resulting in the 
huge amount of data and information overload (Miles and Huberman 1994; Maxwell 
2013). The notion of progressive focusing ensured that the conceptual framework 
and the constructs within it were kept flexible. The data collected in the case studies 
was used not only to verify or reject the constructs but also to refine them, and to 
understand what these concepts mean for actors operating in practical situations. 
The conceptual framework, as outlined in Chapter 3, shares some similarities with 
what Meyer and colleagues refer to as configurational approaches to organisational 
analysis (Meyer et al. 1993). Similar to the configurational mode of inquiry, the 
conceptual framework for this research opts for the holistic analysis of a range of 
external and internal factors and aims to explain how these factors influence IORs in 
PPPs. For example, taking into consideration the effects of interdependence as a 
contextual factor along with the organisational motivations to enter PPPs offers a 
holistic account of the ways in which IORs develop in PPPs which is valuable both 
theoretically and empirically in order to understand the IORs. The conceptual 
framework acknowledges equifinality – the idea that there is no one way to succeed 
and that different forms can be equally effective in different settings (Meyer et al. 
1993). This idea is reflected in the findings where no specific type of IOR is seen as 
consistently better than the others unless it is embedded in an appropriate pattern of 
contextual, organisational and motivational factors. This approach is particularly 
useful in guarding against over-simplified and stereotyped causal explanations 
between different theoretical constructs whilst reflecting and making sense of the 
complex relational dynamics in PPPs. The typology of IORs (collaborative, 
contractual, cooperative or conflictual) is grounded in empirical evidence and 
synthesises the findings from the interplay of various factors. It is a classification 
which goes beyond normative descriptions. 
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Another benefit associated with considering multiple influence factors that can 
operate concurrently is to guard against over-emphasising the effects of one 
particular set of factors. Previous research on the formation of inter-organisational 
arrangement has highlighted the importance of initial conditions or antecedents of 
relationship formation and have emphasised the ways in which these foreshadow 
subsequent development of IORs. For example, Doz (1996) found that initial 
conditions play a key role in blocking or fostering subsequent learning cycles. 
Although he acknowledges that these effects are not static, the initial conditions 
remain at the centre of his alliance development path. Considering the multiple 
dimensions of influence such as contextual, organisational and motivational factors 
along with the outcomes of PPPs in the conceptual framework of this research 
endorses Ness’s findings that ‘the imprints from the initial conditions do not 
foreclose developmental paths’ (Ness 2009: 469). Rather an explanation of PPP 
outcomes depends on process and interaction patterns that change over time due to 
the dynamic interplay between several factors. Such insights would not have been 
possible without adopting a conceptual framework that encouraged the researcher to 
examine multiple dimensions of influence that occur simultaneously. Hence, this 
thesis argues that combining multiple dimensions in studying IORs is likely to 
provide more convincing explanations as compared to ‘the attempts to statistically 
isolate the effects of each contingent variable’ (Meyer et al. 1993: 1177). 
While the conceptual framework is not unique in terms of integrating various 
exogenous and endogenous factors to understand inter-organisational arrangements 
of several types, it stands out from the existing frameworks in that it analyses the 
influence of these factors as part of a holistic examination of IORs. For instance, 
Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) have developed a framework for understanding 
cross-sector partnerships that takes into account initial conditions; process; structural 
and governance components; contingencies and constraints; and outcomes. Although 
this framework draws together a range of influencing factors, it is mainly concerned 
with an examination of what makes partnerships successful and in what ways do 
these factors affect the outcomes of partnership efforts, as evidenced by the nature of 
the embedded propositions. This approach is similar to what Meyer, Tsui and 
Hinings call ‘quite simple causal assumptions [that] are usually adduced… and seen 
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as linked by linear relationships involving unidirectional causation’ (Meyer et al. 
1993: 1177). This restricts the holistic analysis of multiple dimensions. 
 Alongside all these benefits of the conceptual framework and analytical approach 
adopted in this thesis, there are some trade-offs which also need to be considered. 
First, although holistic analysis of multiple dimensions allows more congruence with 
practice, it makes the analytical process more complex and cumbersome. Each 
additional dimension brings with it more complexity and may result in an entangled 
web of themes that initially makes the analytical process unwieldy and requires much 
perseverance. Second, taking a multi-dimensional approach is particularly onerous 
and challenging within a comparative case study design that involves diverse case 
studies. A critical reflection on the cross-case analysis undertaken in Chapter 8, 
reveals that the main focus of the analysis is on themes that are common or 
comparable across all three case studies. This meant that some of the detail that was 
idiosyncratic to an individual case study (such as the parallel hierarchies of 
governance in CARE-LDG PPPs) is not pursued in as much analytical depth as 
would have occurred within a single case study analysis. There are interesting details 
and analytical strands within the individual case studies that can be pursued in 
subsequent publications relating to the case study data and in further research of the 
topic of IORs in PPPs (see section 10.6). Third, many factors cannot be 
straightforwardly compartmentalised under a single conceptual headings. For 
example, the reputation of prospective partners and sector differences are treated as 
contextual factors in the conceptual framework for this thesis. However, they could 
also be analysed as organisational factors and the future researchers may need to 
think about how best to treat some of these factors. Lastly, employing the multi-
dimensional conceptual framework developed for this thesis has entailed the 
integration of a range of factors which have different theoretical underpinnings. 
Hence, the theoretical coherence of the framework would benefit from further 
examination and development. 
Nevertheless, the conceptual framework seems to have face validity in that the 
factors identified in the framework were relevant in terms of how interviewees talked 
about the case studies. Hence, there were no particular difficulties in using the 
255 
 
framework as an analytical tool. Moreover, the framework was a useful device to 
structure the case study material as presented in Chapters 5-7. While the framework 
offers an adequate vocabulary for discussing the relational aspects of PPPs, one area 
in which it did not necessarily help was in defining the PPP phenomenon. As 
mentioned earlier, in view of problems in defining what counts as a PPP in a 
mutually agreed manner, this thesis suggests an alternative strategy of accumulating 
practical examples of PPPs, focusing on their relational practices and examining 
which practices facilitate the achievement of synergistic outcomes, which lie at the 
heart of the PPP phenomenon. Furthermore there are some aspects of the conceptual 
framework that would benefit from further development particularly around the 
characterisation of IORs which is discussed later in this chapter in section 10.6. 
The consideration of multiple dimensions in the conceptual framework has allowed a 
deeper understanding of IORs in the selected educational PPPs and has hopefully 
guarded against the twin danger of either glib appreciation or unwarranted criticism 
of PPP practice. In face of the complexity of the phenomenon under study, if a 
survey methodology had been used instead of a qualitative case study design there is 
a real danger that it would have underestimated and over simplified the complexity 
of IORs in PPPs. The findings are considered valid as they have explanatory value 
within the constructs used in the conceptual framework (Yin 1994; 2014). 
While this research was carried out in a particular context, educational PPPs in 
Pakistan, the use of multiple case study design has fostered the external validity. The 
aim was to corroborate, modify, reject or advance the theoretical concepts and 
relationships incorporated in the conceptual framework for this study. Though the 
conclusions drawn are essentially based on the analysis of data collected from 
specific case studies, the generalisations made are at a conceptual level which is 
fundamentally above the specific cases. Furthermore, the level of detail across 
different factors identified in the conceptual framework is not the same in all three 
case studies (which is almost inevitable in qualitative case studies) but the 
comparative analysis of three case studies has offered some important insights that 
are developed by working iteratively between empirical evidence and theoretical 
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constructs which lies at the heart of the process of ‘analytic generalization’ (Yin 
1994; 2014). 
The choice of research methods was not problem-free. There were challenges 
associated with collecting data from the diverse actors belonging to many different 
organisations that were involved in the case study PPPs. It took quite a long time to 
negotiate access and schedule interviews. In some cases, despite several attempts, it 
was not possible to interview some government officials at higher levels which is 
acknowledged as a missed opportunity. 
Another problem was how to compare some rather different case studies. In PEF’s 
PPPs it was the public sector organisation that was the driving force whereas in the 
case of the Adopt-a-School PPPs it was private sector organisations that were central 
to the initiatives. In view of the diverse case studies, to produce case study reports 
that did justice to the richness of data and to compile a cross-case analysis was a 
challenging task. More positively, this diversity increased the coverage of the thesis 
and served to highlight the importance of different contextual, organisational and 
motivational factors in influencing IORs. Nevertheless, it added to the complexity of 
the data analysis. It was only after several iterations between the data and theoretical 
constructs that it was possible to fine tune the analysis to answer the research 
questions and draw out the theoretical and empirical contributions of the research. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, some of the aspects of IORs which are described 
in more detail in the individual case studies were not developed further in the cross-
case analysis in order to focus on the common or comparative aspects of the case 
study IORs. These trade-offs are often mentioned by the comparative case study 
researchers (such as Eisenhardt 1989b; Ness 2009). Further analysis of some of these 
individual case study details could have resulted in a more nuanced understanding of 
relational dynamics. 
Operationalising the idea of progressive focussing, to keep a balance between 
confining the breadth of inquiry and giving attention to the emerging issues (also 
referred to as etic and emic issues respectively), was not without problems. As 
expected it resulted in a number of iterations between theory and data throughout the 
research process which was very time consuming. 
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To end on a positive note, the idea of progressive focussing facilitates a dynamic and 
non-linear research process and ‘revolves around a central idea of trying to match 
theory and reality’ (Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012: 824). It may create difficulties in 
producing 'marketable' outcomes, which can emerge more readily if one limits the 
factors to be taken into consideration (Johnson 2004). Nevertheless, a disciplined 
qualitative mode of inquiry, that appreciates complexity of factors and relationships, 
optimises the opportunity to gain a holistic understanding of the social phenomenon 
under study (Stake 1995). It also allows the researcher to enter unexplored avenues 
of study which is a daunting but rich experience. 
10.4 Contribution to knowledge 
The research reported in the thesis makes a number of contributions to knowledge. It 
sheds new light on the relational aspects of PPPs and offers an integrated conceptual 
framework for explaining and investigating IORs in PPPs. This framework integrates 
insights from the largely separate literatures on PPPs and inter-organisational 
relations whilst also drawing on the wider field of organisation theory and behaviour. 
This research finds that partners’ motives for entering into a PPP play a dominant 
role in shaping IORs. These motives are, in turn, influenced by a range of contextual 
and organisational factors. Moreover, the IORs in PPPs are not static; they develop 
and change over time. These changes result from a dynamic interplay between 
contextual factors, organisational factors, partner motives and the perceived 
outcomes of the partnership. 
As opposed to the existing binary distinction between contractual and collaborative 
IORs in the existing PPP literature, this thesis argues for a classification of IORs in 
PPPs which is more detailed in view of the diverse nature of PPPs. It has broadly 
characterised the IORs in PPPs as collaborative, contractual, cooperative or 
conflictual. Based on the rich case study data, this thesis argues that the cooperative 
and conflictual IORs can also be seen as more distinctive forms of what is sometimes 
painted with one broad brush and referred to as contractual IORs. Whereas much of 
the existing literature emphasises that collaborative relationships are a prerequisite 
for PPPs to deliver synergistic outcomes, this research finds that these outcomes are 
also found in PPPs characterised by cooperative IORs. This finding counters an 
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apparent pro-collaboration emphasis in the existing PPP literature by documenting 
and explaining the benefits associated with cooperative IORs. 
Although the 4 Cs spectrum developed in this thesis is helpful in that it extends and 
provides more nuance to the dichotomy of relationships in the existing PPP literature, 
there is a need for further articulation. Two of these relationship types (contractual 
and collaborative) are more developed and can be arranged more neatly across 
different dimensions but the overall relationship between all four is a bit sketchy and 
needs further development (discussed in section 10.6). However, it does not seem 
unreasonable to propose that the four relationship types developed in this thesis are 
likely to be the four main types of IORs that can be found embedded in PPPs. 
The research findings are an important contribution to both the IOR and PPP 
literatures. While motives are given considerable attention in the IOR literature and 
the link between motives and contextual factors is often emphasised, the relationship 
between organisational factors, contextual factors, motives and perceived outcomes 
is under-researched and this research has made a contribution in this respect. As for 
the PPP literature, it was mentioned in Chapter 3 that the PPP literature often refers 
to contextual factors as antecedents to PPP formation but underplays the motives of 
partners for entering partnerships. Given that this research finds an important role for 
motives in shaping the IORs in PPPs, it has the potential to enrich our understanding 
of the PPP phenomena by expanding the range of issues examined. 
This research also offers new empirical evidence on the operation of PPPs in a 
developing country context, which contributes to redressing the predominance of 
evidence from developed countries in the existing literature. The data from a 
developing country context highlights some indigenous factors such as the influence 
of donors and measures to guard corruption which affect IORs. With regards to the 
added value of PPPs, forcing a child to come to school to sit an exam are likely to 
sound draconian to western ears. In Pakistan most people would see this as a major 
benefit because irregular school attendance and high drop-out rates are real concerns. 
The research findings also suggest several implications for policy and practice and 
these are discussed in the next section. 
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10.5 Implications for policy and practice 
PPPs are often discussed as an important part of the contemporary public 
management agenda and their use has grown considerably across the world 
(Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002; Osborne 2000; Hodge et al. 2010). With a lot 
more emphasis on PPPs and pressures to expand universal access to education as a 
result of commitment to Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Education for 
All (EFA) agenda, PPPs have received substantial policy attention as a means to 
expand access to education in developing countries such as Pakistan. Therefore, the 
study of PPPs is of particular significance not only for theoretical but also for policy 
and practical purposes. 
The most important implication of this thesis is that PPPs come in many varieties and 
rather than letting the normative descriptions of PPPs dictate the form of 
partnerships, they should be customised according to the context, needs and 
objectives of the stakeholders. This research argues that a PPP is and should be seen 
as a productive and satisfactory inter-organisational arrangement as long as it 
achieves its goals which are mutually agreed by partners and provides evidence of 
synergistic outcomes. A PPP with low levels of collaboration but successful in 
producing added value is better than the one with high levels of collaboration but 
which struggles to deliver the expected added value. This insight should help to 
address potential concerns in the minds of those practitioners who want to engage in 
PPPs but are threatened by the loss of control and organisation identity which often 
occur as a result of interactive processes especially joint decision-making. The idea 
of maintaining cooperative IORs through a process of orientation might also help 
partners to assess each other’s trustworthiness before making further commitments 
that would require more detailed negotiation. 
Setting up and managing PPPs is difficult and challenging. There are many examples 
in the existing literature where PPPs did not achieve their goals, or they made slow 
progress, and some have been prematurely terminated (e.g. Chen et al. 2013; 
Koppenjan 2005). This thesis has, however, documented case examples where, 
despite problems, PPPs have survived and have been able to deliver synergistic 
outcomes. The case studies reported in Chapters 5-7 indicate that behind the 
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successful stories there were typically comments about the difficulties and 
frustrations that had to be faced in the initial years of the partnership. 
The good news is that in many situations these partners learned how to work 
together, and early signs of synergistic rewards made partners more enthusiastic and 
tolerant in their relationship with others. This clearly shows that IORs in PPPs are 
dynamic and instead of looking at the quality of relationships and trust as static and 
pre-installed features of PPPs, partners should be prepared to see IORs as an 
evolving phenomenon. Although this is not a new insight it is worth reiterating. 
Furthermore, this has implications for both the policy and practice of PPPs. Policy 
makers must appreciate that policy making is not necessarily an ex ante activity but 
one that needs to be customised according to the emerging circumstances. For 
practitioners it may be useful to follow the advice of Huxham (2003) who suggests 
that partners should be prepared for a continuous nurturing process to develop 
mutual understanding and trust. 
Finally, while researching this topic I have noticed a lack of knowledge transfer not 
only between theory and practice but also between different stakeholders in Pakistan. 
PPPs in Pakistan have been pushed by a donor agenda. The resulting PPPs have gone 
some way towards pooling the resources and expertise of different parties. However, 
there are no serious efforts in Pakistan to learn from the success and failure of 
different PPP initiatives. This was particularly apparent when I attended some of the 
seminars arranged by ITA. Whilst many educational NGOs, public sector education 
officials and policy makers were invited to these seminars to share their experiences, 
many of them did not arrive much before their scheduled time for presentation and 
they left soon after making their own presentations. These were not effective forums 
for learning across initiatives. There is a need for better knowledge transfer and 
shared learning given the huge educational challenges faced by Pakistan. A more 
systematic and institutionalised approach to sharing knowledge and experience might 
facilitate this process. 
10.6 Lessons for future research 
This thesis signals some ways in which future research could be directed to increase 
our understanding of PPPs. First of all, the thesis suggests that it would be beneficial 
261 
 
to direct more research towards understanding the relational aspects of PPPs. This 
thesis has taken one step in this direction but there is a need to investigate these 
issues in PPPs for other public services, such as health care, in order to find out what 
type of IORs are present in those PPPs and the ways in which they influence 
synergistic outcomes. Future research should take into account the factors identified 
in the conceptual framework and should explore those factors that emerged 
inductively in this thesis, such as organisational culture and structure, in a more 
systematic way. 
Given the lack of research on the motives to enter (and remain in) PPPs, further 
research is needed to enhance our understanding of the dynamics of these motives 
throughout different stages of PPPs. This thesis focused on the ways in which 
motives, along with other factors, influence the IORs in PPPs. It has not investigated 
in depth the ways in which motives change over time. Further research on how 
motives and IORs change during the course of a PPP is needed. A longitudinal 
research design is needed to develop a deeper understanding of these aspects and I 
would like to undertake future research in this direction. 
The typology of IORs developed in this thesis also needs further work. As mentioned 
earlier the relationship between different types of IORs suggested in this thesis needs 
further development. Amongst the various ways in which the further articulation and 
disentangling of IORs can proceed in future is to consider whether these relationship 
types are best described using cumulative approach as adopted by Himmelman 
(1996) or a multi-faceted characterisation used by Gulati, Wohlgezogen and 
Zhelyazkov (2012). However, the best choice is still unclear and this is what I would 
like to explore in a further study. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the analytical 
approach adopted while undertaking the cross-case analysis mainly focused on 
themes that were common or comparable across all three case studies. There is a 
scope for further analysis of the individual case study data and the researcher intends 
to consider this in future publications to add more nuances to our understanding of 
IORs in PPPs. 
Lastly, it is important that future research pays attention to integrating the findings 
from all three perspectives on the operation of PPPs: structural, economic and 
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relational. Integrating all these perspectives will both increase the sophistication of 
future research on PPPs and enrich our understanding of the phenomena by 
expanding the range of issues examined. Some scholars have already identified the 
value of understanding PPP from different perspectives (Duffield 2010) and there is 
a need to build on this. 
The suggested agenda for this work is daunting. Nonetheless, given the increasing 
proliferation of PPPs as a policy tool to overcome societal problems, the need for a 
more comprehensive approach to PPPs is inevitable and the opportunities for 
learning are abundant. 
10.7 Concluding remarks 
This study has investigated IORs in PPPs by using a case study research design and 
employing qualitative data collection methods. The research has focussed on the 
relational aspects of PPPs which have not received enough attention in the existing 
PPP literature. A conceptual framework for understanding IORs in PPPs was 
developed. This comprises a range of contextual factors, organisational factors and 
motives to enter PPPs that shape IORs. The resulting IORs can be collaborative, 
contractual, cooperative or conflictual. Contextual and organisational factors 
influence partners’ motives to enter PPPs and to continue to participate in them. This 
is an ongoing and dynamic process, such that IORs change over time. 
This thesis places no restrictions on the type of IORs that should be embedded in 
PPPs. Thus there are no a priori stipulations on how often partners should interact 
with each other, how decision-making should be done, or what should be the balance 
of IORs. These remain empirical questions but they should not dictate what counts as 
a PPP. What distinguishes one PPP from another or might make one PPP superior to 
another is whether it achieves the desired synergistic benefits, which are often 
claimed as the ultimate goal of getting involved in PPPs or any other inter-
organisational arrangements (Klijn and Teisman 2005; Brinkerhoff 2002a; Huxham 
and Vangen 2005).  
Although synergistic outcomes have received considerable attention among PPP 
scholars, much of the literature suggests that building collaborative IORs is a 
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prerequisite for achieving these outcomes. This research finds that these outcomes 
are also found in PPPs characterised by cooperative IORs. This finding counters an 
apparent pro-collaboration emphasis in the existing PPP literature by documenting 
and explaining the benefits associated with cooperative IORs in PPPs. Instead of 
looking at a dichotomous division between contractual and collaborative IORs, this 
research argues for a richer articulation of IORs. It is crucial to recognise diversity 
and value it rather than simplifying and generalising PPP practice with normative 
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Appendix A: Interview guide 
(Please note that these are not necessarily all the questions asked nor 
were all of these questions necessarily asked from each interviewee) 
Preamble (to be read to all interviewees): 
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. My name is Sidra Irfan. I am a 
lecturer at University of the Punjab and currently I am undertaking my PhD studies 
at The University of Edinburgh. I am carrying out this research as a part of my PhD. 
You have been approached because this research requires information from people 
who are working in public-private partnerships in the education sector of Pakistan. I 
would like to ask you a few questions regarding your partnership. There are no right 
or wrong answers. If you do not wish to answer a question, please just say so and I 
will simply move on to the next one. I would like to use a digital recorder to record 
our conversation but if there is anything you would like to say ‘off the record’ please 
just say so. Direct quotations from your interview may be used in my PhD thesis or 
publications from the study but your name will not be attached to them. Having 
heard about this research, are you still happy to participate? If you have any 
questions, please ask me now and I will do my best to answer. 
 
1. Can you please introduce yourself (qualification, experience etc.) and briefly 
describe your main responsibilities in this partnership? 
2. What is your organisation’s mission and goals? 
3. What are your organisation’s major strengths and weaknesses? 
4. Who are your organisation’s primary constituencies? What are the sources of 
funding for your organisation? 
5. For how long are you in partnership with (the relevant organisation)? 
6. What is the mission of this partnership? What is this partnership for? (Do your 
partners understand what this partnership is for?) 
7. What are/were your organisation’s motives or objectives for participating in this 
partnership?(Any interdependencies) 
8. Do your partners understand your organisation’s mission, operations, and 
constraints? 
9. Do you understand your partners’ mission, operations, and constraints? 
10. What do you contribute to this partnership? (Do you think it is your/ your 
sector’s strength? Is it acknowledged by your partners?) 
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11. What does your partner(s) contribute to this partnership? (Do you think it is the 
strength of your partner(s)? Can your organisation contribute this to the 
partnership?) 
12. Do all partners possess the necessary capacity to effectively participate and 
contribute to the partnership?  If not, what is lacking? 
13. Do you feel you and your partners are compatible (e.g., mission and goals, 
management styles, constituencies, core values)? 
14. Are there mechanisms in the partnership to address incompatibilities among the 
partners? 
15. Are there any external constraints that prevent partnership working and success?  
16. How are the goals of partnership determined? (Are goals of the partnership 
mutually determined and agreed?) 
17. Do the partners meet regularly to review, revise as needed, and assess progress in 
meeting identified goals? 
18. Do you think that partners in this partnership share a common vision for the 
partnership? 
19. Does participating in the partnership compromise or promote your organisation 
identity?  (please provide examples) 
20. What kinds of adjustments have you made in order to participate and promote the 
effectiveness of this partnership? 
21. Have your partners adjusted in response to your concerns about compromising 
your strengths and identity? 
22. Do you feel your organisation has changed as a result of this partnership?  If so, 
how? 
23. How far do the standard operating procedures govern partnership’s day-to-day 
implementation? 
24. Within this partnership, does your organisation prefer the predictability of SOPs 
and written agreements over informal arrangements? Why? 
25. How are the decisions made about partnership? Is your organisation’s view 
considered equally in decision-making? 
26. Is there any dominating partner(s) who controls the majority of resources and 
opportunities in the partnership? (If yes, do other partners challenge dominating 
partner(s)? Can you give examples) 
27. Are partners reciprocally accountable (i.e., each is accountable to all of the 
others)?  
28. Do all partners participate actively in meetings? Are all (representatives) free to 
speak up and play an active role? 
29. Do you think your organisation has an equal opportunity to participate in the 
programme activities of the partnership? 
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30. Do you think this partnership is characterised by some degree of trust among 
partners? (please provide examples) 
31. What does collaboration in the partnership mean to you? What would you 
consider to be the indicators of collaborative relationships in PPPs? 
32. What is the degree of conflict within the partnership? (Substantial/inhibiting, 
Annoying but manageable, Easily resolved) 
33. What is the frequency of conflict within the partnership? 
34. Do you think that the partnership as a whole embraces (or at least does not 
discourage conflict), seeking to reveal it in order to do effort to resolve 
differences and contribute to trust building and learning? 
35. Do partners freely express their views and preferences despite the risk of 
conflict? 
36. What do you think the partnership provides in terms of added value, beyond what 
an independent organisation could provide? 
a. Can you provide any quantitative examples? 
b. Can you provide any qualitative examples? 
37. Has the partnership resulted in enhanced linkages with other programmes and 
actors?  If so, please give examples. 
38. Is the partnership better able to influence other actors than the individual partner 
organisations?  Please provide examples. 
39. Are there any other examples of multiplier effects of the partnership. 
40. Has your organisation attained the objectives for participating in this partnership? 
Is your organisation satisfied with the progress in attaining these benefits? 
41. Can you provide evidence of meeting your objectives?  How will you know if 
you have met them? 
a. Quantitative examples or potential indicators. 
b. Qualitative examples or potential indicators. 
42. Has your organisation’s performance been enhanced by your participation in the 
partnership? If yes, please provide examples. If no, can you suggest why?  
 
End (to be read to all interviewees): 
Thanks very much for your time. It has been very useful talking to you. Before we 
finish, is there anything that you think is important about this partnership but I have 
not asked about it. Can I contact you in future if there is anything I want to ask you? 
(If yes, take contact details)  
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Appendix B: List of interviewees 
 
 Key informants 
Director Punjab Resource Management Programme (PRMP) 
Former Directorate Public Instructions (DPI), Elementary Education Punjab 
Director Community Participation Programme 
Chief Projects Planning & Department PPP cell 
 
Punjab Education Foundation (PEF)  
MD Both current and former 
DMD Operations  
  
PEF-FAS (Foundation Assisted Schools) 
Carried out as initial case study 
  
FAS Director   
FAS Programme Coordinator 2 
FAS Programme officers and Monitors 5 
FAS School owners 9 
  
PEF-EVS (Education Voucher Scheme)   
EVS Director   
EVS Programme Officer and monitors 2 
EVS School owners 6 
  
PEF-NSP (New School Programme)   
Deputy Director NSP   
NSP School owners 2 
  
PEF-CPDP (Continuous Professional Development Programme) 
CPDP Director   
Deputy Director   






Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education 
(CARE) 
Chairperson   
Head of Academics   
Head of Management   
Area managers 4 
Cluster Managers (CM) 4 
Academic Internal Coordinators (AIC) 2 
Internal Coordinators (ICs) 7 
Head Teachers 7 




Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi (ITA)  
Director Programmes   
Provincial Programme Coordinator   
District Manager   
Education Promoter   




Lahore District Government Education Officials  
(at district level) 
Director Public Instructions (DPI), Elementary Education Punjab 
Deputy Secretary Secondary Education 
District Education Officer Male Elementary Education (DEO MEE)  
District Education Officer Secondary Education (DEO SE) 
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District Education Officer Male Elementary Education (DEO MEE)  
Deputy District Education Officer Women Elementary Education (DDEO WEE) 
Assistant Education Officer (AEO) 
Total                                                                                            7 
 
 





Appendix C: List of important documents 
 
Level 1 
1. Accelerating Economic Growth and Reducing Poverty: The Road Ahead 
(Government of Pakistan 2003) 
2. Pakistan Policy On Public Private Partnerships 2009 
3. Public Private Partnership (PPP) Strategy for the Social Sectors in the Punjab 
2008-09, Punjab Devolved Social Services Programme (PDSSP) 
4. White Paper On Public - Private Partnerships, Punjab Devolved Social 
Services Programme (PDSSP) 
Level 2 
1. National Education Policy 2009 (Government of Pakistan 2009) 
2. Pakistan Education Statistics 2010-11 (Government of Pakistan 2011) 
3. Public Private Partnerships in the Education Sector: Education Sector 
Reforms Action Plan 2001-2005 (Government of Pakistan 2004b) 
4. Education Sector Reforms Action Plan 2001-02 – 2005-06, Ministry of 
Education 
5. Chief Minister’s School Reforms Roadmap, Government of Punjab 
6. Education Emergency Pakistan 2011, The Punjab Education Task Force 
7. Punjab School Education Sector Plan 2013-2017, School Education 
Department, Government of Punjab 
8. Partnerships for Equity in Education in South Asia: Prospects and 
Challenges, 2011 
9. Annual Statistics of Education Report (ASER) 2011 
Level 3 
1. Public-private partnerships in education: lessons learned from the Punjab 
Education Foundation (Malik 2010) 
2. The Punjab Education Foundation Act 1991 (Government of Punjab 1991) 
3. PEF’s partnership MoUs 




5. FAS minutes of meetings 
6. Some PEF circulars 
7. List of state adopted schools 
8. CARE Foundation - Factsheet as on 01-Apr-2012 
9. The CARE model: better school management in practice 
10. CARE achievement history 
11. CARE-LDG MoU 
12. CARE rules 
13. ITA brochure, Education: a comprehensive agenda for children, youth and 
adults 
14. ITA Job Description: Education Promoter 
15. ITA Job Description: District Manager 
16. ITA-LDG MoU 
 
 
